DEFENCE 


BRIGADIER  GENERAL  HULL. 


DEFENCE 


BRIGADIER  GENERAL  W.  HULL. 


Delivered  before  the  General  Court  MaitiaJ.  of  which  Major  General 
Dearborn  was  President,  at  Albany,  March,  1814. 


WITH  AN 
ADDRESS   TO  THE    CITIZENS    OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


WRITTEN  BY  HIMSELF. 
Copied  from  the  original  Manuscript,  and  published  by  his  authority. 


To  which  are  prefixed, 

THE  CHARGES  AGAINST  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  HULL,  AS 
SPECIFIED  BY  THE  GOVERNMENT. 


BOSTON  I 

PUBLISHED  BY  WELLS  AND  LILLY. 

Court-Street. 

1814. 


DISTRICT  OF  MASSACHUSETTS,  TO  WIT  : 

District  Clerk's  Office? 

BE  it  remembered,  that  on  the  ninth  day  of  June,  anno  domini  eighteen  hxin- 
dred  and  fourteen,  and  in  the  thirty-eighth  year  of  the  independence  of  the  Uni 
ted  States  of  America,  William  Wells  and  Robert  Lilly  of  the  said  District. 
Jiave  deposited  in  this  office  the  title  of  a  book,  the  right  whereof  they  claim  as 
Proprietors,  in  the  words  following,  to  wit :  » 

Defence  of  Brigadier  General  William  Hull.  Delivered  before  the  general 
Court-Mart ial,  of  which  Maj.  Gen.  Dearborn  was  President,  at  Albany,  March, 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fourteen.  With  an  Address  to  the  Citizens  of  the 
United  States.  Written  by  himself.  Copied  from  the  original  manuscript,  and 
published  by  his  authority.  To  which  are  prefixed,  the  Charges  against  Gene- 
I'al  Hull,  as  specified  by  the  Government. 

r  In  conformity  to  the  Act  of  the  Congress'of  the  United  States,  intitled  "An  Act 
for  the  Encouragement  of  Learning,  by  securing  the  copies  of  Maps,  Charts  and 
Books,  to  the  Authors  and  Proprietors  of  such  Copies,  during  the  times  therein 
mentioned ;"  and  also  to  an  Act  intitled,  "  An  Act  supplementary  to  an  Act, 
iutitled,  an  Act  for  the  Encouragement  of  Learning,  by  securing  the  Copies  of 
Maps,  Charts  and  Books,  to  the  Authors  aad  Proprietors  of  such  Copies  during 
the  times  therein  mentioned  ;  and  extending  the  Benefits  thereof  to  the  Arts  of 
Designing,  Engraving  and  Etching  Historical,  and  other  Prints." 

WILLIAM  S.  SHAW, 


ADDRESS 


TO  THE 


CITIZENS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


Fellow-Citizens, 

IN  submitting  my  defence  to  your  consideration, 
and  in  making  my  appeal  to  your  judgment,  I 
have  only  to  ask  you  to  examine  with  candour, 
and  decide  with  impartiality.  I  am  sensible  the 
fate  of  one  man  is  of  little  consequence,  compared 
to  the  fate  of  a  nation. 

If  the  sacrifice  of  me,  however  innocent,  could 
make  atonement  for  the  sins  of  others,  redeem 
our  misfortunes,  and  restore  the  national  charac 
ter,  it  might  be  justified  by  precedents  in  other 
countries,  and  perhaps,  as  a  patriot,  I  ought  to  be 
satisfied.  It  is  unfortunate  for  the  administration, 
and  for  the  other  generals  who  have  conducted 
our  armies,  that  it  cannot  have  the  effect.  In  coun 
tries,  where  the  people  are  hardly  permitted  to 

*: 

A" 

M187286 


iv  ADDRESS  OF 

* 

think,  and  their  only  prerogative  is  obedience,  in 
nocence  is  no  shield  ;  and  because  there  can  be  no 
inquiry,  the  most  elevated  merit  is  often  brought 
to  the  scaffold  for  the  most  meritorious  conduct. 
But  in  a  country  where  justice  is  the  basis  of  its 
government,  where  the  people  are  enlightened  by 
science,  and  understand  both  their  rights  and  du 
ties,  such  outrages  on  justice  cannot  with  impu 
nity  be  committed. 

Under  a  government  thus  constituted,  whew 
public  misfortunes  occur,  those  to  whom  the  ad 
ministration  is  intrusted  are  in  the  first  instance 
responsible.  They  well  know  the  public  ven 
geance  will  fall  on  them,  unless  they  avert  it,  and 
too  often  have  no  other  means  of  justification,  but 
in  the  condemnation  of  others.  The  power  they 
possess,  and  the  patronage  they  can  give,  afford 
great  facilities  in  effecting  the  object.  It  is  how 
ever  our  happy  lot,  that,  when  this  power  and  pa 
tronage  are  unjustly  exercised,  a  remedy  exists  ; 
and  that  remedy  is  an  appeal  to  your  justice.  To 
that  justice  I  now  appeal,  in  the  confident  expec 
tation,  that  you  will  be  satisfied  of  the  purity  and 
rectitude  of  my  conduct,  that  you  will  reverse 
the  unjust  sentence  which  has  been  pronounced 
against  me,  and  restore  me  to  that  honourable 
standing  in  society  j  which  had  been  acquired  by 
the  services  of  nearly  half  a  century. 


GENERAL  HULL.  v 

I  regret  that  it  is  not  in  my  power,  in  this 
communication,  to  present  to  you  all  the  testimo 
ny  and  documents,  on  which  my  defence  is 
grounded,  and  which  had  any  relation  to  the  trial. 
The  proceedings  of  the  Court  Martial  are  depo- 
gited  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  De 
partment  of  War,  and  by  law  I  am  entitled  to  a 
copy  of  them.  As  soon  as  they  are  obtained, 
they  will  be  published  in  a  separate  number. 

1  believe  we  are  all  conscious  of  the  crimes  of 
which  we  are  guilty.  When  I  might  have  shel 
tered  myself  in  the  enemy's  territory,  as  a  priso 
ner  of  war,  I  ask  you  to  account  for  my  return 
to  my  own  country  on  any  other  principle,  than 
a  consciousness  of  rny  innocence,  and  that  I  had 
faithfully  done  my  duty  ?  What  other  principle 
could  have  induced  me  to  have  requested  an  in 
vestigation  of  my  conduct  ?  When  a  Court  Mar 
tial  was  ordered  to  assemble  at  Philadelphia  for 
my  trial,  why  did  I  promptly  repair  there,  with 
out  any  restraint,  and  without  even  having  been 
divested  of  my  sword?  After  the  trial  was  post 
poned  by  the  government,  without  any  request  on 
my  part ;  and  having  before  that  time  received 
notice  of  my  exchange  from  the  government,  why 
did  I  remain  more  than  a  year  in  the  country, 
without  any  restraint  or  confinement  ? 


vi  ADDRESS  OF 

When  the  new  court  was  ordered  for  my  trial 
at  Albany,  and  I  was  furnished  with  the  volume 
of  capital  charges,  exhibited  against  me  by  the 
government,  why  did  I  voluntarily  appear  before 
the  Court,  and  submit  to  my  trial,  when  it  was  in 
my  power  so  easily  to  have  avoided  it  ?  Why, 
after  the  trial,  did  I  return  alone  and  unattended 
to  my  residence  in  Massachusetts,  and  there  wait 
the  sentence  of  the  Court  Martial  ? — I  do  presume 
your  answer  must  be,  that  this  conduct  only  could 
have  resulted  from  a  consciousness  of  innocence, 
and  a  full  conviction  that  I  had  done  my  duty. 

I  now  ask  you  to  consider  the  conduct  of  the  go 
vernment,  in  relation  to  me.  Did  they  believe  the 
black  catalogue  of  charges  they  exhibited  against 
me  was  true  ?  If  they  did,  could  the  administration 
have  been  justified  in  leaving  me  at  perfect  liber 
ty,  for  more  than  a  year  after  I  had  been  furnish 
ed  with  a  copy  of  these  charges  ?  Did  the  mem 
bers  of  the  Court  Martial,  who  pronounced  the 
sentence,  in  their  consciences  believe  I  was 
guilty,  and  deserved  punishment?  If  they  did, 
how  can  their  conduct  in  directing  me,  the  day 
after  the  sentence  was  concluded,  to  return  to 
my  home  in  Massachusetts,  without  any  kind  of 
restraint,  and  without  requiring  any  kind  of  secu 
rity  for  my  appearance  to  receive  the  execution 
of  the  sentence?  This  direction  was  given  the 


GENERAL  HULL.  vii 

day  after  the  sentence  was  passed.  Can  it  be 
presumed  there  was  a  concert  between  the  Presi 
dent  and  the  Court,  and  he  had  directed  the  Court 
to  adopt  this  measure  previous  to  the  sentence? 
Is  it  possible  it  was  understood  between  the  Pre 
sident  and  the  Court,  previous  to  the  conclusion 
of  the  trial,  what  the  sentence  should  be,  and  that 
it  should  be  remitted  by  him?  And  if  both  the 
President  and  the  Court  had  believed  in  their 
consciences,  I  had  been  guilty  of  the  crimes  with 
which  I  was  charged,  could  it  be  reconciled  to 
their  duty  to  leave  me  in  a  situation,  where  I  could 
so  easily  avoid  the  punishment  which  was  to  have 
been  inflicted  ? 

I  have  stated  these  facts,  and  made  these  ob 
servations,  to  convince  you,  that  my  whole  con 
duct  has  manifested,  I  myself  was  conscious 
of  no  crime,  and  it  was  not  the  intention  either 
of  the  President,  or  the  Court  Martial,  that  I 
should  receive  the  punishment  which  had  been 
ordered. 

I  now  ask  you,  my  fellow-citizens,  to  decide 
for  yourselves  what  have  been  the  motives  of  the 
administration  in  this  business  ?  With  respect  to 
two  thirds  of  the  members  of  the  Court  Martial, 
they  have  ordered  a  sentence,  which  in  their  con 
sciences  they  believed  ought  not  to  be  executed. 


viii  ADDRESS  OF 

The  Court  Martial,  in  justification  of  their  con 
duct,  in  recommending  me  to  the  mercy  of  the 
President,  can  appeal  to  no  precedent,  not  even 
Jhe  proceedings  in  the  trial  of  admiral  Byng.  Af 
ter  the  Court  had  found  him  guilty  of  a  particular 
charge,  there  was  nothing  left  to  their  discretion. 
The  articles  of  war  provided,  that  the  punishment 
should  be  death.  In  my  case  the  articles  of  war 
provided  death,  or  such  other  punishment  as  the 
Court  Martial  should  think  proper  to  order.  Why 
then  did  not  the  Court  order  such  a  punishment 
as  they  believed  ought  to  have  been  inflicted  ? 

From  these  facts  and  observations,  I  do  think 
the  motives  of  the  administration  must  be  appa 
rent.  And  indeed,  I  presume  it  will  not  be 
in  your  power  to  reconcile  the  conduct  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  and  the  conduct 
of  the  Court  Martial,  without  believing  there  was 
a  concert  and  understanding  how  this  business 
was  to  be  conducted.  • 

With  respect  to  the  lenity  of  the  Court,  I  in 
formed  them  I  did  not  ask  it ;  and  I  requested 
no  other  mercy  from  them,  than  the  mercy  of  a 
decision  ;  that  they  would  decide  on  my  case,  and 
keep  me  no  longer  in  suspense. 

In  regard  to  the  pardon  of  the  President,  I  had 
no  opportunity  of  requesting  it,  because  it  was 


GENERAL  HULL.  is 

granted,  before  I  had  any  knowledge  of  the  sen 
tence.  Ingratitude,  I  hope,  is  no  part  of  my  cha 
racter.  But  I  do  submit  to  your  consideration, 
whether  I  ought  to  feel  grateful  to  him,  when  the 
National  Intelligencer,  a  paper  published  at  his 
door,  and  under  his  auspices,  in  giving  an  account 
of  the  trial  and  announcing  the  sentence,  states, 
that  the  punishment  is  more  protracted  and  terri 
ble,  in  consequence  of  a  remission  of  the  sentence. 
If  his  object  was  to  aggravate  and  increase  the 
punishment,  it  cannot  be  called  an  act  of  mercy. 

There  are  two  very  important  facts,  relating 
to  my  situation,  as  commander  of  the  north-west 
ern  army,  not  noticed  m  my  defence.  One,  the 
armistice  agreed  to  by  general  Dearborn,  from 
which  my  army  was  expressly  excluded.  The 
other,  the  President's  message  to  Congress,  the 
first  session  after  the  capitulation.  With  regard 
to  the  first,  the  following  are  the  facts.  This  was 
an  arrangement  of  Sir  George  Prevost,  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  employing  all  his  forces  against  the 
army  I  commanded.  Having  received  information 
that  the  orders  in  council  had  been  repealed,  on 
1he  second  day  of  August,  eighteen  hundred  and 
twelve,  he  despatched  colonel  Baynes,  his  adju 
tant  general,  to  the  head-quarters  of  general  Dear 
born,  at  Greenbush,  near  Albany,  with  an  autho 
rity  to  conclude  an  armistice — on  the  ninth  of 


x  ADDRESS  OP 

August  it  was  concluded  between  him  and  general 
Dearborn,  and  my  army  was  excluded. 

Immediately  after  the  departure  of  colonel 
Baynes  on  his  mission,  major  general  §heafe  of 
the  British  army  was  ordered  to  lake  Erie,  with  a 
large  part  of  the  British  force  from  Montreal,  to 
be  placed  under  the  command  of  general  Brock. 
From  the  nature  of  the  transaction,  it  is  certain, 
that  general  Brock  was  made  acquainted  with 
these  circumstances,  and  informed  that  he  might, 
with  the  most  perfect  safety  to  his  posts  at 
Kingston,  York,  forts  George  and  Erie,  march 
his  whole  force  against  my  army,  which  had  in 
vaded  the  province  of  which  he  was  governour 
and  commander  in  chief.  Calculating  the  dis 
tances,  and  the  celerity  with  which  the  British 
commanders  convey  important  information,  there 
was  full  time  for  the  purpose.  Of  this  important 
arrangement,  in  which  the  army  I  commanded  had 
so  much  interest,  I  never  received  any  informa 
tion  from  general  Dearborn.  That  general  Brock 
took  his  whole  force  to  Maiden,  from  fort  George 
and  its  vicinity,  excepting  a  few  men  to  take  care 
of  the  cannon  and  stores,  is  certain ;  and  that  ge 
neral  Sheafe  arrived  from  Montreal  with  the  rein 
forcements,  immediately  after  general  Brock's 
departure  from  Fort  George,  is  likewise  a  fact 
well  known.  That  at  this  time,  on  the  ninth  of 


GENERAL  HULL.  *i 

August,  a  cessation  of  hostilities  had  been  con 
cluded,  which  extended  from  fort  Erie,  on  the 
cast  part  of  lake  Erie,  to  Quebec,  In  my  next 
number,  I  shall  produce  documents  to  prove  the 
facts  I  have  here  stated.  They  are,  however, 
all  so  public,  and  so  well  known,  that  I  am  fully 
authorized  in  stating  them  without  the  documents. 
That  on  the  day  of  the  capitulation,  the  sixteenth 
of  August,  general  Brock  well  knew  that  a  cessa 
tion  of  hostilities  below  had  taken  place,  is  certain, 
because  on  that  day  he  gave  me  information  of  it, 
and  that  the  orders  in  council  had  been  repealed, 
and  observed,  he  hoped  it  would  be  the  founda 
tion  of  a  peace.  It  is  likewise  well  known,  this 
measure  was  disapproved  by  the  President,  and 
principally  on  account  of  the  effect  it  would  have 
on  my  army.  When  general  Dearborn  was  or 
dered  by  the  President  to  make  diversions  on 
the  enemy's  posts  below  me,  and  ought  to  have 
been  co-operating  with  me  with  all  his  forces,  he 
was  sitting  at  his  ease  at  Greenbush,  and  making 
arrangements,  which  were  one  great  cause  of  the 
destruction  of  my  army.  And  yet  this  same 
general  Dearborn  was  appointed  the  president  of 
the  Court  Martial  which  has  condemned  me  for  the 
misfortune,  which  his  own  misconduct  had  been 
a  great  cause  in  producing.  In  sacrificing  me, 
he  has  undoubtedly  made  some  atonement  for  his 
own  faults,  in  the  opinion  of  the  administration, 


xii  ADDRESS  OF 

and  may  be  permitted  to  remain  in  the  possession 
of  his  nominal  rank,  and  in  the  enjoyment  of  his 
emoluments,  in  the  degraded  and  disgraceful  situ 
ation,  to  which  he  has  submitted  for  more  than  a 
year.  Thus  has  general  Dearborn,  by  adopting 
a  measure,  which  brought  the  principal  part  of 
the  enemy's  force  against  my  army,  exhibited  his 
profound  skill  in  military  operations,  and  his 
talents  and  qualifications  as  commander  in  chiei 
of  the  American  army. 

I  shall  now  proceed  to  consider  that  part  of  the 
President's  message,  of  the  fourth  of  November, 
eighteen  hundred  and  twelve,  which  developes 
the  objects  of  my  unfortunate  campaign.  It  is  in 
the  following  words. 

"Previous  to  its  declaration,  [the  declaration 
"  of  war]  it  was  deemed  proper,  as  a  measure  of 
"precaution  and  forecast,  that  a  considerable 
"  force  should  be  placed  in  the  Michigan  terri- 
"  lory,  with  a  general  view  to  its  security,  and  in 
"the  event  of  war,  to  such  operations  in  the  up- 
"  permost  Canada,  as  would  intercept  the  hostile 
u  influence  of  Great  Britain  over  the  savages, 
"obtain  the  command  of  the  lake  on  which  that 
"  part  of  Canada  borders,  and  maintain  co-ope- 
"  rating  relations  with  such  forces  as  might  be 
"  most  conveniently  employed  against  other  parts. 


GENERAL  HULL.  xiii 

"  Our  expectation  of  gaining  the  command  of 
"  the  lakes,  by  the  invasion  of  Canada  from  De- 
"troit,  having  been  disappointed,  measures  were 
"  instantly  taken  to  provide  on  them  a  naval 
"force  superiour  to  that  of  the  enemy." 

The  objects  of  the  force  intrusted  to  my  com 
mand,  are  here   particularly  stated.     They  are 
stated  by  the  first  magistrate  to  the  legislature 
of  the  nation.     This  is  a  document  of  the  highest 
authority,  and  must  be  considered  as  conclusive 
evidence,  that  these  were  the  objects,  for  which 
the  expedition  was  ordered,  and  which  the  Pre 
sident  expected  would  have  been  accomplished. 
If  it  was  the  expectation  of  the   President,  that 
with  the  few  militia  under  my  command,  I  should 
have  obtained  possession  of  the  lake,  it  is  unac 
countable,  that  it  never  was  communicated  to  me. 
•  All  my  instructions  from  the  Department  of  War 
were  laid  before  the  Court  Martial;  and  there  was 
not  the  least  intimation  of  the  kind.     Indeed  1 
never  had  the  most  distant  idea,  that  this  expec 
tation    was    entertained,    until    it   was  disclosed 
in  this  message.     Both  in  my  repeated  written 
communications,    and  in  frequent  conversations 
with  the  President  and  Secretary  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  War,  I  had  urged  the  necessity  of  a  navy 
on  lake  Erie,  superiour  to  the  British,  in  the  event 
of  war  with  Great  Britain.     I  well  knew  at  that 


iiv  ADDHESS  OP 

time,  they  had  a  strong  naval  force  on  the  lake? 
perfectly  manned  and  prepared  in  every  respect 
for  offensive  or  defensive  war.  The  United 
States  had  not  a  single  vessel  or  gun  boat  on  those 
waters.  All  they  had  was  an  old  unarmed  trans 
port  vessel,  repairing  on  the  stocks,  and  which  was 
not  launched  until  near  a  month  after  the  declara 
tion  of  war. 

There  were  but  two  modes  of  taking  possession 
©f  the  lake ;  one,  by  taking  or  destroying  the  en 
emy's  naval  force ;  the  other,  by  taking  posses 
sion  of  all  their  posts  and  harbours,  both  on  the 
main  land  and  islands,  an  extent  of  coast  more 
than  three  hundred  miles.  I  am  confident  no  one 
will  believe  it  was  possible  for  me,  either  to  have 
tak^n  or  destroyed  the  British  fleet  then  on  the 
lake,  with  the  means  I  possessed.  The  force, 
under  my  command,  was  totally  inadequate  to 
have  effected  it  in  the  other  way,  especially  after 
the  fall  of  Michilimackinac,  and  all  the  northern 
nations  of  savages  were  in  hostility  against  me. 
Although  I  still  entertain  the  same  opinion  I  gave 
to  the  government,  before  the  declaration  of  war, 
that  a  navy  on  lake  Erie  was  essentially  necessary ; 
yet,  I  now  believe,  had  an  adequate  force  been 
sent  to  the  Michigan  territory,  and  sufficient 
forces  had  been  ordered  to  have  taken  possession 
of  forts  George  and  Erie  at  the  same  time,  and 


GENERAL  HULL,  xv 

these  armies  had  co-operated,  the  whole  of  that 
part  of  the  province  of  Upper  Canada,  which 
borders  on  lake  Erie,  might  have  been  in  our  pos 
session  in  the  campaign  of  eighteen  hundred  and 
twelve,  with  all  the  enemy's  harbours  on  the  bor 
ders  of  the  lake,  by  which  means  the  naval  force 
would  have  been  destroyed,  or  must  have  sur 
rendered  at  the  approach  of  winter. 

This  idea  I  suggested  to  the  Secretary  of  War/ 
in  my  memoir  of  the  sixth  of  March,  eighteen 
hundred  and  twelve,  provided  the  object  was  the 
reduction  of  the  Canadas,  and  it  was  the  intention 
of  the  government,  contrary  to  every  opinion  I 
had  given,  not  to  build  a  navy  on  lake  Erie.  I 
suggested  it  as  the  only  possible  mode,  and  at  the 
same  time  pointed  out  all  the  difficulties  which 
.would  attend  it.  On  the  sixth  of  March,  at  the 
lime  when  this  memoir  was  presented,  I  had  no 
command  in  the  army,  and  had  uniformly  declin 
ed  to  accept  a  military  appointment,  although  I 
had  been  strongly  solicited.  Being  then  the  gO" 
vernour  of  the  Michigan  territory,  it  was  my  duty 
to  induce  the  government  to  provide  means  for 
its  safety. 

About  the  eleventh  of  April,  after  I  had  Beeg 
appointed  to  the  command  of  the  north-western 
army,  unsolicited,  and  even  undesired  on  my 


xvi  ADDRESS  OP 

part;  I  then  presented  to  the  President,  through 
the  medium  of  the  Department  of  War,  another 
communication,  in  which  I  represented  in  the 
strongest  and  most  explicit  terms,  the  necessity 
of  our  having  a  naval  force  superiour  to  the  ene 
my  on  the  lakes ;  and  that  without  it,  and  unless 
the  army  I  was  to  command  was  strengthened 
by  additions  to  its  numbers,  and  unless  it  were 
followed  by  detachments  to  keep  open  the  com 
munication,  and  insure  its  supplies  from  Ohio ; 
and  unless  it  was  supported  by  co-operations  on 
other  quarters,  my  army  could'  not  be  able  to 
maintain  itself  at  Detroit,  much  less  carry  on  offen 
sive  operations  in  the  enemy's  country. 

After  these  communications,  and  under  the  cir^ 
cumstances  in  which  I  was  placed,  I  ask  you,  my 
fellow-citizens,  whether  I  had  any  reason  to  be 
lieve  it  to  be  the  expectation  of  the  government, 
that  I  should  have  obtained  the  command  of  the 
lakes  ?  But  in  this  I  was  mistaken.  It  really  ap 
pears,  that  it  was,  because  the  President  says,  in 
the  Message  I  have  quoted,  "  Our  expectation  of 
"  gaining  the  command  of  the  lakes  by  the  inva- 
"  sion  of  Canada  from  Detroit  having  been  disap- 
"  pointed,  measures  were  instantly  taken  to  pro- 
ct  vide  on  them  a  naval  force,  superiour  to  that  of 
"  the  enemy," 


GENERAL  HULL.  xvii 

The  other  object  was,  "  to  maintain  co-operat- 
f*  ing  relations  with  such  forces,  as  might  be  most 
**  conveniently  employed  against  other  parts.5' 

I  opened  a  road  of  two  hundred  miles  through 
a  savage  wilderness,  invaded  the  enemy's  coun 
try,  remained  a  month  in  the  possession  of  it, 
waiting  for  co-operating  relations,  until  I  was  in 
formed  I  should  receive  none ;  and  until  general- 
Dearborn,  instead  of  co-operations,  agreed  to  a 
cessation  of  hostilities,  which  afforded  the  enemy 
an  opportunity  of  concentrating  his  whole  force 
against  my  little  army. 

By  the  documents  of  the  government,  it  thus 
appears,  that  these  were  the  objects  of  my  expedi 
tion  ;  and  because  I  disappointed  the  expectations 
of  the  administration  in  not  obtaining  the  com 
mand  of  the  lakes,  with  the  few  Ohio  militia  I  com 
manded,  and  did  not  maintain  co-operating  rela 
tions  with  other  forces,  when  there  were  none  to 
co-operate  with  me,  I  have  been  condemned. 

I  do  expect,  my  fellow-citizens,  when  you  be 
come  acquainted  with  the  true  history  of  my  case, 
you  will  reverse  the  unjust  sentence  which  has 
been  pronounced  against  me.  I  am  now  perfect 
ly  supported  by  a  consciousness  of  having  dose 
my  duty  in  the  most  faithful  manner,  and  my  only 


xviii         ADDRESS  OP  GEN.  HULL. 

desire  is,  to  convince  you  and  posterity  of  the 
purity  of  my  motives,  and  the  correctness  of  my 
conduct.  Under  this  support  I  am  tranquil  and 
happy.  Had  I  pursued  any  other  course,  I  should 
want  the  consciousness  which  I  now  feel,  and  in 
sincerity  I  can  adopt  the  language  of  Pope, 

' '  One  stlf  approving  hour  -whole  years  outweighs 
*'  Of  stupid  starers  and  of  loud  huzzas ; 
"  And  more  true . ioy  Marcellus  exiled  ftt'ls, 
"  Than  Ccesar  with  a  senate  at  his  fort-Is." 

WILLIAM  HUL.L, 
NEWTON,  (Mass.)  June  1st,  1814. 


CHARGES. 


At  a  general  Court  Martial  (ordered  by  the  President  of  the  United  States)  etfcy 
rened  at  Albany,  in  the  State  of  New- York,  on  the  third  day  of  January  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  fourteen,  and  continued  by  adjournments  to  the 
twenty-fifth  day  of  March  following,  brigadier  general  William  Hull,  of  the 
army  of  the  United  States,  wa«  tried  on  the  following  charges  and  specifica 
tions-,  viz : 

CHARGE  I. 

TREASON  against  the  United  States,  between  the 
ninth  of  April  and  the  seventeenth  of  August,  eight 
een  hundred  and  twelve. 

FIRST  SPECIFICATION.  In  this  :  That  on  the  first 
day  of  July,  in  the  year  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve, 
before  that  time  and  ever  since,  an  open  and  public 
war  was,  and  is  yet  carried  on  and  prosecuted  by  and 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  their  ter 
ritories,  and  the  united  kingdom  of  Great-Britain  and 
Ireland,  and  the  dependencies  thereof:  and  that  Wil 
liam  Hull,  a  brigadier  general  in  the  army  of  the  said 
United  States,  a  citizen  of  the  said  United  States, 
owing  allegiance  to  the  said  United  States,  and  late 
commander  of  the  north-western  army  of  the  said 
United  States,  well  knowing  the  premises,  and  trai 
torously  and  unlawfully  designing  and  contriving  to 
send  and  convey  intelligence  to  the  said  enemies  of 
the  said  United  States,  touching  a  declaration  of  war 
by  the  said  United  States,  against  the  said  united 
kingdom  of  Great-Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  de 
pendencies  thereof ;  and,  also,  touching  the  expedition 
«>n  which  the  said  north-western  army  under  his  com- 


xx  CHARGES  AGAINST 

maud  as  aforesaid  was  employed ;  and,  also,  touching 
the  numbers,  state  and  condition  of  the  said  north-west 
ern  army;  in  prosecution  of  the  said  traitorous  and  un 
lawful  design,  on  the  said  first  day  of  July,  in  the  year 
aforesaid,  at  the  rapids  of  the  river  Miami  of  the  lake, 
in  the  territory  of  Michigan,  the  said  William  Hull 
(then  and  there  being  a  brigadier  general  in  the  army 
of  the  United  States,  and  being  then  and  there  com 
mander  of  the  said  north-western  army  as  aforesaid,) 
did  traitorously  hire  or  cause  to  be  hired  an  unarmed 
vessel,  with  the  pretended  purpose  of  transporting 
therein  certain  sick  soldiers,  and  the  principal  part  of 
the  hospital  stores  belonging  to  the  said  north-western 
army,  from  the  said  rapids  of  the  river  Miami  of  the 
lake  to  Detroit,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan,  but 
in  truth,  traitorously  contriving  and  intending  that 
the  said  unarmed  vessel,  together  with  all  persons, 
papers,  and  things  put  on  board  thereof,  should  be 
captured  by  the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States,  on 
the  passage  of  the  said  unarmed  vessel  from  the  said 
rapids  of  the  river  of  the  Miami  of  the  lake  to  Detroit 
aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan  aforesaid :  and 
(hat  the  said  William  Hull,  in  further  prosecution  of 
his  said  traitorous  and  unlawful  design  and  contri 
vance,  (being  then  and  there  a  brigadier  general  in 
the  army  of  the  United  States  as  aforesaid,  and  being 
then  and  there  commander  of  the  said  north-western 
army  as  aforesaid,)  did  then  and  there  traitorously  put, 
or  traitorously  cause  to  be  put  on  board  of  the  said 
unarmed  vessel,  a  trunk  containing  (among  other 
things)  the  official  correspondence  of  the  Secretary  of 
the  Department  of  War  and  the  said  brigadier  general 
William  Hull,  as  well  touching  the  expedition  on 
which  the  said  north-western  army  under  his  com- 
inand  as  aforesaid,  was  then  employed,  as  touching  a 
declaration  of  war  by  the  said  United  States  against 
the  said  united  kingdom  of  Great-Britain  and  Ireland, 
and  the  dependencies  thereof,  and  also,  certain  offi 
cial  muster-rolls,  reports,  and  returns,  of  the 


GENERAL  HULL.  xxi 

state  and  condition  of  the  said  north-western  army, 
mider  his  command  as  aforesaid  :  and  that  afterwards, 
to  \vit :  on  the  second  day  of  July,  in  the  year  afore 
said,  the  said  vessel,  so  as  aforesaid  traitorously  hired 
or  traitorously  caused  to  be  hired,  by  the  said  briga 
dier  general  William  Hull,  on  its  passage  from  the 
said  rapids  of  the  river  Miami  of  the  lake  to  Detroit 
aforesaid,  was  captured  by  the  said  enemies  of  the 
United  States,  having  on  board  thereof,  at  the  time 
of  the  said  capture,  the  said  trunk  containing  the  said 
official  correspondence,  as  well  touching  the  said  ex 
pedition,  as  the  said  declaration  of  war,  and  the  said 
official  muster-rolls,  reports  and  returns,  of  the  num 
bers,  state,  and  condition  of  the  said  north-western 
army  (together  with  certain  sick  soldiers,  and  the 
principal  part  of  the  hospital  stores  belonging  to  the 
said  north-western  army,)  and  by  means  of  the  said 
capture,  and  in  fulfilment  of  the  said  traitorous  and 
unlawful  design,  contrivance,  and  intendment  of  the 
said  brigadier  general  William  Hull,  the  said  official 
correspondence,  as  well  touching  the  said  expedition, 
as  the  snid  declaration  of  war,  and  the  said  official 
muster-rolls,  reports  and  returns,  of  the  numbers,  state 
and  condition  of  the  said  north-western  army,  (to 
gether  with  certain  sick  soldiers,  and  the  principal 
part  of  the  hospital  stores  of  the  said  north-western 
army,)  came  to  the  possession,  knowledge  and  use  of 
the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States;  giving  infor 
mation  and  intelligence  to  the  enemies  of  the  said 
United  States,  as  well  touching  the  said  expedition, 
as  touching  the  said  declaration  of  wTar,  and,  also, 
touching  the  numbers,  state  and  condition  of  the  said 
north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States,  then 
and  there  under  the  command  of  the  said  brigadier 
general  William  Hull  as  aforesaid;  whereby  the 
said  William  Hull,  on  the  first  day  of  July,  in  the 
year  aforesaid,  at  the  rapids  of  the  river  Miami  of  the 
lake  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan  aforesaid, 
(being  then  and  there  a  brigadier  general  in  the  army 


xxii  CHARGES  AGAINST 

of  the  United  States,  and  being  then  and  there 
mander  of  the  said  north-western  array  as  aforesaid* 
and  being  then  and  there  a  citizen  of  the  said  United 
States,  owing  allegiance  to  the  said  United  States,) 
did  then  and  there  traitorously  and  unlawfully  hold 
correspondence  with,  and  give  intelligence  to  the 
enemy,  and  did  then  and  there  traitorously,  by  the 
means  aforesaid,  adhere  to  the  enemies  of  the  said 
United  States,  giving  them  aid  and  comfort. 

SECOND  SPECIFICATION.  And  also,  in  this :  That 
afterwards  and  during  the  said  war,  so  as  aforesaid 
carried  on  and  prosecuted  by  and  between  the  said 
United  States  of  America  and  their  territories,  and 
the  said  united  kingdom  of  Great-Britain  and  Ireland^ 
and  the  dependencies  thereof,  the  said  north-western 
army  of  the  said  United  States,  under  the  command 
of  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  as  afore 
said,  having  entered  the  said  British  province  of  Up 
per  Canada,  and  having  established  a  military  post 
at  or  near  Sandwich,  in  the  said  British  province  of 
Upper  Canada,  which  it  was  the  duty  of  the  said 
brigadier  general  William  Hull  to  maintain  and  de 
fend,  in  order  that  the  said  war  might  and  should  be 
advantageously  carried  on  and  prosecuted  on  behalf 
of  the  said  United  States,  and  more  especially  that  a 
certain  British  fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called 
Amherstburgh,  in  the  said  British  province  of  Upper 
Canada,  occupied  by  the  enemies  of  the  said  United 
States,  might  and  should  be  advantageously  attacked 
and  taken  by  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said 
United  States,  under  the  command  of  the  said  briga 
dier  general  William  Hull  as  aforesaid,  yet  the  said 
William  Hull,  (a  brigadier  general  in  the  army  of 
the  United  States,  a  citizen  of  the  said  United  States, 
owing  allegiance  to  the  said  United  States,  and  com 
mander  of  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said 
United  States  as  aforesaid,)  well  knowing  the  premi 
ses,  on  the  eighth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve,  at  Sandwich 


GENERAL  HULL.  xxiii 

aforesaid,  in  the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada 
aforesaid,  did  then  and  there  traitorously  and  unlaw 
fully  conspire  and  combine  with  certain  enemies  of 
ihe  said  United  States,  (whose  names  are  unknown) 
to  quit  and  abandon  to  the  enemies  of  the  said  United 
States,  the  said  military  post  established  by  the  said 
north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States,  at  or 
near  Sandwich  aforesaid,  in  the  British  province  of 
Upper  Canada  aforesaid,  and  to    prevent  the   said 
British  fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherst- 
burgh,  from  being  attacked  and  reduced,  or  an  attempt 
being  made  to  reduce  the  same,  by  the  said  north 
western  army  of  the  said  United  •  States,  under  the 
command  of  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull 
as  aforesaid ;  and  that  the  said  William  Hull,  (then 
and  there  being  a  brigadier  general  in  the  army  of  the 
said  United  States,  then  and  there  being  commander 
of  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United 
States,  and  then  and  there  being  a  citizen  of  the  said 
United  States,  owing  allegiance  to  the  said  United 
States)  in  prosecution  of  the  said  traitorous  conspiracy 
and  combination,  did  then  and  there  traitorously  quit 
and  abandon,  and  did  then  and  there  traitorously  cause 
to  be  quitted  and  abandoned,  the  said  military  post 
established  by  the  said  north-western  army  of  the 
.said  United  states  as  aforesaid,  at  or  near  Sandwich 
as  aforesaid,  in  the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada 
aforesaid,  and  did  then  and  there  traitorously  neglect 
and  omit  to  make  the  proper  preparations  for  attack 
ing  and  reducing,  or  attempting  to  reduce  the  said 
British  fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherst- 
burgh,  but  on  the  contrary,  did  then  and  there  traitor 
ously  prevent  the  same  from  being  attacked  and  re 
duced,  and  an  attempt  being  made  to  reduce  the  same 
by  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United 
States,  then  and  there  under  his  command  as  afore 
said  :  and,  in  further  prosecution  of  the  said  traitorous 
conspiracy  and  combination,  did  then  and  there  trai 
torously  march,  withdraw  and  remove,  and  traitorqusly 
c 


xxiv  CHARGES  AGAINST 

order  to  be  marched,  withdrawn  and  removed,  the 
main  body  of  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said 
United  States,  from  the  said  military  post  established 
by  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United 
States,  at  or  near  Sandwich  aforesaid,  to  a  place  out 
of  the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  to  wit; 
to  Detroit  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan 
aforesaid ;  whereby  the  said  William  Hull,  on  the 
said  eighth  day  of  August,  in  the  j~ear  one  thousand 
eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  at  Sandwich 
aforesaid,  in  the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Ca 
nada,  (being  then  and  there  a  brigadier  general  in 
Hie  army  of  the  said  United  States,  and  being  then 
and  there  commander  of  the  saijl  north-western  army 
of  the  said  United  States,  and  being  then  and  there  a 
citizen  of  the  said  United  States,  owing  allegiance 
to  the  said  United  States,)  did  then  and  there  trai 
torously  conspire,  combine,  and  hold  correspondence 
with  the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States,  and  did 
then  and  there  traitorously  and  shamefully  quit  and 
abandon,  and  traitorously  and  shamefully  cause  to  be 
quitted  and  abandoned  the  said  military  post,  so  as 
aforesaid  established  by  the  said  north-western  army 
of  the  said  United  States,  at  or  near  Sandwich  afore 
said,  in  the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada  afore 
said,  and  did  then  and  there  traitorously  neglect  and 
omit  to  make  the  proper  preparations  for  attacking 
and  reducing,  or  attempting  to  reduce  the  said  fort 
called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherstbur^h,  in 
the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  but  did 
then  and  there  traitorously  prevent  the  said  British 
fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherstburgh, 
in  the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  from 
being  attacked  and  reduced,  or  an  attempt  being  made 
to  reduce  the  same  by  the  said  north-western  army 
of  the  United  States,  under  his  command  as  aforesaid, 
and  by  the  means  aforesaid,  did  then  and  there  trai 
torously  adhere  to  the  enemies  of  the  said  United 
States,  giving  them  aid  and  comfort. 


GENERAL  HULL.  *xv 

SPECIFICATION.  And  also,  in  this  . — That 
afterwards  an(J  during  the  sak!  war,  so  as  aforesaid 
carried  on  and  prosecuted,  by  and  between  the  said 
United  States  of  America  and  their  territories,  and 
the  said  united  kingdom  of  Great-Britain  and  Ireland, 
and  the  dependencies  thereof,  to  wit :  on  the  sixteenth 
day  of  August,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hun 
dred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  at  Detroit,  in  the  Michi 
gan  territory  aforesaid,  the  said  William  Hull  was 
then  and  there  a  citizen  of  said  United  States,  owing 
allegiance  to  the  said  United  States,  and  was  then 
and  there  a  brigadier  general  in  the  army  of  the  said 
United  States,  and  was  then  and  there  commander  of 
the  north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States,  and 
was  then  and  there  commander  of  a  certain  fort, 
called  Fort  Detroit,  and  belonging  to  the  said  United 
States,  erected  at  or  near  the  town  of  Detroit,  upon  a 
bank  of  the  river  Detroit,  in  the  said  territory  of  Mi 
chigan;  the  works  whereof,  and  the  guns  and  gun- 
carriages  belonging  thereto,  then  were,  and  long  be 
fore  had  been  decayed,  dilapidated,  and  out  of  repair. 
And  that  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull, 
then  and  there  did  traitorously  conspire  and  combine 
with  certain  enemies  of  the  said  United  States, 
(whose  names  are  unknown,)  then  and  there  traitor 
ously  and  shamefully  to  surrender  and  abandon  to  the 
enemies  of  the  said  United  States,  the  said  fort,  called 
Fort  Detroit,  belonging  to  the  said  United  States  as 
aforesaid,  and  then  and  there  under  the  command  of 
the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  as  aforesaid, 
with  all  the  troops,  regulars  as  well  as  militia,  then 
and  there  under  the  command  of  the  said  brigadier 
general  Hull  as  aforesaid,  and  all  the  public  stores 
and  arms,  and  all  public  documents,  including  every 
thing  else  of  a  public  nature,  appertaining  to  the  said 
fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  and  to  the  said  north-west 
ern  army  of  the  said  United  States,  under  the  com 
mand  of  the  said  brigadte*  general  William  Hull  as 
aforesaid.  And  that  in  prosecution  of  the  said  trai- 


xxvi  CHARGES  AGAINST 

torous  conspiracy  and  combination,  the  said  brigadier 
general  William  Hull  did  then  and  there  wilfully  and 
traitorously  neglect  and  omit  to  repair  and  strengthen 
the  works  of  the  said  fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  then 
and  there  under  his  command  as  aforesaid,  and  to  put 
the  same  (together  with  the  said  guns  and  gun-car"- 
riages  belonging  thereto)  into  a  proper  state  and 
condition  for  resistance  and  defence  against  the  ap* 
proaches,  attacks,  and  assaults  of  the  enemies  of  the 
said  United  States.  And  did  then  and  there  wilfully 
and  traitorously  neglect  and  omit  to  fortify  the  places 
and  passes  at  and  near  to  the  said  fort,  called  Fort 
Detroit,  by  and  through  which  the  troops  of  the  ene 
mies  of  the  said  United  States  might  then  and  there 
reasonably  be  expected  to  approach,  and  did  approach 
the  said  fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  for  the  purpose  of 
attacking  and  subduii  g  the  same.  And  did  then  and 
there  traitorously  neglect  and  omit  to  oppose,  resist, 
repel  and  defeat,  and  to  attempt  to  repel  and  defeat 
the  troops  of  the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States, 
in  their  hostile  preparations,  and  approach  to  and 
.towards  the  said  fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  for  the 
purpose  of  attacking  and  subduing  the  same.  And 
that  in  further  prosecution  and  completion  of  the  said 
traitorous  conspiracy  and  combination,  the  said  briga 
dier  general  William  Hull  did  then  and  there  traitor 
ously  and  shamefully  abandon  and  surrender  the  said 
fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  then  and  there  under  his 
command  as  aforesaid,  (which  it  was  his  duty  then, 
and  there  to  maintain  and  defend,)  together  with  all 
the  troops,  regulars  as  well  as  militia,  then  and  there 
in  the  said  fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  then  and  there 
belonging  to  the  said  United  States  as  aforesaid,  and 
then  and  there  under  his  command  as  aforesaid,  and 
all  the  public  stores  and  arms,  and  public  documents, 
including  every  thing  else  of  a  public  nature,  in  and 
appertaining  to  the  said  fort,  called  Fort  Detroit,  and 
to  the  said  north-wester^  tirmy  of  the  said  United 
States,  then  and  there  under  his  command  as  afore- 


GENERAL  HULL.  xxvii 

said,  unto  the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States,  to 
wit :— to  the  British  forces  then  and  there  under  the 
command  of  major  general  Brock ;  whereby  the  said 
William  Hull,  on  the  said  sixteenth  day  of  August, 
in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve 
aforesaid,  at  Detroit  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Mi 
chigan  aforesaid,  (being  then .  and  there  a  citizen  of 
the  said  United  States,  owing  allegiance  to  the  said 
United  States,  and  being  then  and  there  a  brigadier 
general  in  the  army  of  the  said  United  States,  and 
being  then  and  there  commander  of  the  said  north 
western  army  of  the  said  United  States,  and  being 
then  and  there  commander  of  the  said  fort,  called  Fort 
Detroit,  belonging  to  the  said  United  States  as  afore 
said,)  did  then  and  there  traitorously  and  shamefully 
abandon  and  surrender  the  said  fort,  called  Fort  De 
troit,  to  the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States,  to  wit: 
• — to  the  said  British  troops  under  the  command  of 
major  general  Brock  as  aforesaid ;  and  did  then  and 
there  by  the  means  aforesaid,  traitorously  adhere  to 
the  enemies  of  the  said  United  States,  giving  them 
aid  and  comfort. 

CHARGE  II. 

Cowardice  at  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Detroit, 
between  the  first  day  of  July  and  the  seventeenth  day 
of  August,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred 
and  twelve. 

FIRST  SPECIFICATION.  In  this  : — That  during  the 
said  war  so  as  aforesaid  carried  on  and  prosecuted  by 
and  between  the  said  United  States  of  America  and 
their  territories,  and  the  said  united  kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  dependencies  thereof, 
the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull,  commanding 
the  north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States  as 
aforesaid,  having  entered  the  said  British  province  of 
Upper  Canada,  in  prosecution  of  the  said  war  on  be 
half  of  the  said  United  States,  and  being  there  in  pos  - 
c* 


xxviii      .      CHARGES  AGAINST 

session  of  the  town  of  Sandwich  and  the  adjacent 
country,  in  the  name  and  on  behalf  of  the  said  United 
States,  and  having  declared  and  avowed  the  object 
and  intention  of  attacking  and  subduing  the  British 
fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherstburgh,  in 
the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  and,  ge 
nerally,  of  maintaining  and  enlarging  his  position  and 
possession  in  the  said  British  province  of  Upper 
Canada,  on  the  eighth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve,  at  Sandwich, 
aforesaid,  in  the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada 
aforesaid,  did  then  and  there  misbehave  himself  before 
the  enemy,  and  shamefully  manifest  an  undue  fear 
and  apprehension  of  danger  by  a  course  of  conduct 
and  conversation  evincing  personal  alarm,  agitation 
of  mind,  and  privation  of  judgment,  by  abandoning 
the  said  object  and  design  of  attacking  the  said  Bri 
tish  fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherst 
burgh,  by  quitting  the  position  and  possession  (aken  at 
the  town  of  Sandwich  and  in  the  adjacent  country,  in 
the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada  as  aforesaid,  and 
by  retreating  abruptly  from  and  out  of  the  said  British 
province  of  Upper  Canada  to  Detroit,  in  the  territory 
of  3Iiehigan  aforesaid,  without  aay  cause  for  so  doing, 
arising  from  the  superiour  numbers,  state  and  condition 
of  the  British  forces  which  were  then  and  there  op 
posed  to  the  said  army  of  the  said  United  States, 
under  the  command  of  the  said  brigadier  general  Wil 
liam  Hull,  and  without  any  other  just  and  sufficient 
cause  whatsoever;  whereby  the  officers  and  soldiers 
of  sakl  north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States, 
then  and  there  under  the  command  of  the  said  briga 
dier  general  William  Hull,  were  induced  to  lose  and 
did  lose  all  confidence  in  the  personal  courage  and 
the  military  capacity  of  their  said  commander;  the 
inhabitants  of  the  said  Briii*h  province  of  Upper 
Canada  were  taught  to  distrust  the  power  and  profes 
sions  of  the  invading  general ;  a  shade  was  cast  upon 
the  reputation  of  the' American  arms;  audtbe  service 


GENERAL  HULL. 

of  the  said  United  States,  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
said  war,  suffered  great  detriment  and  disadvantage. 
SECOND  SPECIFICATION.  And,  also,  in  this : — That 
during  the  said  war  so  as  aforesaid  carried  on  and 
prosecuted  by  and  between  the  said  United  States  of 
America  and  their  territories,  and  the  said  united  king 
dom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  dependen 
cies  thereof,  to  wit :  on  the  fifteenth  day  of  August, 
in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve 
aforesaid,  the  enemy  having  raised  certain  batteries 
on  the  banks  of  the  said  river  Detroit,  in  the  said 
British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  opposite  the  said 
fort  Detroit,  and  certain  American  posts  and  batteries 
established  and  erected  near  the  said  fort  Detroit,  in 
the  said  territory  of  Michigan,  and  a  cannonade  being 
commenced  from  the  said  batteries  of  the  enemy 
against  and  upon  the  said  fort  of  Detroit  and  the  said 
American  posts  and  batteries  established  ajsd  erected 
near  thereto,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan,  the 
said  brigadier  general  William  Hull,  on  the  said  fif 
teenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  at  Detroit  aforesaid,  in 
the  territory  of  Michigan  aforesaid,  (being  then  and 
there  commander  of  the  said  fort  Detroit,  and  of  the 
said  American  posts  and  batteries  established  and 
erected  near  thereto,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan, 
and  being  then  and  there  commander  of  the  said 
north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States,)  did 
then  and  there  during  the  continuance  of  the  cannon 
ade  aforesaid,  shamefully  misbehave  himself  before 
the  enemy,  and  manifest  great  fear  and  apprehension 
of  personal  danger  by  a  course  of  conduct  and  con 
versation  evincing  personal  alarm,  agitation  of  mind, 
and  privation  of  judgment,  and  particularly  by  various 
timid  and  cowardly  actions  and  expressions  then  and 
there  used  and  uttered  in  the  presence  of  the  officers 
and  soldiers  then  and  there  belonging  to  the  said 
north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States,  and  then 
and  there  under  his  command  as  aforesaid,  as  well  in 


CHARGES  AGAINST 

the  public  street  of  the  town  of  Detroit,  as  in  places 
adjacent  to  the  said  fort  of  Detroit,  and  the  said 
American  posts  and  batteries  established  and  erect 
ed  near  thereto,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan; 
whereby  a  fatal  encouragement  was  afforded  for  the 
hostile  enterprises  of  the  enemy,  a  pernicious  example 
(calculated  to  intimidate  and  to  disorganize)  was  given 
to  the  American  troops,  and  the  service  of  the  United 
States  in  the  prosecution  of  the  said  war,  was  exposed 
to  hazard,  shame,  and  disappointment. 

THIRD  SPECIFICATION.  And,  also,  in  this  : — That 
during  the  said  war,  carried  on,  and  prosecuted  by  and 
between  the  said  United  States  of  America  and  their 
territories,  and  the  said  united  kingdom  of  Great  Bri 
tain  and  Ireland,  and  the  dependencies  thereof,  to  wit : 
on  the  sixteenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  one  thou 
sand  eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  the  British 
forces  under  the  command  of  major  general  Brock  hav 
ing  crossed  the  said  river  Detroit,  having  landed  at  a 
place  called  Spring  Wells,  otherwise  called  Spring 
Hill,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan ;  and  having 
thence  marched  towards  the  said  fort  of  Detroit,  with 
the  design  to  attack  the  same,  the  said  brigadier  ge 
neral  Hull,  on  the  said  sixteenth  day  of  August,  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  at  De 
troit  aforesaid,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan,  (be 
ing  then  and  there  commander  of  the  said  fort  of 
Detroit,  and  being  then  and  there  commander  of  the 
said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States) 
did  then  and  there,  during  all  the  time  of  the  enemy's 
crossing  the  said  river  Detroit  as  aforesaid,  landing 
at  the  said  Spring  Wells,  otherwise  called  Spring 
Hill  as  aforesaid,  and  marching  towards  the  said  fort 
Detroit  as  aforesaid,  with  the  design  to  attack  the 
same  as  aforesaid,  shamefully  misbehave  himself  be 
fore  the  enemy,  and  manifest  great  fear  and  appre 
hension  of  personal  danger,  by  various  timid  and 
cowardly  actions  and  expressions  then  and  there  used 
and  utterred  in  the  presence  of  the  officers  and  sol- 


GENERAL  HULL,  xxxi 

*Hers  belonging  to  the  said  north-western  army  of  the 
said  United  States,  then  and  there  under  his  com 
mand  as  aforesaid ;  by  avoiding  all  personal  danger 
from  making  an  attempt  to  prevent  the  enemy's  cross 
ing  the  said  river  to  Detroit  and  landing  at  the  said 
Spring  Wells,  otherwise  called  Spring  Hill ;  avoiding 
all  personal  danger  from  reconnoitering  and  encoun 
tering  the  enemy  in  battle  on  the  said  march  of  the 
enemy  towards  the  said  fort  of'  Detroit;  by  hastily 
sending  flags  of  truce  to  the  enemy  with  overtures  for 
a  capitulation;  by  anxiously  withdrawing  his  person 
from  the  American  troops  in  the  open  field  to  a  place 
of  comparative  safety,  within  the  walls  of  the  said 
fort  Detroit;  by  an  irresolute  fluctuation  of  orders, 
sometimes  inconsistent  with  each  other,  and  some 
times  incoherent  in  themselves;  by  forbidding  the 
American  artillery  to  fire  on  the  army  on  the  said 
march  of  the  enemy  towards  the  said  fort  Detroit;  by 
calling  the  American  troops  from  the  field,  and  crowd 
ing  them  in  the  said  fort  Detroit,  while  the  enemy 
was  on  the  said  march  towards  the  said  fort  Detroit ; 
by  a  precipitate  declaration  to  the  enemy,  that  he 
surrendered  the  said  fort  Detroit,  and  the  said  north 
western  army  of  the  said  United  States,  before  terms 
of  capitulation  were  signed  or  considered,  or  even 
suggested ;  and  generally  by  a  course  of  conduct  and 
conversation  evincing  personal  fear,  agitation  of  mind, 
and  privation  of  judgment;  whereby  the  said  fort  of 
Detroit,  and  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  United 
States,  then  and  there  under  the  command  of  the  said 
brigadier  general  William  Hull,  were  then  and  there 
rendered  an  easy  and  certain  conquest  to  the  approach 
ing  enemy ;  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  a  gallant  army 
(compelled  by  the  obligations  of  military  law  to  obey 
the  orders  of  their  commander)  were  exposed  to  un 
merited  mortification  and  reproach;  and  the*  service 
of  the  said  United  States,  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
said  war,  suffered  great  Detriment  and  discredit. 


CHARGES  AGAINST 

FOURTH  SPECIFICATION.  And,  also,  in  this : — That 
during  the  said  war  so  as  aforesaid  carried  on  and  pro 
secuted  by  and  between  the  said  United  States  of 
America  and  their  territories,  and  the  said  united 
kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  depen 
dencies  thereof,  to  wit :  on  the  sixteenth  day  of  Au 
gust,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
twelve  aforesaid,  at  Detroit  aforesaid,  in  the  territory 
of  Michigan  aforesaid,  the  said  fort  Detroit  being  then 
and  there  well  garrisoned  and  supplied  with  cannon, 
ammunition,  and  provisions;  the  said  north-western 
army  of  the  said  United  States  being  then  and  there 
well  supplied  with  arms,  ammunition,  and  provisions; 
and  the  officers  and  soldiers  thereof  being  then  and 
there  in  high  spirits,  and  eager  to  meet  and  encounter 
the  enemy  in  battle ;  and  a  fine  train  of  artillery  being 
then  and  there  subject  to  the  orders  and  disposal  of 
the  said  brigadier  general  Hull,  for  the  purposes  of 
defence  or  attack,  yet  the  said  brigadier  general  Wil 
liam  Hull  (then  and  there  being  commander  of  the 
said  fort  Detroit,  and  of  the  said  north-western  army  of 
the  said  United  States)  acting  upon  the  impulse  of  per 
sonal  fear  and  apprehension,  and  contemplating,  as 
the  means  of  personal  safety,  a  shameful  abandonment 
and  surrender  of  the  said  fort  Detroit,  and  of  the  said 
north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States  under 
his  command  as  aforesaid,  to  the  approaching  enemy, 
did  then  and  there  shamefully  misbehave  himself  be 
fore  the  enemy,  and  did  then  and  there  enter  into  a 
disgraceful  capitulation  with  the  enemy,  containing  no 
consolatory  stipulation  that  the  said  garrison  and  army 
should  march  out  of  the  said  fort  of  Detroit  with  the 
honours  of  war ;  no  just  and  humane  stipulation  for  the 
security  and  protection  of  such  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada  as  had  accept 
ed  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull's  invita 
tion  to  join  the  American  standard ;  nor  any  reason 
able  stipulation  for  an  opportunity  of  reporting  to  the 
Secretary  for  the  Department  of  War  the  circum- 


GENERAL  HULL.  xxxiii 

stances  of  so  unexpected  and  so  important  an  event; 
and  did  then  and  there  shamefully  abandon,  surrender, 
and  give  up  the  said  fort  of  Detroit,  together  with  all 
the  troops,  regulars  as  well  as  militia,  then  and  there 
under  his  command  as  aforesaid,  and  all  the  public 
v stores  and  arms,  and  all  the  public  documents,  includ 
ing  every  thing  else  of  a  public  nature  belonging  to  the 
said  fort  of  Detroit,  and  to  the  said  north-western 
army  of  the  said  United  States,  then  and  there  under 
his  command  as  aforesaid,  to  the  said  approaching 
enemy,  to  wit : — to  the  British  forces  under  the  com 
mand  of  major  general  Brock,  without  any  cause  for 
so  doing,  arising  from  the  superiour  numbers,  state  and 
condition  of  the  said  British  forces ;  or  from  the  ac 
tual  want,  or  just  expectation  of  sudden  want,  of  arms, 
ammunition,  and  provisions  for  the  said  fort  Detroit, 
and  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United 
States,  and  without  any  other  adequate  cause  what 
soever;  whereby  the  territorial  sovereignty,  rights, 
and  property  of  the  said  United  States  were  shame 
fully  ceded  to  the  enemy ;  a  brave  and  patriotic  army 
was  wantonly  sacrificed  by  the  personal  fears  of  the 
commander;  and  the  service  of  the  said  United  States, 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  said  war,  suffered  a  great 
and  afflicting  loss. 

CHARGE  III. 

Neglect  of  duty  and  unofficerlike  conduct,  while 
commanding  a  separate  army,  between  the  ninth  of 
April  and  the  seventeenth  of  August,  in  the  year  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve. 

FIRST  SPECIFICATION.  In  this  :— That  before 
and  during  the  said  war,  carried  on  and  prosecuted 
as  aforesaid,  by  and  between  the  said  United  States 
of  America  and  their  territories,  and  the  said  united 
kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  de- 
pendencies.thereof,  the  said  brigadier  general  William 
Hull,  being  duly  appointed  to  command  the  north- 


xxxiv  CHARGES  AGAINST 

western  army  of  the  said  United  States,  did  actually 
take  and  assume  the  command  of  the  said  army,  on 
or  about  the  twenty-fifth  day  of  May,  in  the  year 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve,  at  or  near 
Dayton,  in  the  state  of  Ohio,  and  did  thence  con 
stantly  continue  in  the  actual  command  of  said  army, 
as  well  on  the  march  from  Dayton  aforesaid,  to  De 
troit,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan,  and  at  Detroit 
aforesaid,  as  in  the  British  province  of  Upper  Cana 
da,  until  his  capitulation  with  the  enemy,  and  the 
consequent  surrender  of  fort  Detroit,  in  the  said  Mi 
chigan  territory,  with  all  the  troops,  regulars,  and 
militia  under  his  command,  to  the  British  forces  un 
der  the  command  of  major  general  Brock,  to  wit : — 
at  Detroit  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan 
aforesaid,  on  the  sixteenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid. 
And  that  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull, 
unmindful  of  the  important  trust  reposed  in  him,  dur 
ing  all  the  time  aforesaid,  and  as  well  on  the  march 
of  the  said  army  from  Dayton  aforesaid,  to  Detroit 
aforesaid,  and  at  Detroit  aforesaid,  as  in  the  British 
province  of  Upper  Canada  aforesaid,  was  guilty  of 
neglect  of  duty  and  of  unofficerlike  conduct,  by  ne 
glecting  and  omitting,  with  sufficient  care  and  fre 
quency,  to  inspect,  train,  exercise,  review,  and  order, 
and  t&  cause  to  be  inspected,  trained,  exercised,  re 
viewed,  and  ordered,  the  said  army  under  his  com 
mand  as  aforesaid ;  and,  also,  by  neglecting  and 
omitting,  in  due  form  and  time,  to  prepare  an  order 
of  battle,  and  to  make  the  same  known  to  the  said 
army  on  the  march  from  Dayton  aforesaid,  to  Detroit 
aforesaid,  in  the  Michigan  territory  aforesaid,  whereby 
the  discipline  of  the  troops  under  the  command  of 
the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  as  aforesaid, 
\vas  in  danger  of  being  relaxed :  their  comfort  was 
liable  to  be  impaired ;  their  confidence  in  the  military 
skill  and  dispositions  of  their  commander  was  dimi 
nished  j  and  the  said  army  was  exposed  to  the  Jiazard 


GENERAL  HULL.  xxxv 

of  disorder  and  defeat  in  the  event  of  an  attack  being 
made  thereon  by  the  enemy. 

SECOND  SPECIFICATION.  And,  also,  in  this  : — 
That  during  the  said  war  so  as  aforesaid  carried  on 
and  prosecuted  by  and  between  the  said  United 
States  of  America,  and  their  territories,  and  the  said 
united  kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the 
dependencies  thereof,  to  wit ;  on  or  about  the  first 
day  of  July,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred 
and  twelve  aforesaid,  at  the  rapids  of  the  river  Miami, 
in  the  territory  of  Michigan,  the  said  brigadier  gene 
ral  William  Hull,  then  and  there  commanding  the 
said  north-western  army  of  the  said  United  States,  on 
the  march  thereof  from  Dayton,  in  the  state  of  Ohio, 
to  Detroit  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan 
aforesaid,  then  and  there  having  sufficient  cause  to 
know  or  to  believe,  that  war  was  then  existing  between 
the  said  United  States  and  their  territories,  and  the 
said  united  kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
and  the  dependencies  thereof,  was  guilty  of  neglect  of 
duty  and  of  unofficerlike  conduct,  by  then  and  there 
hiring  or  causing  to  be  hired  an  unarmed  Vessel,  and 
putting  or  causing  to  be  put  on  board  thereof,  to  be 
transported  by  water-passage  from  the  said  rapids  ot* 
the  river  Miami  of  the  lake,  to  Detroit  aforesaid, 
(the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  having  suf 
ficient  cause  to  know  or  to  believe  the  imminent 
danger  of  capture  by  the  enemy  to  which  the  said 
unarmed  vessel  on  the  passage  aforesaid,  would  be 
exposed)  certain  sick  soldiers,  and  a  great  part  of 
the  hospital  stores  belonging  to  the  said  army,  to 
gether  with  a  trunk,  containing  (among  other  things) 
the  papers  hereinafter  mentioned,  which  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  most 
carefully  to  keep  and  preserve  from  the  knowledge 
and  view  of  the  enemy,  that  is  to  say :  the  official 
correspondence  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Department  of 
War  and  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull,  as 
touching  the  expedition  on  which  the  said  north* 


xxxvi  CHARGES  AGAINST 

western  army  under liis  command  as  aforesaid,  was 
then  employed,  as  touching  a  declaration  of  war  by 
the  said  United  States  of  America  against  the  sail! 
united  kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and 
the  dependencies  thereof;  and,  also,  certain  other 
official  muster  rolls,  reports,  and  returns  of  the  num 
bers,  state,  and  condition  of  the  said  army  under  his 
command  as  aforesaid.  And  the  said  unarmed  ves 
sel  on  the  passage  aforesaid,  from  the  said  rapids  of 
the  river  Miami  of  the  lake  towards  Detroit  afore 
said,  afterwards  to  wit :  on  or  about  the  second  day 
of  July  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
twelve  aforesaid,  was  captured  by  the  enemy,  having 
on  board  thereof,  at  the  time  of  such  capture,  the 
said  sick  soldiers,  the  said  hospital  stores,  and  the 
said  trunk,  containing  the  said  official  correspon 
dence,  and,  also,  the  said  muster  rolls,  reports,  and 
returns  of  the  numbers,  state,  and  condition  of  the 
said  army  ;  whereby  the  said  sick  soldiers  were  made 
prisoners  of  war ;  the  said  hospital  stores  were  lost 
to  the  United  States ;  and  the  said  official  correspon 
dence,  and  the  said  muster  rolls,  reports,  and  returns 
of  the  numbers,  state,  and  condition  of  the  said  army 
came  to  the  possession,  knowledge,  and  use  of  the 
enemies  of  the  United  States,  to  the  great  injury  of 
the  said  United  States. 

THIRD  SPECIFICATION.  And,  also,  in  this  : — That 
during  the  said  war  so  as  aforesaid  carried  on  and 
prosecuted  by  and  between  the  said  United  States  of 
America  and  their  territories,  and  the  said  united 
kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  de 
pendencies  thereof,  the  said  brigadier  general  Wil 
liam  Hull,  having  arrived  with  the  said  north-western 
army  of  the  said  United  States  under  his  command 
as  aforesaid,  at  Detroit, in  the  territory  of  Michigan, 
on  the  seventh  day  of  July,  in  the  year  one  thousand 
eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  and  having  the 
possession  and  command  of  said  fort  of  Detroit,  from 
that  time,  constantly,  until  the  abandonment  and  sur- 


GENERAL  HULL.  xxxVU 

sender  thereof  to  the  British  forces  under  the  command 
of  major  general  Brock,  on  the  sixteenth  day  of  Au 
gust,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
twelve  aforesaid,  and  finding  upon  his  said  arrival  at 
Detroit  aforesaid,  that  the  works  of  the  said  fort  De 
troit  were  greatly  damaged  and  dilapidated,  and  that 
the  guns  and  gun-carriages  belonging  to  said  fort  of 
Detroit  were  also  damaged  and  out  of  repair;  and, 
moreover,  well  knowing  the  importance  of  the  said 
fort  Detroit  to  the  service  of  the  said  United  States 
in  the  operation  of  the  said  war,  and  that  the  same 
(together  with  the  said  guns  and  gun-carriages)  should 
be  put  and  kept  in  proper  order  and  repair,  was  guilty 
of  neglect  of  duty  by  neglecting  and  omitting,  dur 
ing  all  the  time  of  his  possession  and  command  as 
aforesaid,  in  proper  and  sufficient  manner  to  repair 
and  strengthen,  or  cause  to  be  repaired  and  strength 
ened,  the  works  of  the  said  fort  Detroit,  by  neglect 
ing  and  omitting,  in  a  proper  and  sufficient  manner, 
and  in  due  time  for  the  service  of  the  said  United 
States,  to  repair  or  cause  to  be  repaired,  the  said  guns 
and  gun-carriages,  and  generally  by  neglecting  and 
omitting  to  put,  or  cause  to  be  put  the  safd  fort  of  De 
troit  in  a  proper  state  and  condition  for  resistance  and 
defence  in  the  event  of  an  invasion  and  attack  by 
the  enemy ;  whereby  the  said  fort  Detroit  was  left  aii 
«asy  conquest  to  the  enemy;  the  said  guns  and  gun- 
carriages,  being  afterwards  required  for  the  service  of 
the  said  United  States,  in  the  British  province  of 
Upper  Canada,  were  still  found  unfit  for  transporta 
tion  and  use ;  great  time  was  consumed  in  preparing 
and  fitting  them  for  the  said  service ;  and  the  opera 
tions  of  the  war  were  fatally  obstructed  and  sus 
pended. 

FOURTH  SPECIFICATION.  And,  also,  in  this: — 
That  during  the  said  war  so  as  aforesaid  carried  on 
and  prosecuted  by  and  between  the  said  United  States 
of  America  and  their  territories,  and  the  said  united 
of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  tho  de- 


xxxviii  CHARGES  AGAINST 

pendencies  thereof,  the  said  brigadier  general  Wil 
liam  Hull,  declaring  and  avowing  an  intention  and 
design,  with  the  said  north-western  army  of  the  said 
United  States  under  his  command  as  aforesaid,  to  in 
vade  and  enter  the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada, 
to  invest  and  attack  the  British  fort  called  Maiden, 
otherwise  called  Amherstburgh,  in  the  said  British 
province,  and  to  maintain  and  enlarge  his  position 
and  possessions  in  the  said  British  province,  and  well 
knowing  that  expedition,  resolution,  ami  energy  were 
indispensible  to  the  prosecution  and  accomplishment 
ef  such  intention  and  design,  and  having  arrived  at 
Detroit  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan  afore 
said,  on  the  seventh  day  of  July,  in  the  year  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  and 
having  invaded  the  said  British  province  of  Upper 
Canada,  on  the  twelfth  day  of  July,  in  the  year 
aforesaid,  and  therein  taken  possession  of  the  town 
of  Sandwich  aforesaid,  and  having  with  the  main 
body  of  his  said  army  evacuated  the  said  British  pro 
vince  of  Upper  Canada  on  the  eighth  day  of  August, 
in  the  year  aforesaid,  was  guilty  of  neglect  of  duty 
and  unofficerlike  conduct,  by  not  seasonably  repair 
ing,  fitting,  and  transporting,  or  causing  to  be  repaired, 
fitted  and  transported,  the  guns  and  gun-carriages 
which  were  necessary  to  the  operation  of  the  war  in 
the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  by  au 
useless  and  injurious  waste  of  time  and  opportunity 
at  Sandwich  aforesaid,  in  the  said  British  province 
of  Upper  Canada,  without  making  an  attempt  to  re 
duce  the  said  British  fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise 
culled  Amherstburgh,  by  an  unnecessary  consumption 
of  time,  in  projects  to  conciliate  the  British  inhabi 
tants  of  the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada, 
and  the  neighbouring  Indians,  without  resorting  to  a 
more  effectual  display  of  a  military  power,  capacity, 
and  disposition  to  maintain  the  acquisitions  of  con 
quest,  and  to  perform  the  promises  of  protection ;  by 
postponing  in  the  first  instance,  and  by  abandoning 


GENERAL  HULL.  xxxikv 

In  the  next,  an  investment  and  attack  upon  the  said 
British  fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Ambers t- 
burgh,  and  by  finally  evacuating  the  said  British  pro 
vince  of  Upper  Canada,  without  haying  provided 
effectually,  in  any  respect,  for  the  safety  of  the  inha 
bitants  thereof  who  had  accepted  the  said  brigadier 
general  William  Hull's  invitation  to  join  the  Ameri 
can  standard,  and  without  having,  in  any  degree,  ac 
complished  tlfe  said  intention  and  design  of  the  said 
brigadier  general  William  Hull,  so  as  aforesaid  de 
clared  and  avowed  upon  the  invasion  of  the  said  Brit 
ish  province  as  aforesaid;  whereby  an  opportunity 
was  afforded  to  the  enemy  to  bring  into  suspicion  and 
contempt  the  power  and  the  conduct  of  the  Ameri 
can  commander;  to  collect  and  combine  the  British 
forces ;  to  seduce,  intimidate,  and  engage  the  In 
dians  ;  to  awe  into  submission  the  wavering  inhabi 
tants  of  the  said  British  province  of  Upper  Canada; 
to  reinforce  the  said  British  fort  called  Maiden,  other 
wise  called  Amherstburgh ;  and  to  prepare  for  invest 
ing  and  attacking  the  said  fort  of  Detroit,  in  the  said 
territory  of  Michigan ;  while  on  thfe  other  hand,  the 
said  army  of  the  said  United  States,  under  the  com 
mand  of  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull,  as 
aforesaid,  diminishing  in  effective  numbers  in  con 
sequence  of  sickness  and  other  casualties ;  the  officers 
and  soldiers  naturally  became  dissatisfied  and  dis 
gusted  with  a  scene  of  such  inactivity,  irresolu 
tion,  and  procrastination ;  the  hope  of  support  and 
co-operation,  as  well  from  the  Indians  as  from  the 
British  inhabitants  of  the  said  British  province  of 
Upper  Canada,  was  destroyed,  and  the  general  ardour 
of  the  troops,  in  the  proseputio:;  of  the  war,  insensi 
bly  abated. 

FIFTH  SPECIFICATION.  And,  also,  in  this  : — That 
during  the  continuance  of  the  said  war,  carried  on 
and  prosecuted  as  aforesaid,  by  and  between  iiie  said 
United  States  of  America  and  their  ter  Tories,  and 
the  said  united  kiagdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland", 


1st  CHARGES  AGAINST 

and  the  dependencies  thereof,  the  said  brigadier 
general  William  Hull,  with  the  said  north-western 
army  of  the  said  United  States  under  his  command  as 
aforesaid,  arrived  at  Detroit  aforesaid,  in  the  territory 
of  Michigan  aforesaid,  to  \vit :  on  the  seventh  day 
of  July,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
twelve  aforesaid ;  that  with  the  said  army  under  his 
command  as  aforesaid,  he  entered  and  invaded  the 
said  Brilish  province  of  Upper  Canada,  to  wit :  on. 
the  twelfth  day  of  July,  in  the  year  aforesaid ;  that 
with  the  main  body  of  the  said  army  under  his  com 
mand  as  aforesaid,  he  evacuated  the  said  British  pro 
vince  of  Upper  Canada  on  the  eighth  day  of  August, 
in  the  year  aforesaid,  thence  returning  to  Detroit 
aforesaid,  in  the  said  territory  of  Michigan,  and  that 
fee  abandoned,  surrendered,  and  gave  up  the  said  fort 
Detroit,  with  all  the  troops,  regulars  as  well  as  militia, 
under  his  command  as  aforesaid,  to  the  British  forces 
under  the  command  of  major  general  Brock,  to  wit : 
on  the  sixteenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  aforesaid. 
And  that  during  all  the  movements  aforesaid,  ami 
during  all  the  time  aforesaid,  to  wit ;  from  the  said 
seventh  day  of  July,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  to  and  including  the 
said  sixteenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  aforesaid,, 
it  was  of  high  importance  to  the  security  and  supply 
of  the  said  fort  Detroit,  and  the  said  army  of  the  said 
United  States,  under  the  command  of  the  said  briga 
dier  general  William  Hull  as  aforesaid,  that  a  free 
and  open  communication  should  be  had  and  preserv 
ed  between  the  said  fort  of  Detroit  and  the  said  army 
of  the  said  United  Slates,  under  the  command  of  the 
said  brigadier  general,William  Hull  as  aforesaid,  and 
a  certain  American  settlement  and  military  post 
made  and  established  at  the  river  Raisin,  in  the  said* 
territory  of  Michigan;  and  that  the  said  brigadier 
general  William  Hull,  well  knowing  the  premises, 
DUt  unmindful  of  the  trust  reposed  in  him,  was  guilty 
of  neglect  of  duty  and  unoiBcerlik^  conduct,  by  suf- 


GENERAL  HULL.  xU 

fering  the  enemy  to  interrupt  and  cut  off  the  said  com 
munication  between  the  said  fort  of  Detroit  and  the 
said  army  of  the  said  United  States  under  his  com 
mand  as  aforesaid,  and  the  said  American  settlement 
and  military  post  made  and  established  at  the  river 
Raisin  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan  afore 
said,  to  wit ;  on  the  first  day  of  August,  in  the  year 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  or 
on  some  other  day  of  the  said  month  cf  August,  or 
on  some  day  of  the  preceding  month  of  July,  in 
the  year  aforesaid  ;  also,  by  afterwards,  to  wit :  on  the 
fourth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  aforesaid,  detaching 
major  Thomas  B.  Van  Horn  of  colonel  James  Find- 
lay's  regiment  of  Ohio  volunteers,  with  an  inadequate 
force,  (the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  having 
sufficient  cause  for  knowing  or  believing  the  same  to 
be  inadequate)  to  attempt  again  to  open  the  said  com 
munication  between  the  said  fort  Detroit,  and  the  said 
army  of  the  said  United  States,  under  the  command 
of  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  as  afore 
said,  and  the  said  American  settlement  and  military 
post  on  said  river  Raisin,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan 
aforesaid;  also,  by  afterwards,  to  wit  :  on  the  eighth 
day  of  August,  in  the  year  aforesaid,  detaching  lieute 
nant  colonel  James  Miller,  of  the  fifth  regiment  of 
United  States  infantry,  with  the  number  or  about  the 
number  of  five  hundred  men  to  attempt  again  to  open 
the  said  communication  between  the  said  fort  of  De 
troit  and  the  said  army  of  the  said  United  States,  under 
the  command  of  the  said  brigadier  general  William 
Hull,  and  the  said  American  settlement  and  military 
post  at  the  said  river  Raisin,  in  the  territory  of  Mi 
chigan  aforesaid,  and  neglecting  to  furnish  and  foi  wan1, 
or  cause  to  be  furnished  and  forwarded,  the  said  last 
mentioned  detachment  at  or  near  Brownstown,  in  the 
*aicl  territory  of  Michigan,  on  its  march  aforesaid,, 
upon  the  service  aforesaid,  an  adequate  supply  of  pro 
visions,  (the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  hav 
ing  sufficient  cause  to  know  or  to  believe  tbat  th§ 


iiii  CHARGES  AGAINST 

said  last  mentioned  detachment  was  at  or  near  Browns- 
town  aforesaid,  on  its  march  aforesaid,  upon  the  ser 
vice  aforesaid,  in  want  of  provisions,  and  that  they 
could  not  prosecute  and  accomplish  the  said  service 
unless  an  adequate  supply  of  provisions  was  furnished 
and  forwarded  to  (hern  at  or  near  Brownstown  afore 
said;)  and,  also,  by  afterwards,  to  wit:  on  the  four 
teenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  aforesaid,  detaching 
colonel  Duncan  Mac  Arthur,  colonel  of  a  regiment  of 
Ohio  volunteers,  and  colonel  Lewis  Cass,  colonel  of 
another  regiment  of  Ohio  volunteers,  with  the  num 
ber  or  about  the  number  of  four  hundred  men,  as 
well  to  attempt  again  to  open  the  said  communica 
tion  between  the  said  fort  Detroit  and  the  said 
army  of  the  said  United  States,  under  the  command 
of  the  said  brigadier  general  William  Hull  as  afore 
said,  and  the  said  American  settlement  and  mili 
tary  post  at  the  river  Raisin  aforesaid,  in  the  terri 
tory  of  Michigan  aforesaid,  as  to  escort  certain  pro 
visions  from  the  said  American  settlement  and  mi 
litary  post  to  Detroit  aforesaid,  without  issuing,  fur 
nishing,  and  forwarding,  or  causing  to  be  issued,  furnish 
ed  and  forwarded  to  the  said  last  mentioned  detach 
ment  an  adequate  supply  of  provisions  for  the  service 
on  which  they  were  employed  as  aforesaid,  (the  said 
brigadier  general  William  Hull  having  sufficient  cause 
to  know  or  to  believe  that  the  said  last  mentioned  de 
tachment  was  in  wrant  of  a  further  supply  of  provi 
sions  upon  the  service  aforesaid,  and  that  they  could 
not  prosecute  and  accomplish  the  said  service  unless 
such  further  supply  was  issued,  furnished,  and  for 
warded  to  them  ;)  whereby  the  said  detachment,  un 
der  the  said  major  Thomas  B.  Van  Horn,  being  en 
countered  by  the  enemy  with  a  superiour  force,  was 
defeated  and  returned  to  Detroit  aforesaid,  without  ac 
complishing  the  service  on  which  they  wrere  employ 
ed  as  aforesaid;  the  said  detachment  under  the  said 
lieutenant  colonel  Janifes*  Miller,  having  achieved  a 
signal  victory  over  the  enemy  during  the  march  on 


GENERAL  HULL.  xliii 

the  service  aforesaid,  at  or  near  Brownstown  afore 
said,  were  nevertheless  compelled,  from  the  want  of 
an  adequate  supply  of  provisions,  to  abandon  the  ser 
vice  on  which  they  were  emploj^ed  as  aforesaid,  and 
to  return  to  Detroit  aforesaid;  the  said  detachment 
under  the  said  colonel  Duncan  Mac  Arthur  and  the 
said  colonel  Lewis  Cass,  from  want  of  an  adequate 
supply  of  provisions  were  unable  to  prosecute  and  ac 
complish  the  service  on  which  they  were  employed 
as  aforesaid,  and  were  returning  to  Detroit  afore 
said,  at  the  time  of  the  abandonment  and  surren 
der  of  the  said  fort  Detroit  and  the  said  army  of 
the  United  States  to  the  British  forces  under  the 
command  of  major  general  Brock  as  aforesaid :  and 
finally,  the  said  communication  between  the  said 
fort  Detroit  and  the  said  army  of  the  United  States, 
under  the  command  of  the  said  brigadier  general  Wil 
liam  Hull,  and  the  said  American  settlement  and  mi 
litary  post  at  the  said  river  Raisin,  in  the  territory  of 
Michigan  aforesaid,  by  reasons  of  the  said  neglects 
and  omissions  of  the  said  brigadier  general  William 
Hull  as  aforesaid,  was,  and  remained  interrupted  and 
totally  cut  off  by  the  enemy,  to  wit :  from  the  said 
first  day  of  August,  in  the  year  aforesaid,  or  from  some 
other  day  in  the  said  month  of  August,  or  in  the  pre 
ceding  month  of  July,  in  the  year  aforesaid,  to  and 
including  the  said  sixteenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year 
aforesaid. 

SIXTH  SPECIFICATION.  And,  also,  in  this  : — That 
during  the  continuance  of  the  said  war,  so  as  aforesaid 
carried  on  and  prosecuted  by  and  between  the  said 
United  States  of  America  and  their  territories,  and 
the  said  united  kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
and  the  dependencies  thereof,  the  said  brigadier  ge 
neral  William  Hull,  with  the  said  north-western  army 
of  the  said  United  States,  under  his  command  as  afore 
said,  having  invaded  and  entered  the  said  British  pro 
vince  of  Upper  Canada  as  aforesaid,  and  having  de 
clared  anil  avowed  an  intention  and  design  of  invest;- 


*liv  CHARGES  AGAINST 

ing  and  attacking  the  said  British  fort  called  Mai 
den,  otherwise  called  Amherstburgh,  in  the  said 
British  province  of  Upper  Canada,  and  a  detach 
ment  of  the  said  army  under  his  command  as  afore 
said,  led  by  the  said  colonel  Lewis  Cass,  and  the 
said  lieutenant  colonel  James  Miller,  having  attack 
ed  and  repulsed  the  enemy,  and  seized  upon  a  cer 
tain  bridge  over  the  river,  called  the  river  Aux  Ca 
nard,  on  the  rout  from  Sandwich,  in  the  said  Bri 
tish  province  of  Upper  Canada,  to  the  said  British 
fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherstburgh, 
and  an  opportunity  having  thereby  been  offered  for 
an  immediate  investment  and  attack  upon  the  said 
British  fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Am 
herstburgh;  yet  the  said  brigadier  general  William 
Hall,  well  knowing  the  premises,  and  unmindful  of 
the  trust  reposed  in  him,  to  wit :  on  or  about  the 
eighteenth  day  of  July,  in  the  year  one  thousand 
eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  at  Sandwich 
aforesaid,  in  the  British  province  of  Upper  Canada 
aforesaid,  was  guilty  of  neglect  of  duty  and  un- 
officerlike  conduct,  by  neglecting  and  omitting  to 
advance  with  the  said  army  under  his  command  as 
aforesaid,  to  maintain  or  attempt  to  maintain  the 
possession  of  the  said  bridge  over  the  said  river,  call 
ed  the  river  Aux  Canard,  and  by  neglecting  and 
omitting  to  proceed  to  the  immediate  investment 
and  attack  of  the  said  British  fort  called  Maiden, 
otherwise  called  Amherstburgh,  in  the  said  British  pro 
vince  of  Upper  Canada,  whereby  the  advantage  of 
acquiring  and  keeping  possession  of  the  said  bridge 
over  the  said  river  called  the  river  Aux  Canard,  as 
aforesaid,  was  improvidently  lost,  and  the  prospect  of 
a  successful  investment  and  attack  upon  the  said  Bri 
tish  fort  called  Maiden,  otherwise  called  Amherst 
burgh,  speedily  vanished. 

SEVENTH  SPECIFICATION.     And,  also,  in  this :-— 
That  during  the  continuance  of  the  said  war,  so  as 
carried  on  ami  prosecuted  by  and  between 


GENERAL  HULL.  xhr 

tiie  said  United  States  of  America  and  their  territories, 
"ind  the  said  united  kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire 
land,  and  the  dependencies  thereof,  the  said  brigadier 
general  William  Hull,  with  the  said  north-western  ar 
my  of  the  said  United  States  under  his  command  as 
aforesaid,  having  evacuated  the  said  British  province 
of  Upper  Canada,  returning  thence  to  Detroit  afore 
said,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan  aforesaid,  the  ene 
my  having  afterwards  taken  possession  of  the  bank  of 
the  said  river  Detroit,  opposite  to  Detroit  aforesaid, 
arid  thereon  erected  batteries  wherewith  to  attack  and 
annoy  as  well  the  said  fort  of  Detroit,  and  the  Ameri 
can  posts  and  batteries  erected  and  established  near 
thereto,  as  the  town  of  Detroit  in  the  said  territory  of 
Michigan ;  the  enemy  having  also  manifested  an  in 
tention  and  design  to  invade  and  enter  the  said  terri 
tory  of  Michigan,  and  to  invest  and  attack  the  said 
fort  Detroit;  and  the  enemy  having  also  afterwards, 
in  pursuance  of  such  intention  and  design,  landed  at  a 
place  called  Spring  Wells,  otherwise  called  Spring 
Hill,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  said  fort  Detroit, 
in  the  territory  of  Michigan  aforesaid  ;  yet  the  said 
brigadier  general  William  Hull,  well  knowing  the 
premises,  and  unmindful  of  the  trust  reposed  in  him, 
to  wit :  from  the  eleventh  day  of  August,  to  and  in 
cluding  the  sixteenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  twelve  aforesaid,  wa* 
guilty  of  neglect  of  duty  and  unofficerlike  conduct, 
by  neglecting  and  omitting  to  prevent,  and  to  attempt 
to  prevent  the  enemy  from  erecting  the  said  batteries 
on  the  bank  of  the  said  river  Detroit,  opposite  to  the 
said  fort  of  Detroit,  aforesaid :  by  neglecting  and 
omitting  to  fortify  the  landing  place  at  the  said  Spring 
Wells,  otherwise  called  Spring  Hill,  in  the  territory 
of  Michigan  aforesaid ;  and  by  neglecting  and  omit 
ting  to  annoy  and  attack  the  enemy  on  and  after  his 
landing  at  Spring  Wells,  otherwise  called  Spring 
Hill  aforesaid,  in  the  territory  of  Michigan  aforesaid ; 
whereby  the  enemy  was  enabled  securely  to  erect 


xlvi    CHARGES  AGAINST  GEN.  HULL. 

the  said  batteries  on  the  bank  of  the  said  river  Detroit 
as  aforesaid,  for  attacking  and  annoying  as  well  the 
said  fort  of  Detroit,  and  the  American  posts  and 
batteries  erected  and  established  near  thereto,  as  the 
said  town  of  Detroit,  to  invade  the  said  territory  of 
Michigan  without  opposition  or  loss,  and  to  approach 
the  said  fort  Detroit  with  the  air  and  confidence  of 
a  triumph, 

A.  J.  DALLAS, 

Judge  Advocate* 


DEFENCE 


OF 


BRIGADIER  GENERAL  HULL. 


>Ir,  President, 

And  Gentlemen  of  the  Court-Martial, 

1  HAVE  too  long,  and  too  severely  felt  the  effects  of 
public  prejudice,  excited  by  unfounded  reports  and 
groundless  clamours,  not  to  rejoice,  that  the  time  has 
arrived,  when  I  may  speak  in  my  own  vindication, 
^before  an  impartial  and  honourable  tribunal. 

The  charges,  upon  which  you  are  now  to  decide, 
have  been  propagated  through  the  union,  writh  a  seal 
and  industry,  to  which  my  age,  my  character,  and  my 
former  services,  have  been  in  vain  opposed. 

My  reputation  and  feelings  have  been  the  sport  of 
every  one,  who  either  from  malicious,  selfish,  or  poli 
tical  motives,  chose  to  traduce  me.  The  time  has 
been,  when  no  one  would  have  dared  to  couple  disho 
nour  with  my  name ;  when  my  heart  has  exulted  to 
find  myself  mentioned  among  those  who  deserved 
well  of  their  country.  But  since  my  efforts  to  serve 


2  DEFENCE  OF 

her,  have  been  unsuccessful,  how  have  I  been  tortured 
with  cruel  and  unfounded  accusations !— Even  con 
scious  innocence  has  not  always  given  me  fortitude 
to  bear  with  this  injustice,  unmoved.— Knowing  the 
integrity  of  my  own  motives,  and  how  zealously  I 
have  sought  to  discharge  my  duty  to  the  public,  my 
heart  has  often  swollen  with  indignation,  when  I  have 
seen  the  indefatigable  pains  that  have  been  taken,  by 
repetitions  of  the  foulest  calumnies,  to  excite,  and  keep 
alive,  prejudices  against  me.  Your  own  knowledge, 
Gentlemen,  of  what  has  been  passing  in  the  world, 
will  convince  you,  that  this  is  not  declamation ;  but  I 
shall  shew  you,  in  the  course  of  my  defence,  that  men, 
from  whose  profession  and  whose  rank  it  was  not  to 
be  expected,  have  been  parties  in  this  injustice. 

At  length,  however,  the  time  I  have  so  anxiously 
desired  has  arrived,  when  my  conduct  must  be  tested 
by  evidence,  instead  of  the  misrepresentations  of  my 
enemies.  And  I  do  eel  a  confidence,  that  when 
you  have  pronounced  upon  that  evidence,  I  may  ap 
peal  to  your  judgment  to  refute  the  clamours  which 
have  been  raised  against  me. 

I  cannot  but  think,  Mr.  President,  that  the  charges 
against  me  are  exhibited  in  a  form,  hitherto  unprece 
dented  in  proceedings  of  this  nature.  It  was  not  to 
be  expected,  that  in  a  court  where  the  accused, 
whatever  may  be  his  infirmities  or  incapacity  to  at 
tend  to  his  own  defence,  is  not  permitted  to  have 
the  benefit  of  counsel,  the  charges  would  be  envelop- 


GENERAL  HULL.  3 

t?d  in  such  a  profusion  of  words,  that  it  m . difficult  for 
one,  not  accustomed  to  the  technical  forms  of  pleadings 
in  the  civil  courts,  to  understand  them,  and  be  so 
complicated  by  repetitions,  that  it  is  still  more  diffi 
cult  to  reduce  them  to  any  order  or  analysis. 

It  is  extremely  important,  however,  that  the  Court 
should  ascertain,  and  always  bear  in  mind,  precisely 
of  what  I  am  accused.  The  course  of  proceeding:, 
which  has  been  adopted  by  the  Court,  renders  this 
the  more  necessary,  as  testimony  has  been  given, 
which  certainly  cannot  be  applied  to  any  of  the  spe 
cifications.  The  Court  have  thought  proper  to  ad 
mit  it,  with  an  intimation,  that  any  further  objection, 
which  I  might  offer  to  its  propriety  or  relevancy,  when 
I  arrived  at  this  stage  of  my  defence,  would  be  con 
sidered. — In  submission  to  this  decision  of  the  Court, 
I  have  omitted  to  make  objections  on  this  ground  in 
several  instances. 

I  shall  not  attempt  to  offer  an  argument  to  the 
Court,  to  prove  the  injustice  of  making  one  charge 
against  a  person,  and  trying  and  convicting  him  on  an 
other.  I  did  however  understand  from  what  passed, 
when  I  first  submitted  to  the  Court  an  objection  of  this 
nature,  that  an  opinion  was  entertained  by  some  of  the 
members,  that  though  the  testimony  might  not  apply  to 
any  specification,  yet  if  the  fact  intended  to  be  proved 
would  come  under  either  of  the  general  charges,  the 
testimony  would  be  proper.  If  this  were  so,  then 
there  would  be  no  use  in  the  specifications.  Indeed 


4  DEFENCE  OF 

they  would  be  worse  than  useless,  for  they  would  only 
mislead  the  accused,  and  induce  him  to  prepare 
against  one  accusation,  when  he  might  be  tried  on 
another.  The  impropriety  of  admitting  any  thing  un 
der  the  general  charge,  for  which  there  is  not  a  spe 
cification,  I  think  will  appear  manifest.  Let  us  sup 
pose,  that  a  general  charge  is  made  of  unofficer-like 
conduct,  and  the  only  specification,  insulting  a  supe- 
riour.  Suppose  that  under  this  general  charge  and 
specification,  testimony  should  be  offered  of  absence 
without  leave.  This  would  also  be  unofficer-like  con 
duct,  and  therefore  would  come  under  the  general 
charge.  But  would  it  not  be  the  height  of  injustice  to 
try  the  accused  for  absenting  himself;  a  crime  of 
which  the  charges  gave  him  no  notice.  I  trust  the 
Court  will  see  the  validity  of  the  objection  I  am  con 
sidering,  and  that  they  will  be  careful  to  give  no 
weight  to  any  part  of  the  testimony,  which  does  not 
apply  to  some  one  of  the  specifications. 

I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  occupy  the  time  of 
the  Court  with  a  recapitulation  of  the  charges,  nor 
«hall  I  exhaust  your  patience  by  attempting,  in  my 
defence,  to  follow  the  volume  on  your  table,  through 
all  its  reiterations.  It  will  be  found,  for  the  most  part, 
to  be  a  repetition  of  the  same  facts,  displayed  in  the 
jargon  of  special  pleading,  with  an  incongruous  dis 
semination  of  such  opprobrious  epithets,  as  fancy 
might  furnish  to  heighten  the  imputation  of  guilt.  I 
shall  endeavour  to  arrange  and  consider  the  accusa 
tions  in  such  order  as  will  enable  me  to  bring  my  de- 


GENERAL  HULL.  5 

fence  into  some  compass,  and  to  be  the  better  under 
stood—I  shall  particularly  notice  the  charges,  which 
the  Judge  Advocate,  in  his  opening,  mentioned  as 
those  which  he  expected  would  be  substantiated,  and 
I  shall  not  omit  to  make  my  defence  against  every 
accusation,  which  there  has  been  the  least  testimony 
to  support. 

The  cardinal  accusations,  if  I  may  be  permitted  so 
to  express  myself,  are  founded  upon  an  alleged  delay 
at  Sandwich,  the  retreat  from  Canada,  and  the  sur 
render  at  Detroit.  If  I  can  satisfy  the  Court  that 
these  acts  were  in  themselves  necessary,  or  justifiable, 
it  will  then  remain  for  me  to  answer  such  of  the  ac 
cusations  as  relate  to  the  manner  in  which  these  acts 
were  done,  and  to  answer  also  some  charges  not  im 
mediately  connected  with  these  transactions.  This 
course  will  embrace  the  whole  of  my  defence.  Of 
this  latter  description,  is  the  first  specification,  under 
the  charge  of  treason,  which  relates  to  the  vessel  sent 
from  the  Miami,  I  shall  therefore  give  this  a  separate 
consideration ;  and  as  it  stands  first  and  highest  in  the 
black  catalogue  of  the  crimes  which  are  imputed  to 
me,  and  is  repeated  in  other  specifications,  I  shall,  in 
the  first  instance,  ask  the  attention  of  the  Court  to 
this  subject. 

I  have  already  protested  against  the  authority  of 
this  Court  to  decide  upon  this  charge,  because  trea 
son  is  a  crime  of  which  a  court  martial  has  no  cog 
nizance.  Their  power  is  confined  to  such  military 

2* 


e  DEFENCE  OF 

crimes  as  are  specified  in  the  articles  of  war.  And 
their  jurisdiction  is  so  limited,  not  only  by  the  consti 
tution,  but  by  the  very  articles  themselves.  I  have 
thought  it  my  duty,  in  the  most  solemn  manner,  to  make 
and  insist  on  this  protest,  for  the  sake  of  repelling  a 
dangerous  example,  and  not  as  it  respects  myself,  or 
the  case  now  under  your  consideration ;  for  my  only 
desire  is  to  acquit  myself  of  the  criminal  acts  and  mo 
tives  which  have  been  so  wantonly  imputed  to  me. 
If  I  cannot  succeed  in  this,  I  am  indifferent  as  to  the 
names  by  which  the  crimes  may  be  called,  and  if  I 
do  not  acquit  myself  of  the  other  charges,  which  are 
the  most  wounding  to  the  feelings  of  a  soldier,  I  am 
equally  indifferent  to  the  punishment  that  may  be  in 
flicted.  I  have  no  desire  to  preserve  a  life,  that  shall 
be  stigmatized  by  a  conviction  of  this  Court  on  the 
charges  of  cowardice. 

The  first  specification,  under  the  charge  of  treason, 
relates  to  sending  the  vessel,  on  the  first  of  July,  from 
Oie  Miami,  with  hospital  stores,  sick,  baggage,  and 
army  documents.  As  to  sending  the  vessel  with  what 
she  had  on  board,  except  the  last  article,  it  is  not  dis 
puted  ;  but  that  for  the  reasons,  which  according  to 
the  testimony  of  general  Mac  Arthur,  I  assigned  for 
it  at  the  time,  it  would  not  have  been  an  improper 
measure  had  not  war  been  declared.  The  whole 
criminality  then,  in  this  respect,  rests  on  the  truth  of 
ihe  allegation,  that  I  despatched  the  vessel,  knowing 
of  the  war;  and  with  a  design  to  give  traitorous  in 
telligence  to  the  enemy- 


GENERAL  HULL.  7 

It  is  very  certain  that  I  had  no  direct  intelligence 
of  the  war  on  the  first  of  July,  when  the  vessel  was 
despatched.  I  had  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  June  re 
ceived  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  at  War,  dated  on 
the  day  war  was  declared,  the  eighteenth  of  June; 
and  I  afterwards  received  another  letter  from  him  of 
the  same  date,  announcing  to  me  the  declaration  of 
war.  It  seems  to  have  been  intimated  that  the  letter 
of  the  eighteenth  of  June,  which  I  received  on  the 
twenty-sixth,  was  the  letter  announcing  the  war. 
But  I  think  the  testimony  of  general  Mac  Arthur 
settles  that  point.  He  acknowledges  that  I  shewed 
him  the  letter  which  I  received  on  the  twenty-sixth 
of  June  at  the  time  I  received  it.  And  also  the  letter 
which  I  received  on  the  second  of  July,  at  the  time 
that  letter  came  to  my  hands.  But  if  the  testimony 
of  general  Mac  Arthur,  and  other  witnesses,  left  any 
doubt  on  this  subject,  it  must  be  removed  by  a  reference 
to  a  letter  from  me  to  the  Secretary  at  War,  which  has 
been  read  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  dated  at  Fort  Find- 
lay  on  the  twenty-sixth  June,  which  acknowledges 
the  receipt  of  the  letter  from  him  of  the  eighteenth 
of  June,  which  I  had  then  received.  In  which  I  say, 
"in  the  event  of  a  rvarj*  it  will  be  necessary  to  pur 
sue  certain  measures.  I  think  this  is  evidence,  not 
only  that  the  letter,  which  I  had  received  on  the  twen 
ty-sixth  of  June,  was  not  the  letter  which  announced 
the  war,  but  that  the  letter  which  I  did  receive,  gave 
me  no  expectations  that  war  ^Yas  declared  when  I 
wrote. 


r 


8  DEFENCE  OP 

It  may  be  said,  however,  in  the  language  of  some 
of  the  specifications,  that  though  I  had  no  certain  in 
formation  of  the  declaration  of  war  when  I  despatch 
ed  the  vessel,  I  had  "  sufficient  cause  to  know  or  be- 
"  lieve  that  war  then  existed."  As  I  have  said  the  first 
letter  from  the  Secretary  at  War  dated  on  the  eighteenth 
of  June,  gave  me  no  cause  to  know  or  believe  the  fact, 
all  that  is  in  that  letter  which  could  by  any  possibility 
be  supposed  to  have  relation  to  such  an  event,  are 
these  few  words,  "  circumstances  have  recently  oc- 
"  curred,  which  render  it  necessary  you  should  pursue 
"  your  march  to  Detroit  with  all  possible  expectation." 
This  was  but  a  reiteration  of  my  former  orders.  In 
the  letter  from  the  Secretary  at  War  of  the  ninth  of 
April,  I  am  directed  "  to  repair  with  as  little  delay  as 
"  possible  to  Detroit."  How  then  was  I  to  infer,  from 
this  letter,  that  war  had  been  declared  ?  I  did  never 
suppose,  that  if  war  was  declared,  I  should  receive  a 
peremptory  order  from  Washington,  to  inarch  my 
whole  army,  in  all  events,  to  Detroit;  thereby  leav 
ing  the  enemy  at  Maiden,  eighteen  miles  in  my  rear, 
directly  on  my  line  of  communication,  with  all  the 
facilities  which  he  had,  by  reason  of  his  command  of 
the  waters,  to  cut  off  my  supplies.  Such  an  order  ap 
peared  to  me  so  inconsistent  with  my  military  expe 
rience,  that  I  did  not  suppose  it  could  have  been  found 
ed  on  a  declaration  of  war,  or  even  on  a  prospect  of 
immediate  hostilities.  I  did  suppose,  that,  in  the  event 
of  a  war,  a  discretion  would  have  been  left  me,  to 
conduct  my  troops  in  such  a  manner,  as  I  might  judge 
from  circumstances  would  be  most  conducive  to  theic 


GENERAL  HULL.  9 

security,  and  most  likely  to  effect  the  destruction  of 
the  enemy ;  and  that  I  should  have  been  left  at  liberty 
to  post  my  army  in  what  I  might  think  the  most  ad 
vantageous  situation.  I  did  suppose,  that  when  it  was 
seen  that  war  would  be  immediate  and  inevitable,  I 
should  have  been  informed  of  measures  taken  to  re 
inforce  me,  and  to  keep  open  the  road,  which  it  was 
known  I  was  obliged  to  make  for  near  two  hundred 
miles  through  the  wilderness,  and  on  which  my  army 
must  depend  for  its  supplies.  I  did  suppose,  that  I 
should  have  been  informed  of  co-operations  intended 
for  my  support,  and  of  means  provided  for  my  com 
municating  with  those  who  might  direct  those  co-ope 
rations.  And  I  did  suppose,  that  I  should  have  been 
informed  of  measures  taken  to  obtain  the  command 
of  the  waters.  All  my  intercourse,  as  well  previous 
ly  as  subsequently  to  my  appointment,  as  I  shall  here 
after  prove,  with  the  executive  officers  of  the  govern 
ment,  gave  me  reason  to  expect,  that  all  these  mea 
sures  would  be  pursued  in  the  event  of  a  war.  How 
then  was  I  to  understand,  from  this  simple  intimation, 
that  circumstances  had  occurred  which  required  that 
I  should  pursue  my  march  to  Detroit  with  expedi 
tion,  that  war  was  actually  declared  or  immediately 
expected?  Besides,  it  naturally  occurred  to  me,  that 
if  the  circumstances  alluded  to  by  the  Secretary  \vere 
a  declaration  of  war,  or  such  as  would  immediately 
lead  to  it,  I  should  be  told  so  explicitly.  I  could  con 
ceive  no  reason  for  making  his  communication  to  me 
in  ambiguous  terms. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  general  Mac  Arthur  has 
proved,  by  the  testimony  which  he  has  given,  relative 


10  DEFENCE  OP 

to  conversations  he  had  with  me  when  I  received  tLe 
letter  from  the  Secretary  at  War,  on  the  twenty-sixth 
June,  and  when  I  despatched  the  vessel  on  the  first 
of  July,  that  I  had  "sufficient  cause  to  know  or 
"  believe  that  war  then  existed." 

General  Mac  Arthur's  testimony  on  this  subject  is 
as  follows :  "  On  the  evening  of  the  twenty-sixth  of 
"  June,  an  express  arrived  from  Chillicothe,  bearing  a 
a  letter  for  me,  another  for  general  Hull.  I  went 
"  with  the  bearer  to  general  Hull,  who  opened  his  let- 
"  ter  and  handed  it  to  me.  It  was  from  the  Secretary 
"  at  War,  dated  June  eighteen,  eighteen  hundred  and 
"  twelve.  It  stated,  that  circumstances  had  occurred 
"  that  made  it  necessary  that  the  General  should  pro- 
"  ceed  to  Detroit,  take  measures  for  defence,  and  wait 
"  for  further  orders.  I  also  received  a  letter  from  a 
"  friend,  quoting  a  postscript  to  a  letter  from  general 
"  Worthington,  a  senator  in  congress,  which  postscript 
"  said,  '  before  this  reaches  you,  war  will  be  declared.' 
"  I  stated  to  the  General,  that  colonel  Dunlap,  the 
"  bearer  of  the  express,  had  told  me,  that  before  that 
"  time  war  was  declared.  The  General  then  asked 
"  me  what  I  thought  of  the  Secretary's  letter.  I  said 
"  I  thought  it  notice  of  a  declaration  of  war.  The 
"  General  said  it  seemed  very  much  like  it.  The 
"  General  and  I  had  a  great  deal  of  conversation  on 
"  the  information  we  had,  from  time  to  time,  received, 
"  and  we  appeared  to  agree  that  war  was  certainly 
"  declared," 


GENERAL  HULL.  11 

General  Mac  Arthur  further  testifies,  "  that  on  the 
:<  morning  of  the  day  on  which  we  left  the  encamp- 
"  ment  near  the  Miami,  the  General  sent  for  me  to 
"  his  tent,  and  stated  that  he  thought  of  sending  the 
"  baggage  by  water  from  that  place.  I  said  I  thought 
"  it  hazardous,  that  possibly  the  British  might  have 
"  information  of  war,  and  might  take  the  vessel. 

"  The  General  replied,  he  could  not  imagine 
*'  there  was  any  danger,  the  wind  was  fair  and  the  ves- 
"  sel  would  pass  in  a  short  time ;  adding  that  he  could 
"  not  take  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  Carrying 
"  on  the  teams  any  further.  I  think  there  wag  a  ver- 
"  bal  or  written  order  to  embark  the  baggage.  I  stat- 
"  ed  to  the  General  that  I  did  not  like  to  send  on  my 
"  baggage,  but  if  it  was  a  general  order  it  must  be 
"  complied  with.  We  proceeded  on  towards  Detroit, 
"  and  on  the  first  or  second  evening  after,  the  com- 
"  mandants  of  corps  were  called  to  the  tent  of  general 
"  Hull,  and  were  informed,  that  a  letter  had  been  re- 
"  ceived  from  the  Secretary  at  War,  announcing  the 
"  declaration  of  war.'*  The  witness  further  stated  in 
some  part  of  his  examination,  that  notwithstanding 
the  order,  he  sent  nothing  by  the  vessel  but  his  mess 
boxes. 

I  must  beg  leave  first  to  remark  to  the  Court,  that 
this  testimony  of  general  Mac  Arthur  affords  strong 
evidence  of  the  fallibility  of  his  memory.  For  he 
states,  that  the  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  which 
I  shewed  to  him  at  Fort  Findlay  on  the  twenty-sixth 


12  DEFENCE  OF 

of  June,  ordered  me  to  "  proceed  to  Detroit,  take  mea 
sures  for  defence,  and  wait  for  further  orders."  An  order 
to  prepare  for  defence  would  have  been  a  much  more 
significant  intimation  of  a  declaration  of  war  than  any 
thing  the  letter  contained.  A  copy  of  the  letter  fur 
nished  by  the  War  Department  is  before  the  Court,  and 
will  prove  how  far  general  Mac  Arthur  may  be  mis 
taken.  The  expressions  which  he  gives,  as  having 
been  contained  in  the  letter  which  he  saw  on  the 
twenty-sixth  of  June,  are  contained  in  the  letter  an 
nouncing  the  war,  which  was  shewn  to  him  on  the 
second  oT  July.  1 1  cannot  be  pretended,  that  he  might 
have  seen  this  last  mentioned  letter  on  the  twenty- 
sixth  of  June,  because  if  that  had  been  so,  there  could 
not  have  been,  after  the  explicit  information  contain 
ed  in  that  letter,  any  such  debate,  as  he  states  there 
was  between  us  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  June,  as  to  the 
possibility  of  war  having  been  declared.  I  do  not 
mean  to  charge  general  Mac  Arthur  with  a  wilful  mis 
representation.  I  have  no  doubt  but  that  the  zeal, 
which  he  has  manifested  for  my  conviction,  has  led 
him  into  this  mistake.  As  this  is  the  highest  charge 
against  me,  he  probably  has  felt  the  most  anxiety  that 
it  should  be  substantiated;  and  his  mind  has  adopted 
as  the  impressions  of  his  memory,  what  are  only  the 
results  of  his  wishes.  I  mark  this  inaccuracy  of  ge 
neral  Mac  Arthur  (he  more  particularly,  to  shew,  that 
inasmuch  as  he  was  so  materially  mistaken,  with  re 
spect  to  the  contents  of  the  letter  which  he  states  he 
bad  in  his  hand,  and  deliberately  perused,  and  has 
confounded  what  passed  at  one  time  with  what  occur- 


GENERAL  HULL.  13 

red  at  another,  he  may  very  possibly  be  as  far  mis 
taken  in  relation  to  the  conversations  he  has  related. 

I  do  aver,  that,  in  respect  to  the  conversation  which 
he  relates  as  having  passed  between  us  on  the  twenty- 
sixth  of  June,  he  is  mistaken ;  or  rather,  he  represents 
it  in  a  manner  calculated  to  make  impressions  alto 
gether  different  from  what  in  truth  it  ought  to  do.  After 
he  had  informed  me  of  the  letter  he  had  received, 
quoting  the  postscript  from  general  Worthington,  and 
after  he  had  communicated  to  me  what  had  been  said 
by  colonel  Dunlap,  the  bearer  of  the  letters,  I  might 
have  said,  it  seemed  like  war,  or  made  use  of  some 
expression  df  that  sort.  But  I  deny  that  I  ever  said 
that  the  Secretary's  Letter  seemed  like  war ;  on  the  con 
trary,  that  letter  induced  me  to  suppose,  notwithstand 
ing  the  postscript  from  general  Worthington  and  the 
information  of  colonel  Dunlap,  that  war  could  not 
have  been  declared. 

I  beg  the  Court  to  remark,  that  neither  the  post 
script,  nor  the  information  of  colonel  Dunlap  did  state, 
or  could  have  stated,  that  war  was  declared ;  but  merely 
gave  theiObpinions,  that  war  would  be  declared  by 
the  time  tht  letters  were  received,  without  stating  any 
grounds  for  their  opinions/  Considering  however  the 
information  of  general  Worthington  as  coming  from 
a  source  entitled  to  great  respect  and  consideration, 
it  induced  me  to  think  it  possible,  that  war  might 
have  been  declared.  But  when  I  found  day  after  day 
passing  without  intelligence  from  the  Government, 
3 


14  DEFENCE  OF 

when  I  found  that  on  the  first  of  July,  five  days  hail 
elapsed  since  the  arrival  of  colonel  Dunlap,  and  when 
I  felt  confident  that  not  a  moment  would  be  lost  in 
despatching  a  messenger  to  me,  whenever  war  was 
declared,  I  wras  satisfied  that  the  information,  which 
had  been  communicated  to  me  through  general 
Mac  Arthur,  had  no  other  foundation  than  those  ru 
mours  and  expectations,  which  had  been  so  long  afloat 
throughout  the  country. — One  circumstance  was  a 
strong  inducement  to  believe,  that  the  relations  of 
peace  with  Great  Britain  had  not  been  interrupted. 
When  I  left  Washington,  the  Secretary  of  War  had 
iold  me,  it  was  not  expected  that  war  would  be  de 
clared  before  the  fourth  of  July.  This  is  a  fact, 
though  the  Secretary  at  War  has  answered  to  the  ninth 
interrogatory  addressed  to  him,  that  "  he  had  not  such 
"a  recollection  of  the  conversation  between  us  re- 
"  specting  the  probable  time  of  the  declaration  of  war, 
uas  to  enable  him  to  answer  satisfactorily  on  that 
"  subject." 

But  as  I  had  not  on  the  first  of  July,  when  I  des 
patched  the  vessel,  received  myself  any  information 
of  the  declaration  of  war,  I  was  to  presu^|,  that  the 
enemy  could  not  have  been  apprised  oMhat  event. 
It  appeared  to  me  an  inadmissible  imputation  on  the 
administration,  to  suppose  it  possible,  that  they  would 
suffer  information  of  intended  hostilities  to  be  convey 
ed  to  the  enemy,  before  it  could  reach  their  own  Ge 
neral — Yet  it  was  fourteen  days  after  war  was  de 
clared  before  I  had  any  information  of  it :  though 
it  appears,  that  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  at  War, 


GENERAL  HULL.  15 

written  on  the  eighteenth  of  June,  had  reached  me  at 
Fort  Findlay  in  seven  days,  and  an  attention  to  the 
dates  of  the  correspondence  between  me  and  the  War 
Department  will  shew,  that  the  communication  be 
tween  the  City  of  Washington  and  the  army,  even 
when  it  was  in  Canada,  might  be  made  in  eight  or  ten 
days.     In  the  Secretary's  letter  to  me  of  the  first  of 
August,  which  has  been  read,  he  acknowledges  the 
receipt  of  mine  of  the  nineteenth  of  July  by  captain 
Curtis,  who  left  my  head  quarters  at  Sandwich  oh  the 
twentieth  of  July.     I  never  heard  that  any  duplicate 
of  the  letter  of  the  eighteenth  of  June  was  written  to  me, 
or  that  the  letter  was  delayed  by  any  accident ;  nor  do 
I  know  that  any  letter  was  written  to  me  by  the  ad 
ministration,  after  war  was  declared,  except  the  one 
of  the  eighteenth  of  June,  till  the  twenty-fourth  of  the 
same  month,  when  six  days  had  elapsed.     A  letter 
written  at  Washington  on  the  eighteenth  of  June 
might  have  reached  me  by  express  in  five  days.    But 
the  letter  which  was  to  give  me  the  first  information 
of  the  war,'  if  it  left  Washington  on  the  eighteenth  or 
nineteenth  of  June,  could  not  have  travelled  at  a 
greater  rate  than  thirty  miles  a  day. 

I  think,  after  this  statement,  the  Court  will  not  say, 
that  it  was  treasonable  in  me  to  conclude,  that  it  was 
impossible  the  administration  should  have  left  me  ig 
norant  of  the  war,  when  it  might  be  known  to  the 
enemy. 

•-,--  !*>-—..:.-"•'' 

I  beg  to  direct  the  attention  of  the  Court  to  the 
testimony  of  general  Cass  upon  this  point.  He  had 


18  DEFENCE  OF 

a  perfect  knowledge  of  all  the  circumstances,  with 
which  general  Mac  Arthur  and  myself  were  acquaint 
ed.  He  had  seen  the  letter  of  the  eighteenth  of  June 
from  the  Secretary  at  War,  which  I  received-  on  the 
twenty-sixth.  He  knew  what  information  general 
Mac  Arthur  had  received  from  his  correspondent  and 
from  colonel  Dunlap.  He  testifies,  that  when  the 
vessel  was  despatched  from  the  Miami,  he  had  no  rea 
son  to  believe  that,  at  that  time,  I  knew  of  the  war- 
He  had  no  conversation  with  me,  which  could  induce 
such  a  belief.  He  sent  his  own  baggage  and  servant 
by  the  vessel  which,  on  his  cross  examination,  he  say  & 
he  certainly  should  not  have  done,  if  he  had  had  any 
thought  that  war  then  existed. 

But  it  appears,  that,  immediately  after  the  receipt 
of  the  letter  announcing  to  me  the  declaration  of  war- 
I  used  every  possible  exertion  to  recal  the  vessel.  I 
refer  the  Court  on  this  point  to  the  testimony  of  cap 
tain  Fuller.  This  conduct  is  entirely  inconsistent 
with  the  criminal  intentions  which  are  imputed  to 
me  in  respect  to  this  transaction. 

It  remains  for  me  to  notice  that  part  of  this  charge, 
which  states,  that  I  put  on  board  the  army  documents 
and  papers,  whereby  the  enemy  were  made  acquaint 
ed  with  the  force  of  the  army,  the  designs  of  the 
government,  and  with  the  declaration  of  war. 

I  do  not  hesitate  to  acknowledge,  that  it  was  im 
proper  to  trust  the  documents  "which  were  put  on 


GENERAL  HULL.  17 

{board  that  vessel  to  such  a  conveyance,  or  even  for 
me  to  part  with  them  in  any  way,  whether  in  peace  or 
war.     But  I  trust  it  has  satisfactorily  appeared  to  the 
Court,  from  the  testimony  of  captain  Hull,  that  this 
was  owing  to  an  accident,  which   might  have  hap 
pened  to  the  most  careful  commander.     I  had  ordered 
my  baggage  to  be  put  on  board  the  vessel,  not  sup 
posing  it  possible  that  the  trunk,  containing  my  pa 
pers,  could  have  been  considered  by  my  aids-de-camp 
included  in  that  order,  and  it  was  not  till  after  the  ves 
sel  had  departed,  that  with  equal  surprise  and  regret  I 
learnt  that  my  aids-de-camp  had,  with  my  baggage, 
shipped  a  trunk  which  contained  nothing  but  papers. 
There  is  one  allegation  in  this  charge,  that  I  feel  my 
self  authorized  to  repel  with  some  indignation,  because 
I  think  it  could  only  have  been  made  with  a  view  to 
exculpate  others  from  misconduct  at  my  expense,  by 
an  attempt  to  make  it  be  believed,  that  the  enemy  de 
rived  a  knowledge  of  the  war  from  the  capture  of  this 
vessel.    If  this  were  so,  how  is  it  to  be  accounted  for, 
that  the  enemy  should  have  assailed  her  in  a  hostile 
manner  before  she  was  captured  ? 

The  Court  will  recollect,  that  lieutenant  Goodding 
states,  that  when  the  vessel  was  off  Bois  Banch  Island, 
the  enemy's  armed  brig  Hunter  bore  down  upon  her, 
and  that  she  was  pursued  by  a  batteau  from  Maiden, 
filled  with  armed  men.  But  the  suggestion,  that  the 
enemy  derived  their  knowledge  of  the  declaration  of 
war  from  the  papers  found  on  board  the  vessel,  is  re 
pelled  by  the  fact,  that  this  vessel  had  no  documents  on 
board  which  could  possibly  give  them  that  information. 


18  DEFENCE  OF 

She  could  not  have  had,  for  1  had  no  such  documents 
in  my  possession  at  the  time  she  sailed  from  the  Rapids 
of  the  Miami.  It  is  also  a  fact,  which  is  now  notorious, 
that  the  enemy  had  received  information  of  the  passing 
of  the  act  declaring  war,  several  days  before  I  had  any 
communication  from  Washington  on  the  subject.  It  is 
as  ungenerous  as  it  is  unjust,  to  charge  the  enemy's 
prior  knowledge  of  the  declaration  of  war  to  any  act 
of  mine* 

1  have  now  closed  my  defence  on  this  first  specifi 
cation  under  the  charge  of  treason.  And  although  I 
persist  in  my  objection  to  this  Court's  taking  cognizance 
of  that  crime,  yet  I  have  given  the  charge  a  full  exami 
nation,  because  the  same  facts  are  specified  under  the 
charge  of  unofficer-like  conduct.  And  I  shall  rely  upon 
\?hat  I  have  now  said  for  my  vindication  against  the 
specification  which  relates  to  this  subject  under  that 
charge. 

To  sustain  this  charge  of  treason  there  are  two  other 
specifications,  one  relating  to  the  supposed  delay  in  at 
tacking  Maiden  and  the  retreat  from  Sandwich  :  the 
other  to  the  surrender  of  Detroit.  But  as  there  is  a 
repetition  of  these  specifications  under  the  two  other 
charges,  I  shall  not  now  notice  them  further  than  to 
observe,  that  these  specifications,  under  the  charge  of 
treason,  allege,  that  the  delay,  the  retreat,  and  the  sur 
render,  were  all  in  pursuance  of  a  traitorous  combina 
tion  and  conspiracy  between  me  and  certain  enemies 
of  the  United  States,  whose  names  are  unknown.  If 
the  Court  had  cognizance  of  this  crime  of  treason.  I 


GENERAL  HULL.  19 

could  not  be  convicted,  unless  the  traitorous  combina 
tion  and  conspiracy  were  proved.  I  might  ask,  where 
is  the  evidence  of  any  combination  or  conspiracy  be 
tween  me  and  the  enemy  ?  But  I  forbear  with  indigna 
tion  the  examination  of  such  a  question — And  now, 
when  the  Court  has  before  it  all  the  testimony  that  the 
utmost  efforts  of  my  prosecutors  have  been  able  to  bring 
against  me,  I  ask  them  to  judge  from  what  malignant 
source  the  information  which  could  have  suggested 
this  charge  must  have  been  drawn.  Some  of  the  wit 
nesses  who  have  testified  against  me,  must  have  fur 
nished  the  materials,  from  which  the  gentleman  em 
ployed  by  the  government  to  frame  the  charges  must 
have  drawn  them.  They  must  then  have  made  sug 
gestions  to  him,  which  they  dare  not  attempt  to  sup 
port  by  their  own  oaths,  or  by  one  particle  of  proof  f 
and  which  could  have  resulted  only  from  the  bitterness 
of  their  own  hearts  towards  me. 

Pursuant  to  the  arrangement  of  my  defence,  which 
I  have  before  suggested,  I  shall  next  consider  the  spe 
cifications,  which  charge  me  with  crimes,  or  miscon 
duct,  in  delaying  to  attack  Maiden;  in  withdrawing  the 
army  from  Canada ;  and  in  making  the  final  surrender. 

There  are,  as  I  have  said,  accusations,  which  are 
not  immediately  connected  with  these  transactions, 
and  these  I  shall  notice  in  the  course  of  my  defence. 
But  if  I  should  satisfy  this  Court,  that  these  cardinal 
accusations  are  unsupported,  that  the  measures  to 
which  they  refer  were  fit  and  proper,  and  such  as  cir- 


20  DEFENCE  OF 

eumstances  required;  or  if  it  should  now  appear,  that 
a  different  course  in  respect  to  either  of  these  meas 
ures  ought  to  have  been  adopted,  yet  if  I  should  sa 
tisfy  the  members  of  this  Court,  that  in  my  conduct 
upon  these  occasions,  I  have  been  actuated  by  the 
purest  motives,  and  a  sense  of  duty,  I  trust  I  shall 
not  be  judged  criminal.  I  shall  not  pretend,  that  I 
may  not  have  erred,  but  error  and  crime  are  not  con 
vertible  terms. 

When  I  accepted  a  commission  from  the  govern 
ment,  I  pledged  to  them  my  utmost  zeal  and  ability, 
in  discharge  of  the  duties  of  the  office  they  conferred 
upon  me ;  and  I  trust  that  pledge  will  not  be  consid 
ered  as  forfeited,  though  it  should  appear  to  this 
Court,  that  on  ~ome  occasions  my  judgment  may 
have  misdirected  me.  The  profession  of  a  soldier 
would  not  be  longer  honourable,  if  neither  the  purest 
intentions,  nor  the  most  zealous  exertions  could  shield 
him  from  criminal  imputations  on  the  jerrors  of  his 
judgment. 

My  defence,  Mr.  President,  on  these  points,  as 
well  as  all  others,  will  be  a  relation  of  facts  and  cir 
cumstances,  and  an  exposition  of  the  considerations 
and  motives  which  have  governed  n^  conduct. 

You  cannot,  Gentlemen,  form  a  just  decision  upon 
my  case,  nor  judge  of  the  considerations  which  have 
influenced  my  conduct,  unless  you  understand  what 
were  my  views,  and  the  views  and  expectations  of  the 


GENERAL  HULL,  21 

executive  officers  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  in  respect  to  the  north-western  army,  its  rela 
tions,  and  objects,  when  I  accepted  my  commission  in 
April,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve. 

I  feel  some  embarrassment,  in  presenting  to  you  this 
part  of  my  case.  I  am  well  aware,  that  it  may  be 
said,  that  I  am  attempting  to  exculpate  myself  by 
censuring  others.  I  well  know  too,  that  the  political 
feelings  of  many  persons  are  so  sensible  and  warm, 
that  the  slightest  imputation  of  misconduct  against 
the  administration  will  excite  their  prejudice,  and 
that  such  prejudices  are  the  more  likely  to  be  roused, 
when  the  charge  is  made  by  one,  who  is  prosecuted 
by  the  administration.  But,  Gentlemen,  I  shall  say 
nothing  of  the  officers  of  the  government,  which  is  not 
supported  by  irrefragable  testimony.  I  shall  only  pre 
sent  for  your  consideration  facts,  which  are  proved  by 
documents  before  you,  and  shall  make  no  observations 
upon  them,  which  are  not  obviously  and  absolutely 
necessary  for  my  defence.  Much  less  shall  I  attempt 
to  charge  the  administration  with  any  wilful  miscon 
duct.  I  believe  every  member  of  it  to  have  been  ac 
tuated  by  the  purest  motives,  and  the  most  ardent  zeal 
in  preparations  for  and  prosecution  of  an  inevitable 
war.  A  w«r,  in  which  I  should  never  have  enlisted, 
had  I  not  believed  it  both  just  and  necessary.  And 
while  my  country  is  engaged  in  such  a  contest,  let  my 
former  services  to  her,  let  my  former  character  shield 
me  from  the  suspicion,  that  I  would  voluntarily  say 
one  word,*  that  shall  lessen  the  confidence  of  my 


22  DEFENCE  OF 

countrymen  in  those,  under  whose  auspices  our  bat 
tles  must  be  fought,  and  by  whose  wisdom  and  strength 
our  misfortunes  are  to  be  redeemed,  and  our  honour  is 
to  be  saved. 

But  in  my  own  vindication,  and  in  defence  of  that 
honour,  which  the  government  have  now  put  at  stake, 
I  am  obliged  to  say,  that  the  army  I  commanded  had 
not  that  co-operation  and  support,  which,  when  I  ac 
cepted  my  commission,  the  government  gave  me  rea 
son  to  expect,  and  without  the  prospect  of  which  I 
should  never,  with  the  force  that  was  placed  under 
my  command,  have  thought  of  carrying  on  offensive 
operations  against  Upper  Canada;  nor  even  have 
placed  my  army,  unless  in  obedience  to  orders,  in  the 
situation,  in  which  it  was,  after  its  arrival  on  the  wa 
ters  of  lake  Erie. 

When  I  accepted  the  command  of  the  north-west 
ern  army,  I  did  not  suppose,  that,  in  the  event  of  a 
war  with  Great  Britain,  the  force  of  that  army  would 
be  adequate  to  conquer  Upper  Canada;  nor  did  I  be 
lieve,  that  the  administration  had  such  an  opinion. 
But  on  the  contrary,  I  did  understand,  and  such  it 
will  appear  was  the  understanding  of  the  executive 
officers  of  the  government,  that  in  the  event  of  a  war, 
the  operations  of  my  army  would  be  strengthened 
and  secured  by  a  competent  naval  force  on  lake 
Erie,  and  by  the  direction  of  other  forces  against  the 
enemy's  territory. 

Had  these  expectations  been  realized,  instead  of 
having  lingered  out  so  many  months  aa  a  prosecute^ 


GENERAL  HULL.  23 

criminal ;  instead  of  now  standing  before  you  as  an 
accused,  I  might  still  have  shared  my  country's  con 
fidence. 

The  foul  charges,  to  which  I  am  now  to  answer, 
would  not  have  thus  blasted  the  laurels  of  my  youth; 
but  even  in  the  wilds  of  Canada,  and  amidst  these 
whitened  locks,  they  might  have  retained  their  pris 
tine  verdure. 

I  proceed,  Gentlemen,  to  turn  your  attention  to  the 
documents,  by  a  reference  to  which  I  mean  to  shew, 
what  were  my  views  and  expectations,  and  what  I 
had  a  right  to  suppose  were  the  views  and  expecta 
tions  of  the  administration,  on  the  subject  which  we 
are  now  considering. 

The  first  paper  read  by  the  Judge  Advocate  was  a 
memorial  addressed  by  me,  in  -eighteen  hundred  and 
nine,  to  the  then  Secretary  at  War. 

From  this  memorial  the  following  is  an  extract  :-— 

"  My  residence  at  Detroit,  for  four  years,  has  given 
"  me  some  knowledge  of  our  northern  and  western 
"  frontier,  and  I  take  the  liberty  of  communicating  to 
"  you  such  facts  as  have  fallen  under  my  observation, 
"  the  opinion  I  have  formed,  and  the  measures,  which 
*'  appear  to  me  the  most  expedient  under  the  existing 
u  state  of  things." 

After  a  variety  of  suggestions,  and  among  others, 
iha.t  though  war  should  not  take  place,  it  would  be 


24  DEFENCE  OF 

necessary  to  have  a  larger  force  in  Upper  Canada 
than  was  then  there.     The  memorial  is  as  follows  : — 

<p 

"  I  would  likewise  suggest,  for  consideration,  the  ex- 
"  pediency  of  building  some  armed  vessels  on  lake 
"  Erie,  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  the  communica- 
"  tion.  Consider,  you  have  three  military  posts  to  the 
"  north  and  w^est  of  these  waters,  and  no  other  com- 
"  munication  writh  them." 

It  is  true,  this  memorial  was  written  Li  time  of 
peace,  but  the  suggestion,  as  to  the  naval  force,  could 
only  be  with  reference  to  its  use  jn  war. 

I  do  not  know  for  what  purpose  this  memorial  was 
read  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  unless  it  were  to  shew, 
of  what  importance  I  thought  our  possession  of  De 
troit.  Sir,  my  opinion  on  that  subject  has  ever  been, 
and  is  yet  the  same,  as  expressed  in  that  memorial. 
I  thought  the  administration  had  the  same  sentiments, 
and  therefore  I  was  the  more  firmly  persuaded,  that 
they  would  have  taken  every  possible  means  to  sup 
port  the  army,  which  was  sent  for  its  protection. 
At  the  moment  I  was  surrendering  that  fortress,  a 
conviction  of  its  great  importance  increased  the 
poignant  regret,  which  I  felt  for  the  necessity  of  the 
measure. 

On  the  sixth  March,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve, 
which  was  about  a  month  before  I  was  appointed  to 
a  command  in  the  army,  I  addressed  another  me 
morial  to  the  administration,  which  is  so  important 


GENERAL  HULL.  2a 

to  shew  my  views,  with  respect  to  the  force  to  be  di 
rected"  against  Upper  Canada  in  the  event  of  a  war, 
that  1  beg  leave  to  read  the  whole  of  it.  It  is  in  the 
following  words : 

(COPY.) 
"WASHINGTON,  March  a,  1812. 

"SIR, 

"  THE  prompt  manner  in  which  you  have  adopted 
measures  for  the  protection  of  Detroit,  and  the  other 
settlements  in  the  territory  of  Michigan,  inspires  me 
with  confidence,  that  such  ulteriour  arrangements  will 
speedily  be  made,  as  the  peculiar  situation  of  that 
section  of  the  United  States  may  require. 

"  How  far  the  measures  already  adopted  will  give 
security  to  that  part  of  the  country,  in  the  event  of 
war  with  Great-Britain,  is  a  subject  worthy  of  con 
sideration. 

"  Officers  of  a  company  have  been  appointed,  with 
orders  to  recruit  in  the  territory. 

"  The  Secretary,  acting  as  Governour,  has  been  au 
thorized  to  make  a  detachment  of  four  companies  of 
militia,  and  call  them  into  actual  service. 

"  The  commanding  officer  of  Fort  Detroit  has  been 
directed  to  erect  batteries  on  the  banks  of  the  river 
Detroit,  for  the  protection  of  the  town. 
4 


20  DEFENCE  OP 

"  These, as  incipient  measures,!  very  much  approve, 
and  was  particularly  pleased  with  the  decisive  man 
ner  they  were  adopted.  It  must  be  apparent,  how 
ever,  they  add  no  physical  strength  to  that  section  of 
the  country ;  the  force  already  there  is  only  better 
organized  and  prepared  to  be  called  into  action.  The 
comparing  of  this  force  with  the  force  which  may  be 
opposed  to  us,  will  evince  the  necessity  of  additional 
means  of  defence,  if  the  country  is  wrorth  preserving. 

"  In  the  fort  of  Detroit,  I  understand  by  the  last  re 
turns,  there  are  less  than  one  hundred  regulars.  The 
population  of  the  territory  is  less  than  five  thousand, 
and  this  population  of  the  territory  principally  of  Ca 
nadian  character.  Connected  with  the  post  of  De 
troit,  and  three  hundred  miles  north,  is  the  island  of 
Michilimackinac,  where  is  a  fort  garrisoned  by  a 
company  of  regulars.  Near  the  south  bend  of  lake 
Michigan,  on  the  westerly  side,  is  Fort  Dearborn, 
likewise  garrisoned  by  a  company  of  regulars. 

"  This  is  all  the  force  on  which  we  can  at  present 
calculate,  for  the  safety  of  our  frontier,  and  for  the 
protection  of  the  Indians,  which  the  United  States 
are  bound  by  treaties  to  afford. 

"  No  support  can  be  derived  from  the  Indian  nations, 
even  in  the  event  of  war,  because  our  officers  are  in 
structed  to  advise  them  to  remain  neuter,  and  not  to 
accept  their  services  if  they  should  be  offered. 


GENERAL  HULL.  27 

"  I  will  now  consider  the  British  force  opposed  to 
this  part  of  the  United  States.  A  fort  at  Amherst- 
burgh,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Detroit  river,  garrisoned 
by  about  one  hundred  British  troops.  Another  fort 
on  the  island  of  St.  Joseph's,  at  the  mouth  of  the  river 
St.  Mary's,  garrisoned  by  about  fifty  British  troops. 
Two  armed  ships  on  lake  Erie,  which  command  the 
waters,  and  would  prevent  all  communication  from  the 
States  through  that  channel.  A  population  of  at  least 
fifty  thousand  in  that  part  of  Upper  Canada,  which  is 
connected  with  the  Detroit  river  and  lake  Erie,  and 
could  easily  be  brought  to  operate  against  our  settle 
ments. 

"  About  four  thousand  men,  principally  Canadians, 
employed  in  the  Indian  trade  and  under  British  in 
fluence  ;  and  lastly  may  be  reckoned  all  the  Indians 
in  Upper  Canada,  and  a  large  proportion  of  the  pow 
erful  nations  residing  in  the  territory  of  the  United 
States,  who  now  hold  a  constant  and  friendly  inter 
course  with  the  British  agents,  and  are  liberally  fed 
and  clothed  by  the  bounty  of  the  British  government. 

"It  appears,  from  this  statement,  that  the  British 
force  which  can  be  brought  to  operate  against  us  in 
the  territory,  is  more  than  ten  to  one,  without  includ 
ing  the  Indians. 

"  It  requires  no  difficult  reasoning  to  determine  what 
must  be  the  consequence.  That  part  of  the  United 
States  must  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  British  govern- 


28  DEFENCE  OF 

ment,  with  all  the  inhabitants,  the  forts  at  Chicago, 
Michilimackinac  and  Detroit,  and  all  the  public  stores, 
with  the  public  and  private  vessels  on  the  lake. 
This  will  give  our  enemies  the  entire  command  of  all 
the  country  north  and  north-west  of  the  Miami  of 
lake  Erie ;  and  the  settlements  on  the  western  part 
of  the  state  of  Ohio  will  be  subject  to  the-  depreda 
tions  of  the  powerful  northern  nations  of  savages. 
There  is  nothing  in  my  opinion  (in  the  event  of  war) 
can  prevent  this  state  of  things,  but  an  adequate  force 
on  the  Detroit  river,  opposite  to  the  settlements  in 
Upper  Canada, 

"  It  may  be  asked,  how  is  this  force  to  be  placed 
there,  and  how  is  it  to  be  supported  ?  If,  Sir,  we  can 
not  command  the  ocean,  we  can  command  the  inland 
lakes  of  our  country.  I  have  always  been  of  the 
opinion  that  we  ought  to  have  built  as  many  armed 
vessels  on  the  lakes  as  wrould  have  commanded  them. 
We  have  more  interest  in  them  than  the  British  na 
tion,  and  can  build  vessels  with  more  convenience. 
If  however  there  is  no  intention  of  the  kind,  that 
communication  must  be  abandoned  until  we  take 
possession  of  the  Canadas. 

"  The  army  which  marches  into  the  country  must 
open  roads  through  the  wilderness,  and  the  supplies 
of  provisions,  and  whatever  else  may  be  necessary, 
must  pass  by  land  through  the  state  of  Ohio. 

"  If  the  conquest  of  the  Canadas  is  the  object  of  the 
Government,  they  will  there  have  an  army  in  n 


GENERAL  HULL.  20 

proper  situation  to  commence  operations,  and  at 
the  same  time  protect  the  defenceless  inhabitants,  and 
controul  the  Indians  within  our  territory.  The  answer 
probably  may  be,  it  is  more  expedient  to  leave  the 
Michigan  territory  to  its  fate  and  direct  the  force  to 
Montreal.  This  will  prevent  all  communication  by 
the  St.  Lawrence  with  Upper  Canada,  and  it  must  of 
course  surrender.  In  this  expectation  I  think  it 
probable  there  would  be  a  disappointment,  if  a  force 
is,  not  sent  sufficient  to  oppose  the  British  force,  which 
may  be  collected  at  Amherstburgh  and  its  vicinity. 
Detroit,  Michilimackinac,  and  Chicago  must  fall. 
The  inhabitants  must  once  more  change  their  alle 
giance,  and  the  Indians  become  the  exclusive  friends 
and  allies  of  the  king,  their  great  father. 

"  In  the  garrisons  at  these  places  they  will  find  large 
quantities  of  arms  and  military  stores  of  every  kind. 
Upper  Canada  and  our  country,  of  which  they  will  be 
in  the  possession,  will  furnish  them  with  provisions. 
How  then  will  Upper  Canada  be  conquered,  by  pos 
sessing  Montreal  ?  They  will  be  in  the  quiet  posses 
sion  of  their  country,  and  a  part  of  ours,  and  how  are 
they  to  be  approached  ?  You  cannot  approach  them 
by  water,  because  they  comma^i  the  lakes.  In  ap- 
p'roaching  by  land,  you  must  pass  through  a  wilder 
ness,  filled  with  savages,  under  British  controul,  and 
devoted  to  British  interest. — The  consequences  of 
such  an  attempt  may  probably  be  best  learned  from 
the  history  of  the  campaign  in  that  very  country, 
conducted  by  generals  Banner,  St.  Clair,  and  Wayne. 
4* 


30  DEFENCE  OF 

In  Upper  Canada  they  have  a  governour,  who  is  a 
major-general  in  their  army,  and  who  commands  the 
regular  troops,  the  militia,  and  the  Indians.  The  \vhole 
force  of  the  country  is  therefore  combined  under 
his  command,  and  may  be  directed  to  a  single  point 
without  any  collision. 

"  From  the  preceding  statement  of  facts  and  obser 
vations  it  must  be  apparent,  that  Fort  Detroit  and 
the  settlements  in  its  neighbourhood,  and  likewise 
Miclulimackinac  and  Chicago,  under  present  circum 
stances,  are  in  the  power  of  the  British,  and  that  their 
possession  of  them  would  be  extremely  calamitous  to 
the  United  States. 

"  In  the  event  of  peace  with  England,  I  am  of  the 
opinion,  that  the  northern  frontier  ought  to  be  better 
protected  than  it  is  at  present.  In  the  event  of  war, 
and  the  object  being  the  reduction  of  the  provinces 
of  Upper  and  Lower  Canada,  I  think  it  must  be  evi 
dent,  that  the  establishment  of  an  army  at  Detroit, 
sufficient  to  defend  that  part  of  the  country,  controul 
the  Indians,  and  commence  operations  on  the  wreakest 
points  of  defence  of  the  enemy,  would  be  an  incipient 
measure,  indispensalaijpr  necessary.  With  respect  to 
the  other  points  of  attack,  I  shall  make  no  observa 
tions,  as  I  probably  shall  have  no  agency  in  them. 

"  In  considering  this  subject,  I  have  endeavoured  to 
divest  myself  of  all  local  feelings,  and  have  grounded 
jny  observations  ami  opinions  on  public  considerations 


GENERAL  HULL.  31 

alone.  Two  things  appear  to  me  to  be  certain,  one 
is,  that  in  the  event  of  war,  the  enemy  will  attempt  to 
take  possession  of  that  country,  with  a  view  to  obtain 
the  assistance  of  the  Indians  residing  in  our  territory; 
and  the  other,  that  under  its  present  circumstances 
of  defence  it  will  be  in  their  power  to  do  it.  A  part 
of  your  army,  now  recruiting,  may  be  as  well  support 
ed  and  disciplined  at  Detroit  as  at  any  other  place. 
A  force  adequate  to  the  defence  of  that  vulnerable 
point,  would  prevent  a  war  with  the  savages,  and  pro 
bably  induce  the  enemy  to  abandon  the  province  of 
Upper  Canada  without  opposition.  The  naval  force 
on  the  lakes  would,  in  that  event,  fall  into  our  pos 
session,  and  we  should  obtain  the  command  of  the 
waters,  without  the  expense  of  building  such  a  force. 

"  The  British  cannot  hold  Upper  Canada  without 
the  assistance  of  the  Indians,  and  that  assistance  they 
cannot  obtain  if  we  have  an  adequate  force  in  the 
situation  I  have  pointed  out. 

"  There  is  another  consideration  very  important.  It 
will  do  more  to  prevent  a  general  Indian  War  with 
the  Indians,  as  far  west  and  beyond  the  Mississipi,  than 
any  other  measure.  The  Indians  cannot  conduct  a 
war  without  the  assistance  of  a  civilized  nation.  The 
British  establishment  at  Amherstburgh  is  the  great 
emporium,  from  which  even  the  most  distant  Indians 
receive  their  supplies.  A  force,  at  the  point  I  men 
tioned,  would  prevent  all  communication  of  the  Indians 
with  that  post.  Indeed,  Sir,  in.  every  point  of  view 


32     ,  DEFENCE  OF 

in  which  the  subject  can  be  considered,  it  appears  to 
me  of  the  first  importance  to  adopt  the  measure. 

"  I  am  very  respectfully, 

"  Your  most  obedient  servant, 

"WILLIAM  HULL.'* 

To  this  document  is  annexed  a  copy  of  a  letter 
from  me  to  the  Secretary  at  War,  and  the  two  docu 
ments  are  certified  as  authentic  documents  in  the  fol 
lowing  words : 

"  Copy  of  the  original  on  file  in  the  War-office. 

"  D.  PARKER,  Chief  Clerk." 

'Can  it  be  supposed,  after  this  exposition  of  my 
views  of  what  would  be  the  enemy's  force  and  situa 
tion,  that  I  could  ever  have  taken  the  command  of 
about  four  hundred  regular  troops,  and  sixteen  hun 
dred  militia,  to  effect,  by  means  of  such  a  force,  with 
out  any  assistance  or  co-operation,  the  conquest  of  a 
province,  a  part  only  of  which  I  had  represented  as 
containing  fifty  thousand  inhabitants?  That  I  could 
have  contemplated  an  attack  on  an  enemy,  having  at 
its  disposal,  a  body  of  regular  troops,  the  controul  over 
countless  savages,  and  the  great  advantage  of  the 
command  of  the  lakes  and  waters  ?  This  memorial 
was  received  and  approved  by  the  Government.  This 
in  itself  is  proof  of  their  adoption  of  its  sentiments, 
and  that  it  was  their  opinion,  as  well  as  mine,  that 
in  the  event  of  a  war,  such  an  army  as  wras  put  under 
my  command  could  do  nothing  offensive,  unless  we 


GENERAL  HULL.  33 

had  a  naval  force  on  the  upper  lakes;  and  without  a 
co-operation  on  other  parts  of  the  enemy's  territory, 
which  should  distract  his  attention,  and  prevent  his 
bringing  the  greatest  weight  of  his  power  on  a  single 
point. 

A  few  days  after  I  was  appointed  to  the  command 
of  the  north  western  army,  I  presented  another  me 
morial  to  the  President,  through  the  War  Depart 
ment,  in  which  I  was  explicit,  as  to  what  might  be 
expected  from  such  a  force,  as  I  was  to  lead;  as 
to  the  necessity  of  reinforcements;  of  our  com 
manding  the  lakes ;  and  of  a  co-operation  in  other 
quarters.  My  draft  of  this  memorial  I  have  lost,  in 
the  way  which  I  shall  hereafter  explain.  The  ex 
istence  of  the  original,  and  its  general  purport,  is 
proved  by  Mr.  Eustis,  who,  in  his  answer  to  the  sixth 
and  seventh  interrogatories,  addressed  to  him,  says, 
"  I  have  a  perfect  recollection  of  your  having  present- 
"  ed  the  memorial  referred  to  in  the  interrogatory.  I 
"  recollect,"  he  adds,  "  your  attendance,  by  appoint- 
"  ment,  at  the  War  Office.  The  memorial,  or  that  part 
"  of  it  wrhich  related  to  the  naval  defence  of  lake  Erie, 
"  was  referred,  or  communicated,  to  the  Secretary  of 
"  the  Navy,  who  wras  present.  The  brig  Adams, 
"  which  had  been  employed  as  a  transport,  under  di- 
"  rection  of  the  War  Department,  became  the  subject 
"  of  conversation.  Whether  she  was  (being  then  on 
"  the  stocks  repairing)  actually  transferred  to  the  Navy 
"  Department,  I  do  not  distinctly  recollect.  If  that 
u  was  the  case,  the  evidence  is  on  record" 


34  DEFENCE  OP 

Yet  this  memorial,  or  a  copy  of  it,  I  have  never 
been  able  to  obtain.  I  have  applied  for  it  to  the  Se 
cretary  at  War.  He  referred  me  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy;  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  Mr.  Dallas; 
to  him  I  applied,  and  he  referred  me  to  the  present 
Judge  Advocate,  who  knows  nothing  of  it. 

And  finally,  when  my  trial  commenced  in  this 
city,  I  addressed  a  letter  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  requesting  him,  to  interpose  his  autho 
rity  to  procure  me  a  document,  which  I  considered 
so  important  in  my  defence. 

It  was,  Sir,  too  much  for  me  to  have  expected  an 
answer  from  the  President  himself,  though  the  time 
has  been,  when  such  an  answer  would  not  have  been 
considered  as  conferring  too  great  an  honour. 

The  President  referred  myt  letter  to  the  gentlemen 
at  the  head  of  the  War  and  Navy  Departments.  They 
also  would  not  condescend  to  answer  my  letter,  but 
handed  it  over  to  their  clerks.  The  elevation  of  these 
gentlemen  seems  to  have  rendered  them  giddy.  I 
ask,  would  it  not  have  comported  with  the  importance 
of  the  occasion,  the  decorum  due  to  an  old  man,  and 
a  veteran  soldier,  not  yet  convicted  of  any  crime,  for 
the  Secretaries  themselves  to  have  addressed  me  ? 

But  in  answer  to  my  letter,  I  received  a  letter  from 
the  Chief  Clerk  in  the  War  Office,  da  ted  twelfth  of  Fe- 
bruary,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fourteen ;  with 


GENERAL  HULL.  35 

a  certificate  from  the  chief  clerk  in  the  Navy  Depart 
ment.  The  letter  from  the  War  Office  is  in  the  fol 
lowing  words : 

"  WAR  OFFICE,  February  12th,  1814. 

i:  SIR, 

YOUR  letter  of  the  first  instant,  addressed  to  the  Pre 
sident  of  the  United  States,  has  been  referred  to  me.  In 
answer  to  which,  I  have  the  honour  to  state,  that  all 
your  communications  to  the  War  Department,  after  you 
were  appointed  brigadier  general  in  the  army,  have 
been  transmitted  to  P.  S.  Parker,  esquire,  judge  advo 
cate  of  the  court-martial,  now  sitting  at  Albany,  togeth 
er  with  such  others  as  you  had  required,  as  far  as  they 
could  be  found  on  the  files  of  this  office.  The  pub 
lic  records  of  papers  of  the  War  Department  have 
been  constantly  within  my  observation  and  charge  for 
several  years  past,  and  I  assure  you,  Sir,  I  have 
never  seen  or  heard  of  a  memoir,  pointing  out  the  ne 
cessity  of  a  navy  on  lake  Erie. 

u  Since  the  receipt  of  your  letter,  I  have  carefully 
examined  the  files,  and  inquired  of  every  gentleman 
attached  to  the  Department,  without  being  able  to 
give  any  information  on  the  subject. 

"  I  have  the  honour  to  be,  Sir, 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant. 
«  DANIEL  PARKER,  C.  C, 

-  BRIO.  GEN.  WILLIAM  HULL,  7 
"  ALBANY/'  5 


36  DEFENCE  OP 

It  is  unaccountable,  Mr.  President,  that  a  public 
document  of  this  nature  should  be  lost.  That  it  did 
exist,  and  was  on  the  files  of  the  War  Office,  is  proved 
beyond  controversy,  by  the  deposition  of  the  late 
Secretary  at  War,  who  swears  that  he  has  a  perfect 
recollection  of  it.  But  a  most  extraordinary  part  of 
this  letter  from  the  War  Department,  is  that  which 
states,  that  the  writer  has  had  the  public  records,  and 
papers  of  the  War  Department,  constantly  under  his 
charge  and  observation  for  several  years  past;  yet, 
that  he  never  knew  or  heard  of  a  memorial,  pointing 
out  the  necessity  of  a  navy  on  lake  Erie.  Mr.  Pre 
sident,  it  is  a  fact  hardly  to  be  credited,  that  the  copy 
of  the  memorial  of  the  sixth  of  March,  eighteen  hun 
dred  and  twelve,  from  which  I  made  that  copy  which 
I  have  just  read  to  the  Court,  is  certified  as  a  true 
copy  from  the  files  of  the  War  Office,  by  the  very  gen 
tleman^  who  writes  me  the  letter  of  the  twelfth  of 
February.  Let  me  quote  from  the  memorial  of  the 
sixth  of  March,  or  rather  from  the  copy  certified  as  I 
have  mentioned  above,  a  passage  which  is  in  the  fol 
lowing  words : 

"  If,  Sir,  we  cannot  command  the  ocean,  we  can 
"  command  the  inland  lakes  of  our  country.  I  have 
"  always  been  of  opinion  that  we  ought  to  have  built 
"  as  many  armed  vessels  on  the  lakes  as  would  have 
"  commanded  them.  We  have  more  interest  in  them 
"  than  the  British  nation,  and  can  build  vessels  with 
u  more  convenience.  If,  however,  there  is  no  inten- 


GENERAL  HULL.  37 

•;  tion  of  the  kind,  that  communication  must  be  aban- 
v<  doned  until  we  take  possession  of  the  Canadas." 

When  the  writer  of  the  letter  had  certified  a  copv 
of  this  memorial  but  a  few  days  ago,  how  could  he 
say,  that  he  never  knew  or  heard  of  a  memorial  point 
ing  out  the  necessity  of  a  navy  on  lake  Erie  ?- 

I  will  not  presume,  Sir,  that  the  writer  of  the  let 
ter  intends  an  equivocation,  and  designs  that  his  mean 
ing  shall  turn  upon  the  nse  of  the  word  necessity. 
This  I  think  would  not  be  consistent  with  the  solem 
nity  of  the  occasion  on  which  his  letter  is  written ; 
nor,  Sir,  would  it  serve  him :  because  it  is  impossible 
to  read  my  memoir  *6f  the  sixth  of  March,  without 
perceiving,  lhat  I  do,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end- 
point  out  the  necessity  of  a  navy,  in  every  sense  in 
which  the  word  necessity  can  be  applied  on  such  a 
subject.  I  am  very  far,  Sir,  from  meaning  to  insinuate, 
in  the  remotest  degree,  that  the  letter  from  the  Clerk 
of  the  War  Department  contains  any  intentional  mis 
representation.  His  character  and  station  protect 
him  from  such  a  suspicion,  and  as  the  memorial  which 
proves  the  inconsistency  of  the  letter  has  been  fur 
nished,  the  declaration  in  the  letter  could  not  have 
been  made  with  any  sinister  design ;  and  I  have  only 
trespassed  on  the  patience  of  the  Court  with  these 
observations  on  this  subject,  to  shew,  that  as  the  me 
morial  of  the  sixth  of  March,  eighteen  hundred  and 
twelve,  has  been  so  entirely  forgotten  at  the  War 
Office,  the  certificate  from  thence,  that  a  memorial 
5 


38  DEFENCE  OF 

pointing  out  the  necessity  of  a  navy  on  lake  Erie, 
was  never  read  or  heard  of  there,  is  no  sort  of  evi 
dence  that  another  such  memorial  may  not  have  ex 
isted  as  well  as  that  of  the  sixth  of  March. 

The  certificate  from  the  Navy  Department  has  been 
read.  It  will  appear  in  the  minutes,  and  I  shall  trou 
ble  the  Court  with  no  remarks  upon  it. 

In  respect  to  this  memorial  I  can  now  only  rest 
upon  my  own  declarations,  which  I  think,  when  I  am 
in  this  manner  deprived  of  the  benefit  of  the  paper, 
I  am  authorized  to  make.  It  did  contain  a  represen 
tation,  in  the  most  explicit  and  strongest  terms,  of 
the  necessity  of  our  having  a  naVal  force  superiour  to 
the  enemy  on  the  lakes  ;  and  that  without  it,  and  un 
less  the  army  I  was  to  command,  was  strengthened 
by  additions  to  its  numbers ;  and  unless  it  were  fol 
lowed  by  detachments,  to  keep  open  the  communica 
tion,  and  insure  its  supplies  from  Ohio;  and  unless  it 
was  supported  by  co-operations,  on  other  quarters,  my 
army  coulcl  not  be  able  to  maintain  itself  at  Detroit, 
much  less  carry  on  offensive  operations  in  the  enemy's 
country. 

That  such  were  the  views  and  sentiments  of  the 
government  as  to  my  expedition,  as  well  as  my  own. 
and  that  I  was  not  expected  to  do  more  than  protect 
Detroit,  and  that  quarter,  and  to  keep  in  awe  the  In 
dians,  will  further  appear,  from  the  facts  and  docu 
ments,  to  which  I  shall  now  refer. 


GENERAL  HULL.  39 

Upon  this  subject,  I  beg  to  turn  the  attention  of 
she  court  to  the  testimony  of  general  Porter.  It  will 
prove,  how  pressing  I  was  on  the  subject  of  a  naval 
force,  not  only  with  the  Secretaries,  but  with  the 
President  himself. 

The  deposition  of  captain  Charles  Steward,  of  the 
navy,  states,  that,  at  an  interview  he  had  with  (he 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in  the  beginning  of  April 
eighteen  hundred  and  twelve,  the  Secretary  informed 
him,  "  that  it  was  contemplated  to  give  him  the  com- 
"  mand  on  the  lakes ;  that  a  naval  force  superiour  to  the 
"  British  on  the  lakes,  had  been  strongly  urged  by 
"  general  Hull,  as  essential,  and  as  a  certain  means 
**  of  insuring  to  the  army  success." 

I  beg  the  court  to  notice  that  it  is  here  stated,  that 
I  had  strongly  urged  that  the  command  of  the  lakes 
was  essential  to  success. 

The  first  letter  which  I  received  from  the  Secretary 
of  War,  after  m^  appointment,  and  which  is  dated 
the  ninth  of  Aoril,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve, 
describes  the  force  whicfr  was  to  be  under  my  com 
mand.  The  description,  of  itself,  I  presume,  must  pre 
clude  an  idea,  that  it  could  have  been  intended  for 
invasion  or  conquest.  But  its  objects  are  expressed 
in  this  letter.  I  am  directed,  as  the  commander  of  that 
force,  to  "  adopt  such  measures  with  the  chiefs  of  the 
"  several  tribes  of  Indians,  as  might,  in  my  judgment. 


40  DEFENCE  OF 

-;  appear  to  be  best  calculated  to  secure  the  peace  of 
"  the  country.'* 

In  tlie  first  letter  which  I  received  from  the  War 
Department,  dated  the  eighteenth  of  June,  and  which 
was  delivered  to  me  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  the  same 
month,  I  am  directed  to  pursue  my  march  to  Detroit 
with  all  possible  expedition ;  and  the  second  letter 
from  the  Secretary  at  War,  of  the  same  date,  which 
announced  to  me  the  war,  gives  me  the  same  positive 
command  to  proceed  to  th§t  post.  If  the  army  I 
commanded,  had  been  deemed  competent  to  carry  on 
offensive  operations  against  the  enemy  without  any 
assistance  or  support,  my  orders  would  certainly  have 
been  of  a  different  nature. 

It  would  have  been  left  to  my  discretion,  to  pur 
sue  such  measures  as  I  might  have  judged  most  effi 
cacious.  With  an  army,  competent  to  make  an  inva 
sion,  Detroit  would  not  have  been  the  point  from 
which  it  should  have  been  made. 

* 

A  station  opposite  Amherstburgh  would  have  been 
on  many  accounts  a  preferable  position,  but  Detroit 
was  the  proper  situation  for  the  army,  for  the  purpose 
of  protecting  the  territory  and  inhabitants  of  Michi 
gan,  and  of  keeping  in  awe  the  savage  tribes. 

I  beg  that  it  may  be  observed,  that  I  do  not  pre 
tend,  that  it  was  not  contemplated,  that  the  army  I 
commanded,  when  I  was  appointed  to  it,  might  be 


GENERAL  HULL.  41 

employed  in  offensive  operations  against  the  British, 
in  the  event  of  a  Avar;  but  I  am  endeavouring  to 
shew,  and  I  trust  shall  satisfy  the  Court,  that  neither 
myself,  nor  the  officers  of  the  government,  ever  sup 
posed  it  would  be  competent  to  act  as  an  offensive 
army,  unless  it  was  assisted  and  supported ;  or  unless, 
as  was  supposed  might  be  the  case,  such  a  defection  of 
the  inhabitants  of  Canada  to  the  government,  and  a 
union  of  the  Indians  with  us,  should  happen  on  the 
appearance  of  my  army,  as  would  in  a  great  measure 
destroy  the  enemy's  means  of  resistance. 

The  next  letter  I  received  from  the  Secretary  at 
War,  is  dated  the  twenty-fourth  June,  eighteen  hun 
dred  and  twelve.  This  letter  informs  me,  that  I  am 
authorized  to  commence  offensive  operations.  This 
would  not  have  been  the  language  addressed  to  me 
upon  this  occasion,  if  the  government  had  supposed 
I  had  a  force  sufficient  to  commence  such  operations. 
In  that  case  I  should  have  received  a  command  in 
stead  of  an  authority. 

> 
In  this  letter,  the  Secretary  adverts  to  my  taking 

possession  of  Maiden;  but  not  as  if  he  supposed  I 
had  the  power  of  doing  it.  I  am  not  to  make  the  at 
tempt,  unless  the  force  under  my  command,  should  be 
equal  to  the  enterprise,  nor  unless  I  could  do  it,  con 
sistently  with  the  safety  of  my  own  posts. 

The  caution,  which  it  is  thought  necessary  to  com 
municate  to  me,  by  this  letter,  to  be  limited  in  my 

5* 


42  DEFENCE  OF 

assurances  of  protection  to  the  Canadians,  and  the 
notice  that  it  conveys  me,  that  an  adequate  force 
cannot  be  relied  upon,  for  the  reduction  of  the  enemy's 
posts  below,  is  evidence,  that  my  army  was  not  thought 
sufficient  to  maintain  itself  in  the  enemy's  country. 
Without  assistance  and  co-operation. 

In  my  letter  to  the  Secretary  at  War  of  the  ninth 
of  July,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve,  which  is  in 
answer  to  that  I  have  last  mentioned,  in  which  I  am 
told,  that  I  am  authorized  to  commence  offensive 
operations,  I  expressed,  in  the  most  explicit  terms, 
my  opinion  of  the  inadequacy  of  my  force  to  the 
only  offensive  operation  which  could  be  undertaken 
from  that  quarter.  Bly  words  are,  "  the  British  com- 
"  mand  the  water  and  the  savages ;  I  do  not  think 
"  the  force  here  equal  to  the  reduction  of  Amherst- 
"  burgh ;  you  must  not  therefore  be  too  sanguine.'* 

I  beg  the  Court  to  remark,  that  this  letter  was  writ 
ten  immediately  after  my  arrival  at  Detroit,  and  a 
few  days  before  I  passed  into^panada ;  of  course  be 
fore  I  had  any  knowledge  of  the  fall  of  Michili- 
mackinac,  an  event  which  had  so  decisive  an  influ 
ence  on  my  subsequent  operations. 

On  the  tenth  of  July,  I  wrote  two  letters  to  the 
Secretary  at  War,  both  on  the  subject  of  provisions 
for  the  army.  I  mention  to  him  in  the  first,  that  the 
contractor  could  not  furnish  the  supplies,  on  account 
of  the  lakes  being  closed  against  us,  by  the  British 
naval  force.  In  the  second  letter,  I  reiterate  the 


GENERAL  HULL.  43 

same  information;  and  also  inform  the  Secretary, 
(hat  I  have  made  a  new  contract  for  provisions,  which, 
as  they  cannot  be  transported  on  the  lake,  must  be 
carried  on  horses  from  Ohio,  through  the  wilderness. 
My  letter  concludes  with  these  words :  "  The  com- 
"  munication  must  be  secured,  or  this  army  will  be 
"  without  provisions.  Troops  will  be  absolutely  ne- 
"  cessary  on  the  road,  to  protect  the  provisions.  This 
"  must  not  be  neglected.  If  it  is,  this  army  will  perish 
"  by  hunger." 

The  receipt  of  these  letters  is  acknowledged  by 
the  Secretary  at  War,  in  his  letter  to  me  of  the  twen 
ty-sixth  of  July,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve.  To 
this  letter,  from  the  War  Department,  I  wish  particu 
larly  to  direct  the  attention  of  the  Court. 

It  shews,  that  the  government  well  understood  the 
situation  of  my  army,  and  how  much  it  stood  in  need 
of  assistance  and  support. 

By  this  letter  I  am  informed,  that  governour  Meiga 
has  been  directed  to  furnish  troops  to  guard  the  road, 
and  insure  the  transportation  of  provisions; — that 
general  Winchester  had  been  ordered  to  reinforce 
me  with  fifteen  hundred  men; — that  a  force  was 
collecting  at  Niagara ; — that  the  commander  in  chief 
would  be  apprised  of  my  situation,  and  directed  to 
take  measures  to  afford  me  the  necessary  support. 

It  is  not  my  intention,  at  this  moment,  to  shew, 
that  none  of  the  expectations,  which  this  letter  aft- 


44  DEFENCE  OF 

thorized,  were  ever  realized.  I  now  refer  to  it,  only 
as  I  have  mentioned,  to  prove,  that  the  officers  of  the 
executive  government  must  have  considered  my  army, 
situated  as  it  was,  incompetent  to  carry  on,  of  itself, 
effectual  operations  against  the  enemy. 

In  my  letter  to  the  Secretary  at  War,  of  the  nine 
teenth  of  July,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve,  are  the 
following  paragraphs  : 

"  If  you  have  not  a  force  at  Niagara,  the  whole 
force  of  the  province  will  be  directed  against  this 
army." 

"  It  is  all  important,  that  Niagara  should  be  invest 
ed — all  our  success  will  depend  on  it." 

There  has  been  read  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  a 
letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  me,  dated  the  first 
of  August.  This  letter  I  never  received.  It,  however, 
shews  no  less,  on  that  account,  how  necessary  it  was 
thought,  that  a  diversion  should  he  made,  in  favour 
of  the  army  1^  commanded.  I  therefore  extract  from 
it  the  following  paragraph  : 

"  On  the  twenty-sixth  July,  your  letters  of  the  se 
venth  and  tenth  were  enclosed  to  general  Dearborn, 
with  a  copy  of  mine  to  you  of  the  twenty-sixth,  ac 
companied  with  a  request,  that  he  would  make  a  di 
version  in  your  favour.  The  General  must  have 
received  this  letter  at  Albany.  By  the  mail  of  this 
ovening,  yours  of  the  twenty-ninth  is  enclosed  to 


GENERAL  HULL.  45 

him,  with  an   instruction,  to  make  a  diversion  at 
Niagara  and  Kingston,  as  soon  as  practicable.";. 

In  another  letter  from -the  Secretary  of  War  of  the 
first  of  August,  he  acknowledges  .the  receipt  of  my 
proclamation  to  the  Canadians.  I  now  refer  to  that 
proclamation,  merely  to  direct  the  attention  of  the 
Court  to  that  part  in  which  I  say,  that  the  force  I 
commanded  was  "  but  the  vanguard  of  a  much  great 
er."  I  do  this  to  shew  the  confidence  I  then  had, 
that  the  corps  I  commanded  was  to  be  reinforced  and 
supported. 

On  the  twentieth  of  August,  the  Secretary  of  "War 
addressed  a  letter  to  me,  which  I  did  not  receive,  but 
from  which  I  here  quote  a  paragraph,  to  shew  how 
necessary  he  thought  co-operation  was  for  my  sup 
port.  The  paragraph  is  in  the  following  words : 

"  Orders  have  been  given  to  general  Dearborn  to 
u  attack  the  enemy's  posts  at  Niagara  and  Kingston, 
"  as  soon  as  may  be  practicable.  Our  force  at  Nia- 
"  gara,  according  to  general  Dearborn's  account,  will 
"  amount  to  twenty-four  hundred,  and  he  will  notify 
"  you  of  such  movements  and  operations,  as  he  may 
"  order." 

It  is  from  these  documents,  which  have  all  been 
introduced  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  that  I  prove  what 
I  undertook  to  do,  that  when  I  took  command  of  the 
north-western  army,  it  was  understood  by  the  ad- 


46  DEFENCE  OF 

ministration,  as  well  as  by  myself,  that  in  the  event 
of  a  war  with  Great-Britain,  my  force  was  to  be  aug 
mented;  that  my  communication  with  the  state  of 
Ohio  was  to  be  preserved,  by  troops  from  that  quar 
ter  ;  that  the  lakes  were  to  be  commanded  by  us ; 
and  that  my  operations  were  to  be  facilitated  by  di 
versions  on  the  frontiers  below  me. 

The  Court  will  hereafter  perceive,  what  an  impor 
tant  influence  a  disappointment  in  all  these  particu 
lars  had  on  the  events  under  consideration ;  and  will 
not  therefore,  I  hope,  think  I  have  uselessly  trespass 
ed  on  their  time,  by  detaining  them  so  long  on  this 
part  of  the  subject. 

I  cannot,  however,  omit  one  farther  remark.  I 
would  ask  the  Court,  if  subsequent  events  do  not  ex 
clude  a  supposition,  that  the  administration  did  ex 
pect,  that  my  army  was  in  all  events  to  be  of  itself 
adequate  to  the  invasion  and  conquest  of  the  enemy's 
country;  unless  it  be  admitted,  that  there  was  an 
entire  ignorance  of  what  was  necessary  to  accomplish 
these  objects  ?  For  we  have  since  seen  general 
Harrison,  with  an  army  more  than  quadruple  to  that 
which  I  led,  for  more  than  a  year,  threatening  the 
enemy  on  the  same  point,  at  which  he  wras  invaded  by 
my  army ;  and  though  ten  thousand  troops  were  co 
operating  with  him,  on  the  points  where  I  had  been 
led  to  expect  co-operation,  yet  he  dared  not  to  set  his 
foot  oi)  the  enemy's  shore,  till  after  our  glorious  naval 
victory  on  lake  Erie,  and  was  then  obliged  to  content 


GENERAL  HULL.  47 

himself  with  the  possession  of  no  greater  territory 
than  his  troops  could  cover. 

I  must  intreat  the  Court,  before  I  proceed  to  the 
consideration  of  other  matters,  to  indulge  me  with 
the  repetition  of  a  remark  which  is  so  necessary  for 
understanding  the  subsequent  parts  of  my  defence, 
that  I  am  anxious  to  impress  it  on  their  minds. 

It  is,  that  though,  as  I  have  said,  and  I  trust  I  have 
proved,  it  was  understood  both  by  the  administration 
and  by  myself,  that  the  force  which  I  commanded 
would  not  in  all  events,  in  case  of  war,  be  competent 
to  the  invasion  and  conquest  of  Canada,  yet  both 
the  officers  of  the  executive  government  and  myself, 
did  contemplate,  that  in  certain  events,  I  might,  with 
the  army  which  I  led>  subdue  the  enemy's  posts  in  the 
Upper  Canada.  It  was  contemplated  and  believed, 
that  there  would  be  a  very  general  defection  of  the 
inhabitants  of  that  province,  and  that  many  of  them 
would  arrange  themselves  under  the  American  stan 
dard  ;  and  it  was  also  contemplated  and  believed,  that 
it  would  be  possible  for  me  to  draw  from  them  the  aid 
of  the  savages.  When  I  landed  in  Canada,  and  pre 
viously  to  the  fall  of  Michilimackinac,  there  was  every 
reason  to  suppose,  that  these  expectations  would  be 
realized.  Until  that  event  took  plice,  of  which  the 
enemy  had  notice  about  the  second  of  August,  I  had 
those  sanguine  hopes  of  success  which  I  expressed  in 
my  proclamation,  and  in  my  communications  with 
the  War  Office.  But  after  that  misfortune,  the  scene 


48  DEFENCE  OP 

was  entirely  changed.  From  that  moment,  I  saw, 
that  although  it  was  possible  that  I  might  obtain 
temporary  advantages,  yet  that  they  would  eventuate 
in  the  greatest  disasters,  unless  I  was  aided  and  sup 
ported  from  other  quarters. 

Thus,  Gentlemen,  I  have  endeavoured  to  shew  you, 
that  I  took  the  command  under  the  expectation,  that, 
in  the  event  of  a  war,  the  operations  of  my  army 
would  be  assisted,  by  a  competent  force  upon  the 
lakes,  by  detachments  to  keep  clear  the  communica 
tion  which  I  had  opened  through  the  wilderness,  and 
by  the  co-operation,  or  at  least  such  a  demonstration 
of  force  against  other  parts  of  the  enemy's  territories, 
as  would  prevent  his  directing  all  his  energies  to  the 
point  where  I  might  meet  him.  But  it  unfortunately 
happened,  that  none  of  these  expectations  were  ful 
filled.  The  effects  of  these  disappointments  will  after 
wards  be  considered. 

I  now  resume  my  vindication  of  the  measures,  which 
form  the  most  prominent  features  in  my  accusation  ; 
that  is  to  say,  the  delay  at  Sandwich  ;  the  retreat  from 
thence  ;  and  the  surrender  at  Detroit. 

It  is  necessary  for  me  to  explain  the  views  and 
intentions  1  had,  when  I  yielded  to  the  importunities 
of  my  officers,  and  crossed  to  the  enemy's  country. 

It  must  be  recollected,  that  the  order  I  received  in 
the  letter  of  the  eighteenth  of  June,  which  announced 


GENERAL  HULL.  49 

the  war,  directed  me  to  proeeed  to  Detroit,  and  there 
to  wait  for  further  orders. 

Finding  that  an  impatience  to  cross  had  been  ex 
cited  in  the  army,  which  was  likely  to  be  extremely 
injurious  to  my  authority,  and  the  discipline  of  the 
troops,  I  called  a  council  of  war,  and  laid  before  the 
officers,  the  orders  by  which  I  was  then  bound ;  and 
asked  their  advice.,  as  to  the  expediency  of  crossing. 
The  council,  notwithstanding  my  orders,  were  of 
opinion,  that  I  ought  to  cross.  I  did  not  feel  myself 
at  liberty  to  follow  their  advice,  and  determined  not 
to  do  so.  But  on  the  same  day,  I  received  the  Se 
cretary  of  War's  letter  of  the  twenty-fourth  of  June, 
in  which  he  says,  "  should  the  force  under  your  com- 
"  mand  be  equal  to  the  enterprise,  consistently  with  the 
"  safety  of  your  own  posts,  you  will  take  possession 
"  of  Maiden,  and  extend  your  conquests,  as  circum- 
"  stances  may  justify." 

I  did  not  think  the  force,  under  my  command,  equal 
to  the  conquest  of  Maiden,  nor  did  I  think,  that  with 
such  a  length  of  line  of  communication,  as  it  was  re 
quisite  for  me  to  keep  open,  I  ought  to  make  the  at 
tempt.  My  letter  to  the  Secretary  at  War,  dated  on 
this  same  ninth  of  July,  which  I  have  already  quoted, 
expresses  this  opinion  of  the  incompetency  of  my 
force,  in  terms  not  to  be  misunderstood. 

(     Yet,  as  soon  as  I  had  received  this  last  mentioned 
letter  from  the  Secretary,  I  determined  to  take  post 
6 


SG  DEFENCE  OF 

in  the  enemy's  country.  My  reasons  for  this  deter 
mination  were,  that  I  hoped  thereby  to  satisfy  the 
impatience  of  my  officers,  and  preserve  the  confidence 
of  my  army;  which  expressions  of  discontent  were 
likely  to  impair. — I  should  command  the  streights, 
and  thereby  prevent  the  enemy  from  sending  succours 
to  their  northern  posts,  or  carrying  on  the  important 
trade  of  their  north-western  company. 

I  knew,  that  it  would  have  a  great  effect  upon  the 
Indians,  to  shew  them  the  American  flag  flying  on 
both  shores;  and  I  hoped,  by  establishing  myself  at 
Sandwich,  to  facilitate  and  increase  the  defection  from 
the  British  standard,  which  had  manifested  itself 
among  the  inhabitants  and  militia,  and  their  Indian 
allies.  My  views,  in  taking  post  in  the  enemy's  ter 
ritory,  are  expressed  in  my  letters  to  the  Secretary  of 
War.  In  my  letter  of  the  ninth  of  July,  I  had,  as  I 
liave  above  mentioned,  told  him,  I  thought  my  force 
incompetent  to  attack  Maiden.  In  my  letter  of  the 
thirteenth,  written  from  Sandwich,  I  say,  "  I  consider 
"  the  possession  of  this  bank  as  highly  important ;  by 
"  erecting  one  or  two  batteries,  opposite  the  batteries 
"  at  Detroit,  the  river  will  be  completely  commanded. 
"  In  the  rear  of  the  army,  on  the  Detroit  river,  lake  St. 
1  Clair,  and  the  river  Le  Trench,  is  a  populous  and 
"  valuable  part  of  the  province.  It  is  likewise  pro- 
"  bable,  when  the  Indians  see  the  American  standard 
"  on  both  sides  the  river,  it  will  have  a  favourable 
"effect."  I  intended,  nevertheless,  without  loss  of 
time,  to  make  preparations  for  pulling  in  a  state  of 


GENERAL  HULL.  51 

service  my  field  artillery,  for  an  attack  on  Maiden ; 
and  whenever  that  should  be  ready,  and  I  should  find 
that  the  enemy's  force  was  not  likely  to  be  further 
weakened  by  desertions,  I  would  make  the  attack,  if 
I  had  a  prospect  of  co-operation  and  support  from 
below,  without  which  I  thought,  and  I  think  recent 
events  will  prove  that  I  thought  correctly,  I  could 
neither  preserve  my  own  posts  on  our  side  of  the 
river,  nor  that  which  the  enemy  then  possessed,  if  I 
should  be  so  fortunate  as  to  wrest  it  from  him. 

My  officers,  however,  were  not  less  importunate, 
for  proceeding  immediately  against  Maiden,  than  they 
had  been  to  cross  the  river. 

I  felt,  myself  compelled  to  yield  to  their  importu 
nity,  and  had  appointed  a  day  for  the  attack.  But, 
before  that  day  arrived,  I  received  intelligence,  that 
determined  me  to  postpone  the  enterprise,  and  to  re- 
cross  to  Detroit. 

As  preliminary  to  my  vindication  of  these  measures, 
it  is  important  to  consider,  what  numerical  force  I 
could  command  when  I  crossed  into  Canada;  its 
nature ;  and  the  probable  force  and  strength  of  the 
enemy. 

In  every  stage  of  this  trial,  I  have  felt  as  a  great 
misfortune,  the  want  of  that  documentary  evidence, 
which  might  be  expected  from  me.  This  arises  from 
the  loss  of  the  packet,  which  sailed  from  the  Miami ; 


52  DEFENCE  OP 

and  from  the  more  recent  loss  of  all  my  baggage,  and 
most  of  my  papers.  When  I  left  Detroit,  a  prisoner, 
I  left  my  baggage  with  my  daughter,  Mrs.  Hickman, 
to  be  carried  to  my  home  by  her.  She  soon  after 
embarked  in  the  enemy's  brig  Adams,  for  fort  Erie. 

On  her  arrival  there,  she  was  permitted  to  go  to 
Buffalo,  leaving  her  own  and  my  baggage  on  board 
the  brig.  The  same  night  the  brig  was  taken  by 
commodore  Elliot,  retaken  by  the  enemy,  and  burnt 
with  all  my  baggage  on  board. 

This  loss  of  my  documents  has  left  the  witnesses, 
who  testified  against  me,  to  speak  on  many  important 
points,  from  estimation  and  conjepture,  and  they  seem 
ed,  to  have  availed  themselves  of  the  liberty,  so  as 
always  to  make  their  estimates  such,  as  would  be  most 
against  me.  I  shall  myself  be  obliged  often  to  speak 
of  numbers  from  conjecture  and  estimate,  but  Avhen  I 
do  so,  I  shall  endeavour  to  present  to  the  Court  the 
data,  on  which  my  estimates  are  founded. 

Major'  Jessup,  the  brigade  major,  says,  that  we 
moved  into  Canada  with  sixteen  or  eighteen  hundred 
men.  Now,  neither  the  Michigan  legion,  or  the  Michi 
gan  militia,  crossed  with  the  army  into  Canada.  And 
besides,  there  were,  as  the  Court  will  recollect  has 
been  testified  by  several  of  the  witnesses,  a  portion  of 
the  Ohio  volunteers  who  refused  to  cross.  This  num 
ber  was  about  one  hundred  and  eighty. 

* 

-' 


GENERAL  HULJL.  53 

Major  Jessup  further  testifies,  "  That  some  time 
Dearly  in  August,  a  few  days  previous  to  leaving 
"  Canada,  he  was  called  into  a  council  of  war,  to  ex- 
"  plain  a  report  of  brigade,  and  that  there  were  then 
"  eighteen  hundred  effective  men  in  Canada  and  at 
"Detroit.  The  Michigan  legion  were  included  in 
"  the  eighteen  hundred,  but  the  Michigan  militia  were 
"  not" 

Now,  if  there  were  but  eighteen  hundred  belonging 
to  the  brigade  at  this  time,  including  all  that  were 
either  with  me  in  Canada,  or  at  Detroit,  and  includ 
ing  the  legion,  how  could  sixteen  or  eighteen  hun 
dred  have  crossed  with  me  ?  At  the  time  that  this 
report  of  major  Jessup's  was  made,  we  had  lost  but 
few  of  the  troops  that  had  crossed;  and  from  the 
amount,  which  he  gives  of  the  whole  forces,  at  that 
time,  to  ascertain  what  was  the  number  that  crossed, 
must  be  deducted  the  Michigan  legion,  and  the  Ohio 
volunteers  that  refused  to  pass  the  river.  This  will 
leave  an  amount  much  short  of  the  sixteen  or  eighteen 
hundred,  with  which,  major  Jessup  says,  we  passed 
into  Canada. 

The  Court  will  remember,  that  by  a  muster  roll  and 
return,  made  at  Fort  Findlay  on  the  twenty-sixth  of 
June,  which  has  been  exhibited  by  the  Judge  Advo 
cate,  the  whole  force  which  I  then  had  under  my 
command,  amounted  to  one  thousand,  nine  hundred 
and  fifty.  I  was  obliged  to  leave  detachments,  at 
Mac  Arthur's  Block-house,  at  Fort  Findlay,  and  at 
6* 


54  DEFENCE  OF 

the  Miami.  There  were  about  forty  invalids  taken 
in  the  vessel,  that  sailed  from  the  Miami.  I  left 
some  sick  at  the  river  Raisin,  and  the  whole  force 
with  which  I  arrived  at  Detroit,  I  am  convinced,  did 
not  exceed  fifteen  hundred  men.  And  I  am  confi 
dent,  that  the  force  with  which  I  passed  into  Canada, 
did  not  exceed  fourteen  hundred.  What  proportion 
of  the  militia,  which  I  bad  with  me  at  Sandwich^ 
would  have  been  effective  to  lead  against  the  enemy, 
the  Court  may  judge  from  general  experience. 

Major  Van  Horn  has  testified,  that  when  detach 
ments  were  ordered,  it  was  always  found,  that  not 
more  than  two  thirds  of  the  command  ordered  could 
be  marched.  I  do  not  believe,  that  at  any  time,  I 
could  have  led  thirteeen  hundred  effective  men  against 
Maiden.  Of  these,  there  was  only  colonel  Miller's 
regiment,  of  less  than  three  hundred,  that  had  seen  any 
service.  The  rest  were  militia,  who,  though  they 
were  very  ardent  and  patriotic  in  their  expressions 
had  had  no  experience,  and  neither  men  nor  officers, 
had  ever  been  tried.  It  is  not  extraordinary,  that  I 
should  have  felt  some  want  of  confidence  in  these 
raw  troops,  for  such  a  contest,  as  we  must  have  ex 
pected  before  Maiden ;  when  it  appears,  by  the  testi 
mony  of  colonel  Miller,  that  their  own  officers  were 
/lot  willing  to  be  responsible  for  their  firmness  in  an 
assault.  Colonel  Miller  states,  that  in  a  council,  in 
which  the  propriety  of  attacking  Maiden  was  discuss 
ed,  at  which  general  Mac  Arthur,  general  Cass,  and 
colonel  Findlay,  were  present  j  "General  Hull  said, 


GENERAL  HULL  $5 

•M  if  we  would  answer  for  our  men,  he  would  lead  us 
"  to  Maiden.  I  told  him,  I  would  answer  for  the  men 
w<  I  commanded ;  but  the  others  said,  they  would  not 
u  be  responsible  for  their  men,  but  believed  they  would 
^  behave  well." 

I  know,  sir,  that  it  may  be  said,  that  my  proclama 
tion  to  the  Canadians,  and  my  letters  to  the  Secretary 
at  War,  hold  a  different  language.  That  in  these  I 
speak  with  confidence  of  attacking  Maiden,  and  of 
the  excellence  and  sufficiency  of  my  force.  And  I 
presume  the  specifications  refer  to  my  proclamation, 
and  to  these  letters,  when  they  allege  that  I  had 
declared  and  avowed  my  intention  of  attacking  and 
subduing  Maiden.  I  cannot  conceive,  that  these 
declarations  could  prove  me  guilty,  if  my  measures 
without  them  would  not  have  been  so.  I  do  not  see, 
that  they  can  in  any  way  be  made  the  test  of  the 
propriety,  or  impropriety,  of  the  course  I  pursued. 
It  would  be  hard,  indeed,  if  every  general  were  to  be 
judged  criminal,  who  did  not  accomplish  all  the  in 
tentions  he  may  have  avowed — this  would  be  a  rule, 
which  I  presume  there  are  many  generals  would  not 
eonsent  to  establish.  If  it  were  adopted,  no  change 
of  circumstances  would  justify  the  relinquishment  of 
a  design,  once  formed. 

I  think,  when  it  is  considered  under  what  circum 
stances  my  proclamation  was  published,  it  will  not 
be  thought  just,  to  adduce  it  as  evidence  against  me 
on  this  occasion.  I  was  then  in  an  enemy's  country, 
the  inhabitants  of  which  were  sufficient,  independent 


56  DEFENCE  OP 

of  his  regular  force,  which  was  established  near  ni£, 
and  of  his  Indian  allies,  to  overwhelm  the  army  1 
commanded.  I  had  no  prospect  of  even  maintaining 
myself,  much  less  of  making  conquests ;  unless  I  could 
induce  a  great  portion  of  those  inhabitants  to  forsake 
his  standard.  It  was  incumbent  on  me  to  use  all 
means  to  deprive  him  of  aid  from  the  savage  tribes. 
I  knew  that  these  two  objects  could  only  be  effected 
by  representing  myself  as  having  the  utmost  confi 
dence  in  the  force  I  commanded,  and  that  it  was  able 
to  overcome  all  opposition.  With  these  views  I  pub 
lished  the  proclamation.  And,  indeed,  the  force  I 
commanded,  would  have  been  equal  to  all  I  represent 
ed,  had  the  same  spirit  of  desertion  and  defection  con 
tinued,  which  had  manifested  itself  in  the  enemy's 
country,  when  we  first  invaded  Canada. 

But  unfortunately,  before  we  retreated,  all  calcula 
tions  founded  on  this  basis  had  failed. 

In  my  letters  to  the  War  Department,  down  to  the 
latter  end  of  July,  I  speak  with  confidence  of  attack 
ing  Maiden,  whenever  the  field  artillery  shall  be  pre 
pared.  But  I  beg  the  Court  to  recollect,  that  this 
confidence  was  grounded  upon  the  expectation,  that 
I  then  entertained,  that  the  enemy  would  be  weaken 
ed  by  the  desertion  of  his  militia,  and  the  abandon 
ment  of  the  Indians.  In  all  my  letters,  which  speak 
of  the  intended  attack,  I  mention  also  the  daily  de 
sertions  from  the  enemy's  standard.  That  I  did  not 
rely  on  the  competency  of  my  own  force,  till  the  ene 
my's  should  be  reduced,  must  appear  from  my  letter 


GENERAL  HULL.  57 

of  the  ninth  of  July,  to  which  I  have  more  than  once 
referred. 

About  the  first  of  August,  we  received  the  account 
of  the  fall  of  Michilimackinac.  On  the  fourth,  I 
wrote  a  letter  to  the  Secretary,  from  which  the  follow 
ing  are  extracts. 

"  At  the  time  the  army  under  my  command  took 
44  possession  of  this  part  of  the  province  of  Upper 
*'  Canada,  every  thing  appeared  favourable,  and  all 
"  the  operations  of  the  army  have  been  successful. 
*'  Circumstances  have  since  occurred,  which  seem 
a  materially  to  change  our  future  prospects. 

"The  Unexpected  surrender  of  Michilimackinac, 
-'  and  the  tardy  operations  of  the  army  at  Niagara, 
"  are  the  circumstances  to  which  I  allude.  I  have 
"  every  reason  to  expect,  in  a  very  short  time,  a  large 
"  body  of  savages  from  the  north,  whose  operations 
**  will  be  directed  against  this  army,"  &c. 

After  these  observations,  I  do  not  believe,  that  the 
Court  wrill  think,  that  it  is  to  be  justly  inferred,  either 
from  my  proclamation,  or  from  my  letters,  that  I  con 
sidered  my  force  under  any  circumstances,  which 
existed  before  we  left  Canada,  competent  to  the  re 
duction  of  Maiden. 

The  force  of  the  enemy,  lieutenant  Forbish  states, 
was,  towards  the  last  of  July,  about  one  hundred  and 


58  DEFENCE  OF 

seventy  regulars,  and  five  hundred  and  fifty  militia. 
The  Indian  force  could  never  be  ascertained  with 
any  precision;  it  could  not  have  been  less  than 
near  a  thousand.  I  always  supposed  the  enemy's 
force  greater  than  this  information  makes  it.  But 
whatever  may  have  been  the  force  of  the  enemy,  it 
must  have  been  estimated  as  very  considerable,  by 
some  of  my  officers,  as  well  as  by  myself.  The  Court 
will  recollect,  that  when  I  made  the  detachment  under 
colonel  Van  Horn,  to  the  river  Raisin,  and  colonels 
Cass  and  Mac  Arthur  remonstrated  with  me  against 
the  sufficiency  of  his  force,  they  each  proposed  to  go 
on  that  expedition  with  his  regiment.  If  the  enemy 
had  not  appeared  to  be  somewhat  formidable  to  them, 
they  could  never  have  advised  me  to  make  so  large 
a  detachment  as  six  hundred  men,  on  a  service  in 
which  they  could  only  have  expected  to  meet  a  small 
part  of  his  force.  Colonel  Mac  Arthur  has  afforded 
other  evidence  of  his  opinion  of  the  power  of  the 
•enemy.  For  when  I  proposed  to  leave  him,  with  his 
regiment,  on  the  Canada  shore,  he  charged  me  with 
having  an  intention  to  sacrifice  him,  by  leaving  him 
with  such  a  force  at  that  post ;  although  he  would  have 
been  in  an  entrenched  camp  with  artillery,  where  he 
would  also  have  had  some  protection  from  the  guiia 
at  Detroit,  and  would  be  in  reach  of  instant  support 
from  thence. 

The  fort  at  Maiden,  I  was  well  acquainted  with. 
In  time  of  peace,  I  had  often  been  in  it.  I  knew  that 
it  was  capable  of  being  made  a  place  of  strength,  antl 


GENERAL  HULL.  59 

tliat,  in  contemplation  of  a  war,  the  British  for  some 
time  had  been  using  great  exertions  to  put  it  in  the 
best  possible  state  of  defence.  I  knew,  that  for  near 
twenty  years,  a  field  officer  had  commanded,  and 
about  an  hundred  regular  troops  had  constantly  been 
stationed  in  it;  and  that  there  always  had  been  a  regu 
lar  corps  of  British  artillery  attached  to  the  com 
mand.  The  question  was,  whether,  with  the  troops 
I  had  under  my  command,  so  few  of  whom  had  ever 
been  tried,  I  was  to  attempt  to  carry  this  fortress  with 
the  bayonet  ?  For  myself,  particularly,  when  I  con 
sidered,  what  would  have  been  the  consequences  of 
an  unsuccessful  attempt,  I  had  a  strong  conviction 
that  it  would  be  wrong  to  make  the  effort,  till  we 
could  have  the  advantage  of  heavy  artillery.  But 
finding  that  many  of  my  officers,  who  had  seen  no 
service,  were  impatient  at  delay,  and  were  destroying 
my  influence  with  the  army,  and  its  discipline,  by 
their  complaints  and  censures — for  their  satisfac 
tion,  and  not  for  my  own,  nor  for  my  own  justification, 
two  days  after  I  crossed,  that  is,  on  the  fourteenth  of 
July,  I  called  a  council  of  war,  in  which  it  was  decid 
ed,  that  no  attempt  ought  to  be  made  on  Maiden,  with 
out  the  heavy  artillery. 

My  utmost  exertions  were  then  used,  to  get  in 
readiness  the  two  twenty-four  pounders,  and  two  how 
itzers,  which  were  at  Detroit.  Carriages  were  to  be 
made  for  them  entirely  new.  Though  a  delay,  in  these 
preparations,  is  one  of  the  charges  made  against  me, 
not  a  witness  has  attempted  to  support  it.  Indeed, 


BO  DEFENCE  OF 

Gentlemen,  I  dare  appeal  to  every  officer,  who  was 
with  me,  and  who  is  willing  to  speak  the  truth, 
whether  I  did  not  use  all  possible  means,  and  make 
all  personal  exertion,  to  accomplish,  as  speedily  as 
possible,  this  desirable  object.  I  several  times  cross 
ed  the  river  myself,  to  inspect  and  hasten  the  artificers. 
I  ordered  planks  to  be  taken  off  my  own  house,  to  fur 
nish  a  necessary  part  of  the  materials  for  the  gun 
carriages. 

Captain  Dallaba,  in  his  second  examination,  states, 
that  he  received  an  order  to  prepare  the  heavy  ar 
tillery,  after  the  army  had  crossed  to  Canada;  he 
thinks  it  was  on  the  fifteenth  or  sixteenth  of  July. 
My  recollection  is,  that  the  order  was  given  on  the 
fourteenth,  that  is,  the  day  after  we  crossed;  and  on 
the  very  day  that  the  council  of  war  advised,  that  the 
attack  should  not  be  made  without  the  heavy  can 
non.  From  that  time,  it  is  not  pretended  there  was 
any  delay  in  preparing  them  for  service,  and  could 
not  have  been,  without  the  fault  of  the  officer,  who 
was  trusted  with  the  service.  Till  we  crossed  to 
Sandwich,  the  artificers  were  employed,  as  appears 
by  the  testimony  of  the  same  witness,  in  mounting 
the  guns  of  fort  Detroit.  I  beg  the  Court  also  to 
notice  the  testimony  of  colonel  Miller  on  this  point- 
he  says,  he  saw  no  want  of  exertion  in  preparing  the 
artillery. 

The  necessary  field  artillery  was  not  prepared  till 
the  seventh  of  August.  Two  days  previous  to  this, 


GENERAL  HULL.  61 

I  had  called  another  council.  The  members  deter 
mined  it  would  be  advisable  to  wait  two  days  for 
the  artillery,  and  if  it  was  not  then  ready,  the  attack 
ought  to  be  made  without  it.  I  did  not  concur  in  this 
opinion.  Indeed,  the  opinion  of  the  officers  in  this, 
and  the  former  council,  appeared  to  me  inconsistent. 
For  if,  according  to  the  decided  opinion  of  the  first 
council,  it  was  then  improper  to  make  the  attack 
without  heavy  ordnance,  why  was  it  not  as  necessary 
when  the  last  mentioned  council  sat  ?  And  if  it  were 
proper  to  wait  two  days  for  the  artillery,  according  to 
the  opinion  of  the  last  council,  why  was  it  not  proper 
io  wait  longer  ? 

It  may  be  said,  that  between  the  first  and  second 
council,  the  enemy's  force  had  diminished  by  deser 
tion.  No  doubt  it  had  as  to  numbers.  Great  part  of 
the  militia  had  left  them,  and  many  of  their  Indian 
allies  ;  but  the  fort  of  Maiden  retained  all  its  strength, 
and  there  was  no  doubt,  but  that  their  regular  force, 
(of  which  not  an  individual  had  deserted,)  and  their 
remaining  militia  were  sufficient  to  man  it.  Indeed, 
reinforcements  had  arrived  from  Fort  George,  both  in 
the  brig  Hunter  and  one  other  vessel.  At  this  coun 
cil,  I  found  that  nothing  would  satisfy  my  officers,  or 
the  army,  but  a  movement  towards  the  enemy.  I  felt 
myself  obliged  to  yield  to  the  advice  of  the  council, 
and  did,  as  general  Cass  has  testified,  declare  that  I 
Would  lead  the. -army  against  Maiden,  as  soon  as  the 
artillery  should  be  completed. 
7 


62  DEFENCE  OF 

My  opinion  was,  that  an  attempt  on  Maiden  should 
never  be  made  until  there  was  an  absolute  certainty 
of  success.  This  opinion  was  founded,  not  only  on 
considerations  which  I  shall  hereafter  mention,  but 
upon  the  orders  I  had  received  from  the  War  De 
partment,  in  the  Secretary's  letter  of  the  twenty-fourth 
of  June,  which  I  have  so  often  quoted ;  and  by  which 
I  was  directed  not  to  attack  Maiden,  unless  I  judged 
my  force  was  equal  to  the  enterprise,  nor  unless  I 
could  do  it  consistently  with  the  safety  of  my  own 
posts.  I  thought,  by  delay,  I  was  every  day  strength 
ening  the  probability  of  success  in  the  enterprise, 
because  the  force  of  the  enemy  was  daily  diminishing 
by  the  desertion-  of  his  militia  and  Indians. 

But  I  thought  myself  bound  to  delay,  till  I  had 
possessed  myself  of  every  possible  means  of  insuring 
success,  from  a  consideration  of  what  would  be  the 
consequences  of  a  defeat. 

The  army  would  have  been  destroyed ;  if  not  by 
the  tomahawk  of  the  Indians,  they  must,  after  a  de 
feat,  have  perished  for  want  of  supplies.  A  defeat 
would  have  been  the  signal  for  all  the  hordes  of  sa 
vages  in  the  surrounding  wilderness,  to  fall  upon  the 
unsuccessful  troops.  Every  path  would  have  been 
filled  with  these  remorseless  warriours.  But  it  was 
not  only  the  fate  of  the  army  that  I  anticipated  on 
such  an  event ;  the  horrours  that  it  would  let  loose  on 
the  neighbouring  country,  and  throughout  our  exten 
sive  borders,  were  presented  to  my  mind.  I  kiu  v. 


GENERAL  HULL.  03 

that  if  the  army  I  commanded  were  beaten  in  battle, 
there  would  be  nothing  to  restrain  the  ravages  of  thai 
part  of  our  enemy,  which,  when  a  battle  is  decided  in 
their  favour,  makes  the  vanquished,  and  their  de 
fenceless  country  and  people,  their  prey. 

In  the  ungenerous  letter  which  colonel  Cass  wrote 
to  the  government,  (and  wrhich,  as  I  think,  was  most 
unwarrantably  published)  he  seems  to  think,  that 
these  are  philanthropic  considerations,  unworthy  a 
soldier.  But,  Sir,  though  brought  up  in  the  field,  and 
though  I  have  seen  something  of  the  horrours  of  war, 
I  am  not  yet  such  a  soldier,  as  that  I  can  think  of 
such  scenes  with  indifference.  When  I  considered 
what  would  be  the  condition  of  the  territory,  over 
which  I  had  so  long  presided,  and  over  which  I  was 
then  Governour,  in  case  the  force  I  commanded  should 
be  beaten  in  battle,  and  the  inhabitants  be  left  to  the 
mercy  of  the  savages,  without  any  stipulation  or  force 
for  their  protection,  I  thought  I  should  deserve  the 
heaviest  curses,  if  I  risked  a  battle,  before  I  had  taken 
every  means  in  my  power  to  insure  victory. 

These  were  the  considerations,  that  induced  me  to 
resist  the  urgency  of  my  officers  to  move  to  the  attack 
of  Maiden,  till  the  eighth  of  August.  It  had  been 
ascertairred  on  the  sixth,  that  the  cannon  would  be 
ready  on  the  eighth ;  and  on  the  sixth  I  issued  an 
order  for  the  army  to  prepare  to  move  to  the  attack 
on  the  eighth.  Every  thing  was  in  readiness  for  the 
enterprise  on  the  seventh.  But  on  that  evening,  I 


<M  DEFENCE  OF 

crossed  with  the  whole  army  to  Detroit,  except  a  de 
tachment  of  about  three  hundred  men,  under  major 
Denny,  which  was  left  intrenched  at  Sandwich,  and 
which  was  also  moved  over  011  the  eleventh. 

This  retreat  from  the  enemy's  shore  is  one  of  the 
acts  of  treason,  cowardice,  and  unofficer-like  conduct, 
of  which  I  am  accused.  I  proceed  to  submit  to  your 
consideration  my  answer  to  this  accusation,  and  the 
reasons  which  then  governed  my  conduct,  and  which 
I  yet  believe  to  have  been  correct. 

About  the  first  of  August,  as  appears  by  my  letter 
of  the  fourth,  I  received  an  account  of  the  fall  of  Mi- 
chilimackinac.  Lieutenant  Hanks,  with  his  men  and 
some  Imlians,  had  arrived  at  my  encampment.  The 
effect  of  this  great  misfortune  was  immediately  seen 
and  felt  in  the  vicinity  of  my  post.  The  Wyandot 
Indians  settled  at  Brownstown,  who  had  previously 
shewn  the  most  friendly  dispositions,  and  given  the 
strongest  assurances  of  their  neutrality,  joined  the 
British.  For  though  they  passed  over  under  the 
pretence  of  having  been  made  prisoners,  the  circum 
stances  which  then  occurred  left  no  doubt  but  that 
they  had  formed  an  alliance  with  the  enemy.  This 
procedure  of  this  tribe  of  Indians,  was  not  only  evi 
dence  of  their  own,  but  of  the  defection  of  the  sur 
rounding  nations,  who  are  all  united  by  some  sort  of 
confederacy,  in  which  the  Wyandots  have  a  superiour 
influence,  which  is  acknowledged  by  the  other  tribes, 
speaking  of  them  as  their  fathers.  When,  therefore, 


GENERAL  HULL.  65 

I  learned  that  this  nation  had  joined  the  standard  of 
the  enemy,  I  knew  that  the  Chippeways,  Ottaways, 
Pottawattamies,  Munsees,  the  Shawanees,  Senekas, 
and  other  tribes,  Avho  altogether  could  furnish  between 
two  and  three  thousand  warriours,  would  also  be  an 
addition  to  his  force. 

At  the  same  time  I  received  intelligence,  as  ap 
pears  by  another  letter  of  mine  to  the  Secretary  at 
War  of  the  same  date,  (fourth  of  August,)  that  a 
'British  officer,  with  fifty-five  regular  soldiers  and  two 
brass  field  pieces,  had  landed  on  the  west  part  of  lake 
Ontario,  had  penetrated  to  the  head  waters  of  the 
river  Le  Trench,  and  was  collecting  the  militia  and 
Indians  in  that  quarter  to  lead  them  against  my  army. 
Prom  the  information  I  had  received,  I  had  reason 
to  think,  and  so  I  mention  in  my  letter  to  the  Secre 
tary,  his  force  would  amount  to  six  or  seven  hundred. 
The  fall  of  Michilimackinac  also  changed  the  dispo 
sition  of  the  inhabitants  of  Canada,  and  from  the  time 
that  accounts  were  received  of  that  event,  there  were 
no  more  of  their  militia  came  over  to  us.  I  had  also 
been  informed  of  the  arrival  of  the  British  colonel 
Proctor  at  Maiden,  and  it  was  generally  believed, 
that  he  had  brought  with  him  some  reinforcements,  as 
well  naval  as  military.  To  the  enemy's  naval  force 
I  had  nothing  to  oppose.  By  it,  the  enemy  might 
command  the  lake ;  obtain  his  supplies  without  the 
ksast  interruption ;  transport  his  troops  at  his  pleasure, 
and  co-operate  with  land  movements  on  the  margin 

of!  the  waters.     I  had  also  intercepted  a  letter  from  a 

7* 


66  DEFENCE  OF 

Mr.  Mac  Kenzie,at  Fort  William,  to  a  Mr.  Mac  Intosh, 
at  Sandwich,  dated  the  nineteenth  of  July,  from 
which  the  following  are  extracts  : 

"  The  declaration  of  war  reached  us  on  the  six- 
"  teenth  instant,  but  we  are  neither  astonished  nor 
"  alarmed.  Our  agents  ordered  a  general  muster,  which 
•*  amounted  to  twelve  hundred,  exclusive  of  several 
"  hundred  of  the  natives.  We  are  now  equal,  in  all, 
u  to  sixteen  or  seventeen  hundred  strong.  One  of 
"  our  gentlemen  started  on  the  seventeenth,  with 
**  several  light  canoes,  for  the  interiour  country,  to 
**  rouse  the  natives  to  activity,  which  is  not  hard  to 
"  do  on  the  present  occasion.  We  likewise  despatch- 
;'  ed  messengers  in  all  directions  with  the  news.  I 
"  have  not  the  least  doubt  but  our  force  will,  in  ten 
"  days  hence,  amount  to  at  least  five  thousand  effec- 
"  tive  men.  Our  young  gentlemen  and  engagees 
'•'  offered  most  handsomely  to  march  immediately  for 
"  Michilimackinac.  Our  chief,  Mr.  Shaw,  expressed 
"  his  gratitude,  and  drafted  one  hundred — they  are  to 
"  proceed  this  evening  for  St.  Joseph's.  He  takes 
"  about  as  many  Indians.  Could  the  vessel  contain 
"  them,  he  might  have  had  four  thousand  more.  It 
"  now  depends  on  what  accounts  we  receive  from  St. 
"  Joseph's,  whether  these  numerous  tribes  from  the 
*'  interiour  will  proceed  to  St.  Joseph's  or  not. 

At  the  time  that  this  intercepted  letter  fell  into  my 
hands,  I  was  informed  by  lieutenant  Hanks,  that  be 
fore  he  left  Michilimackinac,  several  agents  of  the 


GENERAL  HULL.  67 

north-west  territory  had  arrived  at  that  post,  after  its 
surrender,  from  Fort  William,  on  the  north  side  of  lake 
Superiour,  who  stated,  that  a  large  force  of  Canadians 
and  Indians  were  collected  at  Fort  William,  ready  to 
descend  the  lakes,  and  that  there  was  also  a  force  of 
the  same  description,  collected  at  the  outlet  of  lake 
Superiour.  I  was  further  informed  by  lieutenant 
Hanks,  that  immediately  after  the  surrender  of  Michi- 
limackinac,  which  was  on  the  eighteenth  of  July,  the 
British  commander .  had  sent  an  express  to  Little 
York ;  and  it  was  supposed,  that  on  the  return  of  the 
express,  all  the  forces  which  had  been  collected  and 
were  collecting  in  the  northern  regions,  would  be 
ordered  to  Maiden.  The  death  of  lieutenant  Hanks 
deprives  me  of  the  benefit  of  his  testimony.  But 
this  is  sufficiently  supplied  by  the  evidence  of  Mr. 
Stone,  and  doctor  Day,  gentlemen  who  were  at  Mi- 
chilimackinac  when  it  surrendered,  and  who  accom 
panied  lieutenant  Hanks  to  my  head  quarters  at  Sand 
wich,  and  doctor  Day  was  present  when  lieutenant 
Hanks  made  the  communication  to  me. 

It  may  be  said,  that  this  information  ought  not  te 
have  had  any  influence  upon  my  conduct,  because 
the  northern  Indians  could  not,  and  in  fact  did  not 
arrive  in  a  great  length  of  time. 

I  presume  that  no  testimony  is  wanting  to  prove 
to  this  Court,  that  from  the  points  where  they  were 
collected,  they  might  have  descended  in  a  very  few 
days.  The  savages  of  our  country  have  an  ad  van- 


6S  DEFENCE  OP 

tage  of  all  other  troops,  in  the  celerity  and  facility 
with  which  they  make  their  movements.  These  too, 
were  to  be  aided  by  the  means  of  the  north-west 
company,  which  were  particularly  adapted  to  trans 
portation,  from  the  nature  of  their  trade  upon  the 
waters  of  the  lakes. 

As  to  the  fact,  that  the  northern  savages  did  not 
arrive  at  Maiden  till  long  after  the  surrender. 

The  testimony  of  captain  Eastman  is,  that  he  re 
mained  at  Detroit  twenty-four  days  after  the  capitu 
lation;  that  the  Sagganau  Indians,  with  about  sixty 
warriours,  arrived  three  days  after  the  surrender ;  thai 
the  Michilimackinac  Indians,  with  about  eleven  or 
twelve  hundred  warriours  arrived  about,  the  tenth  or 
eleventh  of  September.  It  may  be  well  to  remark 
here,  how  formidable  this  force  proved  to  be,  although 
it  was  but  a.  small  portion  of  that  which  would  have 
eome,  had  not  Detroit  been  surrendered.  But  can  it 
be  concluded  that  this  force  would  not  have  arrived 
earlier,  had  not  intelligence  of  the  fall  of  my  army 
reached  them,  which  it  must  have  done  a  few  days 
after  the  event  happened  ?  When  information  of  so 
many  adverse  circumstances  had  reached  me  from 
various  quarters,  the  fate  of  my  army  appeared  in 
evitable.  I  had  but  one  of  two  courses  to  pursue,  and 
either  seemed  to  me  almost  a  desperate  alternative. 
I  must  either  advance  or  retreat.  If  I  had  seen 
nothing  that  I  was  to  regard,  but  the  power  of  the 
enemy,  I  had  no  doubt  but  that  I  ought  to  have 


GENERAL  HULL.  69 

adopted  the  former  expedient.  I  was  obliged  to  con 
sider  the  effect  a  retreat  would  have  in  my  own  camp. 
The  young  and  inexperienced  officers  I  had  under 
my  command,  who  could  see  no  danger  that  was  not 
immediately  before  their  eyes;  who  thought  and  said 
that  they  were  very  brave,  but  with  a  few  exceptions, 
do  not  kqow  it  to  this  day  from  any  trials  of  their 
courage;  who  despised  ail  precaution,  and  thought  all 
generalship  consisted  in  inconsiderate  and  impetuous 
advances — I  knew  well,  would  pursue  the  conduct 
which  they  afterwards  did,  and,  by  representing  a  re 
treat  as  proceeding  from  the  most  unworthy  and  un 
justifiable  motives,  destroy  the  efficiency  of  the  army, 
by  robbing  me  of  its  confidence.  The  cabals,  which 
had  risen  to  such  a  height  as  to  mature  a  plan  of  mu 
tiny,  in  which  my  chief-  officers  were  to  be  the  ring 
leaders,  could  not  be  entirely  concealed  from  me; 
although,  till  I  saw  the  confession  published  to  the 
world,  by  one  of  the  conspirators,  I  did  not  know  the 
extent  of  their  design. 

Under  these  awful  circumstances,  dangerous  as  the 
attempt  on  Maiden  appeared  to  me  to  be,  I  thought 
it  might  be  less  so,m  than  a  retreat.  I  determined  to 
attack  Maiden,  and  on  the  sixth  of  August  issued 
orders  to  have  every  thing  prepared  for  the  move 
ment  of  the  army  on  the  eighth.  And,  Gentlemen, 
there  is  no  part  of  my  conduct,  since  I  have  been  a 
soldier,  that  I  reflect  upon  with  so  much  self 
of  errour,  as  J  do  upon  this. 


70  DEFENCE  OF 

I  look  back  with  regret  upon  the  moment  when  1 
yielded  to  the  councils  of  the  inexperienced  officers 
i  commanded,  and  determined  to  make  an  attempt, 
which  my  own  judgment  did  not  approve,  which  was 
contrary  to  all  military  knowledge,  and  which  even 
success  might  not  justify.*  I  thought,  however,  it  was 
possible,  that  if  I  were  successful,  and  should  possess 
myself  of  the  enemy's  fortress,  I  might  possibly  main 
tain  myseif  there  for  some  short  time ;  and  in  that  time 
I  hoped  I  might  have  some  succour  and  security  from 
my  own  country,  and  her  armies,  that  I  had  been  led 
to  expect  would  be  operating  below  me, 

On  the  seventh  of  August  every  thing  was  in  rea 
diness  for  the  intended  movement,  but  on  that  day 
at  about  one  o'clock,  an  express  arrived  with  letters 
to  me  from  the  commanding  officers  on  the  Niagara 
frontier,  two  from  mnjor-general  Hall,  and  the  other 
from  general  P.  B.  Porter.  These  letters  were  sent 
to  me  by  express,  to  inform  me,  that  a  large  force  from 
the  neighbourhood  of  Niagara  were  moving  towards 
my  army.  But  what  was  more  decisive  in  its  iriiiu- 
ence  on  my  measures,  was,  that  I  learned  from  those 
letters,  that  I  was  not  to  expect  that  these  moyements 
of  the  enemy  were  to  be  checked,  or  that  rny  army 
would  be  sustained,  by  any  operations  against  the 
enemy  in  any  quarter.  I  found  that  the  invasion  of 
.Canada,  and  the  whole  war,  was  to  be  carried  on 
foy  the  three  hundred  regular  troops  under  colonel 
Miller,  and  the  twelve  or  fourteen  hundred  militia, 
which  had  been  placed  under  my  command.  I  mual 


GENERAL  HULL.  71 

here  again  beg  leave  to  turn  the  attention  of  the 
Court  Martial  to  the  correspondence  between  the 
Secretary  at  War  and  myself,  to  remind  the  Court 
Martial  of  the  reasons  I  had  to  expect  supplies,  as 
sistance,  and  co-operation,  when  I  took  the  command 
of  the  north-western  army.  When  I  received  these 
letters  from  generals  Hall  and  Porter,  my  situation 
became  embarrassing  and  distressing  to  a  great  de 
gree.  I  had  but  a  few  hours  before,  with  what  re 
luctance  appears  from  the  testimony  of  general  Cass, 
yielded  to  importunities  of  my  officers,  and  given 
them  expectation,  that  I  would  lead  the  army  against 
Maiden.  I  had  issued  orders  for  making  the  neces 
sary  preparations,  and  fixed  a  time  for  the  movement. 
I  knew  well  what  would  be  the  effect  of  disappoint 
ing  the  expectations  which  those  measures  had  rais 
ed.  But  as  general  Mac  Arthur  has  testified,  I  told 
him,  as  commander  of  that  army,  I  felt  myself  res 
ponsible  for  its  movements,  and  its  fate.  Under  an 
awful  sense  of  that  responsibility,  I  determined  to 
recross  the  river,  with  the  greater  part  of  the  army. 
In  making  this  movement,  I  had  no  design  of  relin 
quishing  the  attack  of  Maiden.  My  intention  was  to 
take  post  at  Detroit,  and  there  to  wait  until  some  na 
val  force  on  the  lake,  and  a  co-operation  from  below, 
which,  from  the  beginning,  I  had  relied  upon,  and 
which  the  letters  I  had  received  from  generals  Hall 
and  Porter  gave  me  reason  to  expect,  would  com 
mence  at  some  future  but  probably  distant  period, 
afforded  some  hopes  of  success,  and  of  advantage 
from  success.  My  further  intention  was  to  concen- 


72  DEFENCE  Otf 

trate  my  forces  at  Detroit,  that  I  might  from  thence 
open  and  secure  my  communication  with  the  state  of 
Ohio;  upon  which,  in  my  judgment,  the  salvation 
of  the  army  depended.  This  consideration  had  so 
much  influence  on  my  measures,  not  only  at  this  time, 
but  throughout  the  campaign,  and  in  the  final  surren 
der,  that  it  will  be  proper  to  present  it  to  the  Court, 
in  such  a  view,  as  that  they  may  judge  of  its  impor 
tance. 

From  Urbana  to  the  Miami  of  the  lake,  is  a  per 
fect  wilderness.  Through  this  wilderness,  a  distance 
of  a  hundred  and  twenty  miles,  and  through  a  country 
of  which  the  Indians  were  the  inhabitants  and  pro 
prietors,  the  army  had  to  cut  a  road,  when  they  ad 
vanced  ;  and  it  was  the  only  road  by  which  supplies 
of  any  kind  could  be  received.  From  the  Miami  to 
the  settlements  on  the  Detroit  river,  the  country  is 
little  better  than  a  Avilderness,  there  being  only  two 
or  three  little  settlements.  Along  the  Detroit  river 
the  country  is  partially  cleared  and  cultivated.  The 
improvements  extend  from  half  a  mile  to  a  mile 
back  from  the  river,  and  in  part  of  these  improve 
ments,  on  the  margin  of  the  streights,  is  the  road  to 
the  town  of  Detroit.  The  whole  country  from  Ur 
bana  to  the  town  of  Detroit  is  filled  with  savages, 
all  of  whom,  with  very  unimportant  exceptions,  be- 
cfcme  hostile  to  us,  and  infested  every  part  of  the 
road  which  was  not  protected  by  an  armed  force. 
From  the  Miami  to  Detroit,  a  distance  of  seventy- 
two  miles,  the  road  rims  so  near  the  waters  of  lak*1 


GENERAL  HULL.  r.\ 

Erie,  ami  of  the  streights,  that  the  enemy  having  the 
command  of  those  waters,  could,  with  the  greatest  fa 
cility,  transport  from  their  shore,  and  from  one  point 
to  another,  detachments  to  intercept  the  communi 
cation.  Their  vessels  too,  would  always  afford  them 
a  secure  retreat,  in  case  of  disaster.  There  were,  in 
the  whole  Michigan  territory,  less  than  five  thousand 
white  inhabitants ;  about  two  thousand  of  whom  were 
settled  along  the  Detroit  river.  The  soil,  though 
fertile,  was  but  little  cultivated :  the  inhabitants 
greatly  relying  for  their  support  upon  the  supplies  of 
fish  and  venison,  which  the  woods  and  waters  afforded. 
The  territory  has  never  furnished  sufficient  provi 
sions  for  its  own  inhabitants ;  there  are  annually,  as 
appears  from  the  testimony  before  you,  large  quanti 
ties  of  pork  and  beef  brought  in  from  the  state  of 
Ohio;  and,  notwithstanding  the  testimony  of  some  of 
the  witnesses,  I  assert,  that  at  the  time  the  army  was 
in  that  quarter,  they  could  not  have  taken  the  neces 
sary  supplies  from  the  country  for  any  length  of  time, 
without  distressing  the  inhabitants.  It  has  been 
proved,  that  even  in  time  of  peace  the  few  troops 
who  were  stationed  at  Detroit  were  fed  by  supplies 
from  Ohio.  The  country  must  afford  insufficient 
provisions  for  an  army,  or  there  could  be  no  necessity 
for  furnishing  general  Harrison  from  the  western 
states,  at  the  immense  expense,  which  his  supplies 
have  cost.  The  testimony  of  general  Mac  Arthur 
affords  some  evidence  of  the  state  of  the  country  in 
respect  to  provisions.  He  stated  that  from  the  morn 
ing  of  the  fourteenth  of  August,  when  he  marched 


74  DEFENCE  OF 

from  Fort  Detroit  with  a  detachment,  till  the  sixteenth, 
when  they  met  with  and  killed  an  ox,  in  a  march  of 
near  thirty  miles,  he  saw  nothing  that  was  food  for 
man,  except  some  unripe  corn  and  some  honey.  The 
opposite  shores  of  the  enemy  were  not  more  produc 
tive  in  supplies.  The  whole  of  the  country  border 
ing  on  the  streights  and  on  the  lake,  is  a  wilderness, 
except  the  settlement  at  Amherstburgh,  and  a  very 
thin  population  on  the  banks  of  the  Detroit  river, 
and  a  small  place  on  lake  Erie,  known  by  the  name 
of  the  NewT-settlement.  Above,  on  the  river  Trench, 
at  about  the  distance  of  sixty  miles,  is  the  most  fruit 
ful  and  valuable  part  of  the  country.  Independent 
of  these  settlements,  which  had  been  exhausted  by  the 
two  armies,  the  whole  is  wilderness.  After  the  fall 
of  Michilimackinac,  when  all  the  hives  of  northern 
Indians  became  hostile,  and  were  let  loose  upon  us, 
when  the  north-west  company,  as  appears  by  the  let 
ter  of  Mr.  Mac  Kenzie,  had  arrayed  against  us  their 
numerous  retainers,  and  when  the  navigation  of  the 
upper  as  well  as  of  the  lower  lakes  was  free  to  the 
enemy,  no  supplies  could  have  been  obtained  from 
the  river  Trench,  or  the  bordering  country. 

It  must  be  remarked,  that  from  the  time  the  army 
arrived  at  Detroit,  not  one  pound  of  provisions  had 
been  received.  From  the  moment  the  declaration  of 
war  was  known  to  the  enemy,  he  had  intercepted  the 
only  line  of  communication,  and  thus  cut  off  all  sup 
plies. 


GENERAL  HULL.  15 

It  appears  from  a  return  made  on  the  day  the  army 
arrived  at  Detroit,  and  which  is  mentioned  in  the 
minutes  of  a  council  of  war,  held  on  the  ninth,  that 
there  were  then  in  store 

125,000  rations  of  flour,  and 
70,666  rations  of  meat. 

This  stock,  as  it  was  never  replenished,  must  have 
been  proportionately  exhausted,  at  the  time  of  the  re 
treat  from  Canada,  and  at  the  time  of  the  final  surren 
der.  And,  indeed,  would  have  been  entirely  so, 
had  we  not  drawn,  as  far  as  we  could,  our  supplies 
from  the  country,  which  every  day  became  the  more 
stripped,  and  the  less  able  to  afford  them. 

A  return  made  to  me  by  the  contractor,  on  the 
twenty-fifth  of  July,  shews  not  only  the  quantity  of 
provisions  on  hand  at  that  date,  but  it  shews,  by  a 
comparison  with  the  return  of  the  ninth  of  the  same 
month,  the  rate  at  which  the  provisions  were  con 
sumed.  This  return  has  been  proved  and  read  in 
evidence.  It  is  as  follows  :  "  Provisions  on  hand  at 
"  Fort  Detroit,  twenty-fifth  of  July,  eighteen  hundred 
"  and  twelve — 

"  70,000  rations  flour, 
«  21,000  salted  meat, 
«  100,000  whiskey." 

It  has  been  said  by  generufe  Cass  and  Mac  Arthur, 
and  by  other  witnesses,  that  they  never  heard  com- 


76  DEFENCE  OF 

plaints  of  a  want  of  provision.  This  is  certainly  true. 
There  was  not,  previously  to  the  surrender,  an  actual 
want  or  deficiency  of  provisions.  Our  stores  were 
not  then  entirely  exhausted ;  but  there  was  a  certain 
ty  that  they  would  soon  be  so. 

Such  then  was  my  situation  when  I  determined  to 
retreat  from  Canada.  I  had  above  me  hordes  of  hos 
tile  savages.  I  had  below  me  an  enemy  in  a  fortress, 
•\vhich  I  believed  to  be  a  work  of  strength,  and  suf 
ficiently  manned  for  its  defence.  I  found  that  he  had 
been  left  at  liberty  to  augment  his  force,  by  drawing 
his  troops  from  all  other  points.  I  commanded  an 
army,  the  troops  of  which  (except  a  few  regulars  of 
the  fourth  regiment)  had  no  experience,  and  had  never 
been  tried ;  and  this  army  was  officered  by  men,  the 
chief  of  whom  had  not  hesitated  to  express,  in  the 
most  indecent  terms,  his  want  of  confidence  in  me.  I 
was  told,  that  I  must  not  expect  any  co-operation  or 
assistance ;  I  saw  that  my  provisions  would  be  soon 
exhausted,  and  that  neither  my  own  nor  the  enemy's 
country  would  afford  supplies  for  any  length  of  time.  I 
saw  that  my  only  communication  was  cut  off,  and 
unless  it  were  opened  the  army  would  be  subdued  by 
•want. 

Under  these  circumstances,  I  determined  to  recross 
the  river,  take  the  principal  part  of  the  army,  not 
with  an  intent,  as  I  have  said,  to  relinquish  the  en 
terprise  against  Maiden  and  the  Upper  Province,  but 
to  wait  for  a  co-operation  and  assistance,  which  might 
afford  more  favourable  prospects,  and  in  the  meau 


GENERAL  HULL,  77 

)  which  I  considered  a  duty  of  the  first  impor 
tance,  to  open  the  only  communication  by  which  I 
could  obtain  supplies.  An  attack  on  Maiden  was  an 
alternative,  which,  as  I  have  said,  presented  itself  to 
my  mind.  It  was  one  which  I  had  the  most  powerful 
inducements  to  adopt.  I  well  knew  what  rewards  of 
honour  and  glory  awaited  an  achievement,  which  my 
country  had  been  led  to  expect  with  so  much  certain 
ty  and  anxiety.  I  knew  what  were  the  expectations 
of  my  officers,  and  what  resentment  a  disappointment 
would  create.  I  knew  a  retrograde  movement  would 
expose  me  to  censures,  and  to  the  malice  of  my  ene 
mies  ;  but  in  deliberating  on  this  alternative,  I  could 
not  but  take  into  view  the  possibility  of  a  defeat  in 
the  attempt,  and  the  consequences  which,  as  I  have 
before  mentioned,  would  result  not  only  to  the  army, 
but  to  the  people  of  the  territory.  A  more  decisive 
consideration,  however,  induced  me  to  reject  this  al 
ternative.  I  then  felt  confident,  and  I  do  now  feel 
most  confident,  that  if  I  had  attacked  Maiden,  and 
had  been  successful,  it  would  have  been  but  a  useless 
waste  of  blood.  It  would  have  been  utterly  impossible 
to  have  maintained  the  fortress.  It  must  have  fallen 
for  want  of  supplies.  It  must  be  remembered,  that  the 
waters  of  the  lakes  were  shut  against  us.  There  could 
have  been  no  possible  communication  with  the  fortress, 
but  by  the  road  which  I  had  cut  through  the  wilder 
ness.  How  was  that  road  to  have  been  kept  open  ? 

Most  probably,  after  an  engagement,  or  after  car 
rying  the  works  by  storm,  I  could  have  taken  into 


78  DEFENCE  OF 

Maiden  but  a  few  hundred  men.  Could  I  have 
made  sufficient  detachments  from  the  garrison,  to  have 
performed  this  service  ?  Let  it  be  remembered,  that 
generals  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass  censured  me  for  send 
ing  so  small  a  detachment  as  two  hundred  men  in  this 
duty;  and  thought  the  force  ought  to  have  been 
double  or  equal  to  one  of  their  regiments.  And  when 
colonel  Miller,  with  six  hundred  men,  two  hundred 
and  eighty  of  whom  were  almost  the  whole  of  the 
regular  force  under  my  command,  had  defeated  the 
enemy  near  Maguago,  he  thought  it  necessary  to  send 
(o  me  for  a  reinforcement  of  one  hundred  and  fifty,  or 
two  hundred,  to  enable  him  to  secure  his  passage  to 
and  from  the  river  Raisin,  though  his  loss  in  the  bat- 
lie  did  not  exceed  eighty,  and  though  he  knew  at  the 
river  Raisin  he  was  to  be  joined  by  the  detachments 
under  captain  Brush,  and  the  companies  under  cap 
tains  Campbell  and  Rowland. 

If  the  road  could  have  been  opened,  still  no  sup 
plies  could  have  passed  into  the  fort,  without  crossing 
the  water,  and  on  that  the  British  had  a  force,  to 
which  we  had  nothing  to  oppose.  If  we  had  possess 
ed  the  fort,  it  would  have  been  pressed  by  the  north 
west  company,  and  its  retainers  from  the  north,  with 
all  the  hosts  of  savages  of  those  regions.  A  British 
force  no  doubt  would  have  approached  it  from  lake 
Ontario,  by  the  river  Le  Trench,  On  the  water  it 
would  have  been  attacked  by  the  naval  force,  and  all 
this  it  mast  have  encountered,  without  the  possibility 
of  obtaining  supplies,  and  without  the  least  prospect 
of  relief  or  assistance. 


GENERAL  HULL.  70 

My  judgment,  Mr.  President,  may  mislead  me  now, 
as  it  did  then ;  but  yet  I  think,  that  if  I  had  led  the 
army  I  commanded  to  the  conquest  of  Maiden,  under 
such  circumstances  as  I  have  stated,  it  would  have 
been  as  great  a  crime  as  any  of  which  I  am  accus 
ed.  Certain  I  am,  that  I  should  have  wanted  that 
consciousness  of  having  acted  from  the  purest  motives, 
and  according  to  my  best  judgment,  which  has  been 
my  only  consolation  in  all  I  have  suffered. 

If  it  be  true,  as  I  have  stated,  and  as  I  think  the 
testimony  proves,  that  my  army  had  not  provisions 
for  any  length  of  time,  and  that  neither  my  own,  nor 
the  enemy's  country  would  have  been  capable  of  fur 
nishing  them,  I  need  hardly  state  to  the  members  of 
this  tribunal,  how  important  it  was  for  me  to  keep 
open  the  road  I  had  made  through  the  wilderness,  the 
only  communication  by  which  supplies  could  approach 
me. 

In  modern  warfare,  the  first  great  object  of  each 
contending  party,  is  the  resources  of  his  enemy.  The 
fate  of  armies  is  found  to  depend  upon  the  abundance 
of  their  resources,  on  their  security,  and  in  the  facility 
of  keeping  up  a  communication  with  them.  It  has  be 
come  a  principle  to  manreuvre  in  such  a  manner,  as  to 
cover  the  places  from  whence  supplies  may  be  drawn; 
not  to  go  far  from  them,  but  with  great  caution,  and  ne 
ver,  to  cease  preserving  with  them  those  connections, in 
which  the  strength  of  an  army  consists,  and  on  which 
its  success  depends.  These  are  the  sentiments  of  a 


80  DEFENCE  OF 

modern  military  writer  of  great  celebrity.     The  ex 
perience  of  all  military  movements  in  latter  times, 
proves  their  correctness.     I  always  felt  the  force  of 
them.     It  was  a  great  violation  of  these  principles, 
and  therefore  as  I   considered   a  great  mistake,   to 
march  the  army  I  commanded,  after  the  war  had 
commenced,  to  Detroit,   leaving   a  British  garrison 
eighteen  miles  in  our  rear,  directly  upon  our  line  of 
communication,  which  from  its  proximity  to  the  lake, 
and  his  force  upon  the  water,  the  enemy  had  the 
means  of  intercepting  with  peculiar  facility.     But  the 
orders  I  received  in  the   letter  of  the   Secretary  of 
War,  which    announced  to   me  the  declaration  of 
war,  were  positive  upon  this  point.     They  left   me 
no  discretion.     I  was  to  march  to  Detroit,  and  there 
to  wait  for  further  orders.     I  had  seen  the  necessity  of 
keeping  open  the  communication,  when  I  was  on  the 
march,  and  therefore  I  built  and  garrisoned  block 
houses  on  the  road.     When  in  the  enemy's  country, 
I  felt  every  day,  more  strongly,  the  force  of  this  ne 
cessity,  and  therefore  detached  major  Van  Horn  on 
that  service.    Whether  that  was  a  proper  detachment, 
as  it  is  made  a  separate  charge,  will  be  a  subject  of 
separate  consideration,  in  a  subsequent  part  of  my  de 
fence.     After  the  defeat  of   major  Van  Horn,  and 
when  I  found  the  situation  of  my  army  immediately 
before  I  left  Sandwich,  such  as  I  have  before  describ 
ed,  I  was  perfectly  convinced  that  no  success,  not 
even  the  capture  of  Maiden,  could  save  it  from  even 
tual  destruction,  if  my  communication  with  Ohio  was 
not  opened. 


GENERAL  HULL.  81 

The  Court  will  recollect,  that  general  Mac  Arthur 
and  general  Cass  have  stated  in  their  testimony,  that 
\vhen  they  objected  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  force  I  de 
tached  under  major  Van  Horn,  they  each  recommended 
that  I  should  send  him  with  his  regiment  on  that  duty. 
This  shews  what  force,  in  their  estimation,  was  ne 
cessary  for  the  purpose.  What  force  colonel  Miller 
thought  necessary,  I  have  already  stated.  If  these 
gentlemen  were  correct  on  this  point,  my  army  could 
not  be  in  a  proper  situation,  when  I  must  have 
stretched  back  with  nearly  half  and  the  most  efficient 
part  of  my  command,  to  insure  me  supplies.  It  must 
be  recollected  also,  that  it  was  not  a  temporary  de 
tachment,  that  would  have  answered  any  purpose.  I 
must  have  kept  always  separated  from  the  army,  a 
sufficient  force  to  have  kept  open  the  road  from  De 
troit  to  Ohio,  a  distance  of  about  two  hundred  miles. 
I  do  not  believe,  that  after  the  fall  of  Michilimackinac, 
when  the  savages  became  arrayed  against  us,  and  in 
fested  every  part  of  the  road,  that  my  whole  force 
would  have  been  sufficient  to  have  protected  so  ex 
tensive  a  line. 

These,  Gentlemen,  were  the  grounds  on  which  I 
made  a  retrograde  movement,  with  a  part  of  the  army, 
to  Detroit.  It  was  from  thence  to  open  the  only 
channel,  through  which  it  could  derive  the  means  of 
its  existence.  I  repeat,  my  judgment  may  have  mis 
led  me.  If  it  did,  it  continues  yet  to  mislead  me  ; 
for  every  day  that  I  have  lived  I  have  become  more 
confident,  that  I  did  right  to  leave  the  enemy's  coim- 


82  DEFENCE  OF 

try.  Had  I  followed  the  dictates  of  my  own  judg 
ment,  I  should  have  made  my  retreat  to  the  Miami 
and  there  waited  for  co-operation  and  assistance.  The 
distance  from  thence  to  the  Ohio  would  have  been 
comparatively  short;  I  should  have  had  no  enemy 
in  my  rear  but  scattering  savages,  and  he  could  not 
then  have  availed  himself  of  the  great  advantage  he 
derived  from  the  command  of  the  waters. 

For  the  reason  that  I  did  not  do  so,  let  me  appeal 
to  the  testimony  of  the  two  officers  next  in  command. 

When  I  proposed  this  measure  to  colonel  Cass,  his 
answer  was,  that  if  I  did  under  the  then  existing 
circumstances,  every  man  of  the  Ohio  volunteers 
would  leave  me.  His  language  in  substance  was,  as 
he  states  it  himself,  that  the  volunteers  would  retreat 
with  me,  if  they  thought  a  retreat  necessary.  But  as 
they  undertook  to  judge,  that  it  was  not  then  necessa 
ry,  they  would  leave  me  and  not  a  man  would  retreat 
under  my  command.  Colonel  Cass's  testimony  on 
this  subject  is  in  the  following  words :  "  I  recollect  a 
"conversation  with  general  Hull,  after  the  retreat 
"  from  Canada,  and  before  we  went  to  the  river  Rai- 
"sin,  in  which  general  Hull  suggested,  that  as  he 
"  heard  of  no  co-operation  from  below,  it  might  be 
"  necessary  to  take  post  at  the  Miami.  I  think  I  told 
"  general  Hull,  that,  if  under  existing  circumstances, 
"  he  took  such  a  step,  the  Ohio  militia  would  desert 
"  him  to  a  man.  Whether  I  told  general  Hull  so  or 
"  not,  I  am  confident  it  would  have  been  the  case." 


GENERAL  HULL.  83 

It  may  be  well  to  remark,  that  this  testimony  of 
colonel  Cass  is  evidence  of  the  insubordination  that 
•was  among  the  troops.  By  whom,  and  by  what 
means,  it  had  been  encouraged,  the  Court  may  judge. 

Upon  this  part  of  the  subject,  that  is  to  say,  the  re 
treat  from  Canada,  I  have  but  a  few  words  more  to 
say.  I  retreated  for  the  purpose  of  being  enabled  to 
take  effective  measures  for  opening  my  communica 
tion.  The  importance  of  accomplishing  this  design, 
I  have  endeavoured  to  shew.  But  it  seems  that  the 
government,  or  whoever  it  may  have  been  that  drew 
the  charges,  that  are  now  before  you,  were  also  sensi 
ble  of  this  importance ;  for  one  of  the  accusations,  that 
I  am  to  answer,  is,  that  I  did  not  keep  open  this  com 
munication,  and  yet  the  measure  I  took  to  accom 
plish  this  object,  and  which  was  the  only  measure 
that  afforded  any  prospect  of  success,  that  is  to  sajs 
withdrawing  the  army  from  Canada,  is  also  made  a 
ground  of  crimination. 

I  beg  the  Court  to  notice,  that  these  reasons  for  the 
retreat  are  such  as  I  assigned  for  it  at  the  time,  as  well 
as  now.  For  the  evidence  of  this  I  refer  to  my  let 
ters  to  the  Secretary  at  War  of  the  fourth  and  eighth 
of  August.  My  letter  to  governour  Scott,  of  the 
ninth  of  August,  and  my  letters  to  governour  Meigcs 
and  colonel  Wells  of  the  eleventh  of  August,  all 
shew,  that  I  abandoned  Canada  because  I  had  as 
certained  that  I  should  soon  be  surrounded  by  an 


84  DEFENCE  OF 

overwhelming  force ;  because  my  communication,  it 
I  remained  where  I  was,  would  inevitably  be  cut  off; 
and  because  I  found  that  the  few  regulars  and  militia 
I  commanded,  were  to  be  left  to  carry  on,  without  any 
assistance  or  co-operation,  the  offensive  war,  which 
the  United  States  had  declared  against  one  of  the 
most  powerful  nations  on  earth. 

It  appears,  that  the  view  which  my  officers  hatl  of 
our  situation,  about  the  time  of  the  retreat  and  sur 
render,  was  very  different  from  what  it  would  appear 
to  have  been,  from  the  testimony  they  have  given 
before  you ;  at  least,  this  observation  applies  to  ge 
neral  Cass.  The  testimony  of  Mr.  Silliman,  (the 
general's  brother-in-law,)  of  Mr.  Mills,  and  of  Mr. 
Converse,  his  neighbour,  proves,  that  in  letters  writ 
ten  by  him,  at  the  times  to  which  his  testimony  re 
lates,  he  had  different  sentiments  from  those  he  has 
here  expressed. 

In  a  letter  of  the  thipd  of  August,  at  which  time 
we  were  in  possession  of  the  enemy's  territory,  and 
all  the  resources  that  might  be  drawn  from  thence, 
general  Cass  tells  Mr.  Silliman,  that  provisions  would 
become  necessary  for  the  existence  of  the  troops. 

In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Silliman  after  the  fall  of  Michili- 
tnackinac,  general  Cass  says,  that  the  impression  made 
by  the  fall  of  Michilimackinac  could  scarcely  be  con 
ceived.  In  the  same,  or  some  other  letter,  according 


GENERAL  HULL.  85 

to  the  testimony  of  Mr.  Silliman,  general  Cass  pressed 
Mm  to  use  his  influence  to  procure  reinforcements  for 
the  army,  and  expresses  his  surprise,  that  we  were 
left  without  co-operation,  by  putting  to  his  correspon 
dent  the  following  interrogation ;  "  Is  there  nothing 
"  to  be  done  in  the  lower  end  of  the  lakes,  to  make  a 
"  diversion  in  our  favour '?"  In  a  letter  from  general 
Cass  to  the  same  gentleman,  dated  on  the  twelfth  of 
August,  general  Cass  says,  "  think  our  situation  as 
14  bad  as  you  may,  it  is  still  worse." 

It  is  most  unfortunate  for  me,  that  I  have  in  the 
course  of  this  prosecution  so  often  to  feel  the  wTant  of 
documents.  I  want  to  prove  the  contents  of  a  me 
morial,  which  was  filed  on  record  in  the  War  Depart 
ment.  I  ask  for  the  record,  and  it  is  lost.  I  am  im 
peached  for  not  having  regularly  issued  orders  to  the 
army.  The  witnesses  who  are  to  support  this  charge 
prove,  that  there  were  orderly  books  in  which  my  or 
ders  were  entered;  but  they  have  either  been  lost,  or 
v/hat  is  more  extraordinary,  left  at  home.  Captain 
Mac  Commick  has  an  orderly  book,  but  when  he  was 
called  here  as  a  witness,  he  left  his  book  behind  him. 
Other  officers  seem  very  unaccountably  to  have 
thought  the  order  to  ship  their  baggage  at  the  Miami 
included  their  orderly  books,  and  they  have  been  lost 
by  that  means.  And  now  these  letters  from  general 
Cass  to  Mr.  Silliman,  the  contents  of  which  it  might 
be  so  important  to  me  to  contrast  with  the  General's 
testimony,  it  appears,  were  intrusted  to  the  General's 
wife,  and  they  too  have  been  lost. 
9 


86  DEFENCE  OP 

But  I  ask  the  Court,  do  not  even  the  slender  ac 
counts  which  we  have  had  of  the  contents  of  these 
letters  shew,  that  general  Cass,  at  the  time  they  were 
written,  did  believe  that  the  army  would  be  in  want  of 
provisions  ? — that  reinforcements  were  necessary  ? — 
that  the  fall  of  Micliilimackinac  was  to  have  a  decisive 
operation  on  the  fate  of  the  army  ? — that  our  hopes 
rested  on  co-operation  from  below,  and  that  the  situ 
ation  of  the  army  was  critical  in  the  extreme  ? — If 
these  were  general  C ass's  sentiments,  when  he  wrote 
the  letters,  I  must  leave  it  to  the  Court  to  reconcile 
them  to  the  testimony  he  has  given. 

The  surrender  of  the  fortress  of  Detroit,  and  of  the 
forces  in  the  Michigan  territory  under  my  command, 
is  another  charge,  against  which  I  am  now  to  defend 
myself.  I  beg  the  court  to  observe,  that  the  course  I 
am  pursuing,  is  to  examine,  in  the  first  instance,  the 
propriety  or  necessity  of  these  principal  measures ; 
the  circumstances  attending  their  accomplishment  be* 
ing  ground  of  distinct  accusation,  I  propose  to  give 
them  distinct  considerations. 

As  to  the  point,  on  which  I  am  now  about  to  make 
my  defence,  I  must  beg  the  Court  to  bear  in  mind 
iv  hat  I  have  said  in  relation  to  the  delay  in  attacking 
Maiden,  and  to  recrossbig  the  river ;  much  of  what  I 
have  said  upon  these  subjects  will  be  applicable  to  the 
charge  now  under  consideration .  The  same  facts  are 
reiterated  in  the  specifications  in  so  many  different 
forms,  that  it  is  difficult  to  analyze  them,  and  might 


GENERAL  HULL.  37 

excuse  repetition.  But  I  shall  endeavour,  as  much  as 
possible,  to  avoid  trespassing  on  the  patience  of  the 
Court ;  and  shall  not  repeat  what  I  have  already  said, 
further  than  may  be  absolutely  necessary  to  make  my 
self  clearly  understood. 

The  extent  and  state  of  the  force  under  my  com 
mand,  at  the  time  of  the  attack  on  the  fifteenth  and  six* 
teenth  of  August,  must  be  ascertained,  before  my  con 
duct  can  be  duly  appreciated.  The  detachments  under 
colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass,  consisting  of  four  hun 
dred  of  the  most  effective  men  of  their  regiments,  were 
nbsent  on  the  expedition  to  the  river  Raisin. 

On  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth,  the  brigade  major 
Jessup,  as  appears  by  his  cross  examination,  had,  by 
my  order,  made  a  report  of  the  effective  men  under  my 
command.  He  stated  the  number,  as  appears  by  a 
document  before  you,  in  the  three  Ohio  regiments,  to 
be  seven  hundred,  including  the  Michigan  legion  and 
waggoners,  but  not  the  Michigan  militia.  The  arm 
ed  inhabitants  which  some  of  the  witnesses  have 
mentioned,  I  presume  were  not  intended  to  be  includ 
ed,  and  indeed  should  not  have  been.  For  although  it 
may  have  been  agreeable  to  the  disposition  of  some 
who  have  testified  in  this  cause,  to  mention  them  here, 
that  they  might  swell  my  numbers  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Court,  yet  I  believe  it  will  not  be  thought,  that  I 
ought  to  have  taken  them  into  calculation  in  estimat 
ing  my  means  of  defence.  In  the  field  thev  were 


33  DEFENCE  OF 

only  likely  to  be  the  first  to  set  an  example  of  disos- 
tier,  and  in  a  siege  they  would  only  have  increased 
1he  consumption  of  provisions. 

Major  Jessup  says,  that  on  the  fifteenth  he  received 
an  estimate  from  one  of  the  adjutants  of  the  number 
of  men  fit  for  duty.  He  thinks  it  exceeded  one  thou 
sand.  This  estimate  was  not  delivered  to  me,  but  was 
given  to  general  Cass  the  day  after  the  battle,  for  what 
purpose  does  not  appear.  I  wish  general  Cass  had 
produced  it  on  this  occasion. 

Of  the  one  thousand,  if  there  were  so  many  effec 
tive,  only  three  hundred  and  twenty  were  regulars; 
that  being  major  Spelling's  estimate  of  the  effective 
force  of  the  fourth  regiment  on  the  day  of  the  surren 
der.  The  rest  of  this  thousand  consisted  of  the  Ohio 
volunteers  and  Michigan  militia.  In  my  letters  to 
the  government,  and  in  my  official  account  of  the 
unfortunate  termination  of  the  expedition  under  my 
rommand,  I  have  always  spoken  of  the  zeal  and 
bravery  of  these  troops,  in  terms  of  respect;  and  I  still 
think  they  merited  all  I  have  said  of  thejn  in  these  re 
spects.  Yet,  in  estimating  their  probable  services  in 
an  arduous  conflict,  I  could  not  but  consider  their  real 
character.  My  experience  in  the  revolutionary  war 
had  fixed  in  my  mind  a  mistrust  of  the  services  of  un 
disciplined  militia,  however  ardent  and  valorous  they 
might  by  language,  and  even  by  actions,  when  not 
before  the  enemy,  make  themselves  appear.  Indeed 


GENERAL  HULL.  89 

the  organization  of  the  militia  corps  I  had  with  me 
was  particularly  calculated  to  create  distrust  with  re 
spect  to  them.  All  their  officers  held  their  commis 
sions  in  virtue  of  an  election,  mediate  or  immediate, 
of  the  men  of  whom  they  were  the  nominal  comman 
ders.  My  second  in  command,  colonel  Mac  Arthur, 
has  prefaced  his  testimony,  by  telling.you  that  at  such 
a  time  he  was  elected  colonel. 

Colonel  Van  Horn  was  elected  major ;  Mr.  Mac 
Commick  was  elected  a  lieutenant.  From  what  sta 
tions  or  what  occupations  these  gentlemen  wrere  elect 
ed  to  high  military  rank,  I  do  not  know.  It  would 
seem,  however,  that  notwithstanding  all  the  experi 
ence  they  have  had  in  the  field,  they  have  not  yet 
learned  even  military  language ;  or  forgotten  what 
were  probably  the  phrases  of  their  former  occupa 
tions. 

General  Mac  Arthur,  in  describing  the  disposition 
he  intended  to  make  of  his  regiment  in  case  of  an 
attack,  spoke  as  he  would  of  the  gate  of  a  cow-pen — 
of  swinging  it  into  the  rear  line  of  a  hollow  square. 
And  most  of  the  witnesses  against  me  have  spoken 
of  the  balance  of  a  detachment,  as  they  would  of  the 
foot  of  an  account  in  a  shop  book.  Elected  officers 
can  never  be  calculated  upon  as  great  disciplinarians. 
In  every  station,  the  elected  will  be  unwilling  to  in 
cur  the  displeasure  of  the  electors.  Indeed,  he  will 
often  be  found  to  court  their  favour,  by  a  familiarity 
and  condescension,  which  are  totally  incompatible 
9* 


90  DEFENCE  OF 

with  military  discipline.  The  man  who  votes  his 
officer  his  commission,  instead  of  being  implicitly 
obedient,  as  every  soldier  ought  to  be,  will  be  dispo 
sed  to  question  and  consider  the  propriety  of  the  offi 
cer's  conduct,  before  he  acts.  This  system  has  not 
only  an  injurious  effect  upon  the  soldiers,  but  it  has  a 
retro-active  effect  upon  the  officers.  They,  knowing 
how  far  they  are  responsible  to  their  electors,  and 
what  deference  is  due  from  them  to  a  majority  of 
votes,  are  under  the  influence  of  their  own  feelings, 
in  intercourse  with  their  superiours. 

The  Court  must  have  observed,  with  what  confi 
dence,  the  officers  who  have  testified  against  me,  have 
pronounced  every  thing  to  have  been  done  wrong,  that 
was  not  done  according  to  their  advice.  They  seem 
1o  have  thought,  that  when  a  Council  of  War  was 
called,  it  was  to  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  a  town 
meeting ;  and  that  a  general  was  absolutely  bound  by 
the  voice  of  a  majority. 

The  testimony  of  major  Van  Horn  is  a  remarkable 
elucidation  of  the  ideas  of  some  of  my  officers  in  this 
respect.  He  seems  to  think,  that  I  was  guilty  of  great 
violation  of  duty,  in  not  being  careful  to  ascertain 
accurately  the  votes  of  the  members  then  present 
Though,  as  was  actually  the  case,  I  had  omitted  to 
take  the  vote  of  a  gentleman,  whose  opinions  coin 
cided  with  my  own. 

Mr.  President,  my  ideas  of  a  Council  of  War  are, 

that  it  is  called  to  advise  the  responsible  officer  as  to 


GENERAL  HULL.  91 

any  question  which  he  may  think  proper  to  submit 
to  its  members  ;  that  he  ought  to  hear  and  weigh,  with 
what  deliberation  circumstances  will  admit,  their 
sentiments  and  opinions.  But  that  after  all,  he  is 
bound  to  act  according  to  the  dictates  of  his  own 
judgment,  be  the  opinions  of  his  officers  what  they 
may.  And  inasmuch,  as  the  advice  of  a  council  will 
not,  in  all  cases,  justify  misconduct,  I  hope  it  will  not 
be  considered,  that  a  measure,  although  it  should 
have  been  wrong,  or  turned  out  unfortunate,  must  be 
condemned,  because  it  was  not  sanctioned  by  a  ma 
jority  of  votes. 

These  are  considerations,  which  I  think  it  neces 
sary  to  impress  strongly  upon  the  minds  of  the  Court. 
It  unfortunately  happened,  that  on  most  questions, 
which  I  submitted  to  the  deliberation  of  my  officers, 
their  opinion  and  mine  did  not  coincide,  and  many  of 
the  witnesses  seem  to  think,  that  therefore  they  must 
be  condemned.  But  such  a  principle  will  not,  I  hope, 
be  adopted  by  this  Court.  The  decisions  of  the 
councils  should  have  the  less  influence,  because  it 
must  be  recollected,  that  I  could  not,  with  the  ex 
ception  only  of  the  officers  of  the  fourth  regiment, 
call  for  the  advice  of  any  one  who  had  seen  the  least 
service,  or  had  the  least  experience.  For  though 
most  of  the  witnesses  who  have  been  produced  on 
the  part  of  the  government,  have  appeared  with  the 
titles  and  badges  of  high  military  rank,  yet  it  is  cer 
tain,  that  most  of  these  gentlemen  when  they  joined 
my  army,  knew  no  more  of  the  duties  of  a  soldier 


92  DEFENCE  OF 

than  was  to  be  learned  from  militia  musters  and  pa 
rades  about  their  own  homes.  What  services  they 
may  have  since  performed  to  entitle  them  to  the 
honours  they  have  attained,  I  am  ignorant ;  and  only 
hope,  that  their  elevated  rank  (as  it  ought  to  be  pre 
sumed  it  was  not  intended  it  should,)  will  not  give 
them  any  other  weight,  than  they  would  have  had,  if 
they  had  remained  in  their  former  subordinate  situa 
tions  until  they  had  given  their  testimony  against  me. 

These  observations  are  made,  in  reference  to  the 
principal  part  of  the  troops  I  had  under  my  command ; 
and  to  shew,  that  although,  as  men,  they  might  be 
brave  and  patriotic,  as  I  have  always  believed  they 
were,  and  as  t  have  always  spoken  both  of  the  officers 
and  soldiers,  yet  from  the  manner  of  their  organization, 
and  from  their  want  of  discipline  and  experience, 
they  were  not  that  kind  of  force  upon  which  a  com 
mander  could  feel,  in  an  arduous  conflict,  the  firmest 
reliance.  So  far  as  we  had  any  opportunity  of  judg 
ing  from  trial,  this  want  of  confidence  in  forces  of 
this  description  was  justified. 

The  expedition  under  major  Van  Horn  was  the 
only  instance  in  which  the  volunteers  acted  by  them 
selves  in  any  affair  of  consequence ;  for  the  rencontre 
at  the  Aux  Canard  bridge,  (although  both  the  officers 
and  men  behaved  well)  was  but  a  skirmish,  which 
could  hardly  be  a  test  either  of  courage  or  discipline. 
The  detachment  under  major  Van  Horn,  as  he  has 
testified,  were  not  surprised.  He  had  fully  prepared 


GENERAL  HULL.  93 

(hem,  according  to  his  statement,  to  expect  their  foe, 
and  yet  his  party  was  disordered  by  the  first  fire  of 
the  enemy.  Notwithstanding  all  the  gallant  exer 
tions  which,  as  he  has  stated,  he  made,  he  was  unable 
to  rally  them,  or  to  prevent  their  flying  in  confusion 
in  the  very  first  moments  of  attack  by  nothing  but 
savages. 

In  submitting  to  your  consideration,  Gentlemen, 
the  state  of  the  forces  under  my  command,  I  must  not 
omit,  painful  as  it  is  to  me,  to  advert  to  the  un 
happy  terms  in  which  I  was  with  my  officers.  They 
took  no  pains  to  conceal  what  they  have  here  testified 
to,  that  they  had  lost  all  confidence  in  me ;  many  of 
them  manifested  it,  as  appears  from  their  own  testi 
mony,  by  the  most  indecent  conduct  and  expressions. 

The  Court  must  recollect  the  language,  which  I 
forbear  to  repeat,  that  my  second  in  command,  colonel 
Mac  Arthur  (now  Brigadier  General  Mac  Arthur,) 
represents  that  he  addressed  to  me,  when  I  proposed 
to  him  to  remain  with  his  regiment  at  Sandwich. 
Let  it  be  remembered  too,  that  the  Brigadier  General 
has  stated,  that  when  we  were  in  the  face  of  the  ene 
my,  and  he  might  hourly  be  expected  to  be  called  to 
battle,  he  used  this  language  with  an  expectation, 
that  he  should  be  arrested :  with  an  expectation,  that 
at  such  a  moment,  he  would  be  put  in  a  situation  that 
he  could  not  be  called  upon  to  use  his  sword.  Briga 
dier  General  Mac  Arthur  has  said,  that  these  expres 
sions  were  extorted  from  him,  by  insinuations  of  cow- 


64  DEFENCE  OP 

ardice.  I  meant  no  such  insinuation.  His  declaration, 
that  he  felt  his  single  self  able  to  carry  the  fortress 
at  Sandwich  against  any  garrison,  left  no  room  to 
doubt  his  own  good  opinion  of  his  prowess.  When 
general  Mac  Arthur  addressed  such  language  to  me, 
I  had  never  seen  any  thing  thai  would  have  warrant 
ed  such  an  insinuation  as  he  conceives  I  made.  But 
if  any  thing  would  justify  an  impeachment  of  that 
officer's  courage,  it  would  be,  such  conduct  at  such  a  time. 
It  may  be  thought,  that  I  ought  to  have  arrested  gene 
ral  Mac  Arthur.  It  is  not  one  of  the  charges  against 
me  that  I  did  not ;  and  therefore  I  shall  not  digress 
further  from  the  course  of  my  defence,  than  to  say,  the 
peculiarity  of  my  situation  alone  prevented  my  doing  it. 

If  I  had  taken  such  a  step,  I  have  no  doubt  his 
men,  who  had  elected  him  a  colonel,  would  have  turn 
ed  their  arms  against  me,  with  as  much  alacrity  as 
they  professed  to  use  them  against  the  enemy.  I 
might,  and  believe  1  should  have  had  a  civil  war  in 
my  camp.  But  to  shew  what  was  the  disposition  of 
my  officers  towards  me,  I  have  only  to  refer  the  Court, 
once  more  to  Colonel  Cass's  (now  Brigadier  General 
Cass)  letter  to  the  Government,  of  the  tenth  of  Sep 
tember,  in  which  he  states,  that  fa,  and  others,  had 
formed  a  conspiracy  to  wrest  the  command  from  me. 
Whether  this  was,  or  was  not,  a  treasonable  design,  is 
not  for  me  to  determine.  But  what  confidence  could 
I  place  in  officers,  whose  conduct  had  been  such  as 
they  themselves  have  described  ? 


GENERAL  HULL.  9J 

I  know,  Mr.  President,  that  my  letters  to  the  Sec 
retary  at  War,  and  my  official  account  of  the  surren 
der,  may  be  appealed  to  on  this  subject.  I  wish  they 
may  be — what  I  have  written  of  the  volunteers  and 
their  officers  is  just,  and  what  I  yet  say.  They  were 
brave,  zealous  men.  It  is  my  pride,  that  in  the  very 
hour  of  misfortune,  I  had  the  magnanimity  to  give 
them  all  the  credit  that  was  due  to  them,  and  to  take 
upon  myself  the  whole  responsibility  of  a  measure 
which  I  knew  would  be  the  subject  of  so  much  cen 
sure.  Would,  sir,  that  I  could  have  observed  a  little 
of  the  same  spirit  in  my  accusers !  That  they  had 
been  willing  to  take  some  share  of  the  blame  that  is 
justly  due  to  them !  And  that  they  had  not,  in  the  tri 
umph  of  their  own  elevation  on  my  depression,  repre 
sented,  with  the  most  uncharitable  bitterness,  a  man 
whose  smiles  they  once  courted. 

I  must  be  pardoned,  Mr.  President,  for  yielding  to 
my  feelings,  in  these  digressions.  I  have  stated  to 
you,  the  numbers,  nature,  and  situation,  of  the  force 
which  I  had  to  oppose  to  the  enemy.  I  shall  now 
state  what  force  he  brought,  or  might  bring,  agains.t 
me.  I  say,  Gentlemen,  might  bring,  because  it  was 
that  consideration  which  induced  the  surrender,  and 
not  the  force  which  was  actually  landed  on  the  Amer 
ican  shore  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth.  It  is 
possible,  that  I  might  have  met  and  repelled  that 
force,  and  if  I  had  had  no  farther  to  look  than  to  the 
event  of  a  contest  at  that  time,  I  should  have  trusted 
to  the  issue  of  a  Jmttle.  I  beg  leave  first  to  examine, 


96  DEFENCE  OF 

what  \vas  the  extent  of  the  enemy's  force  landed  at 
Spring  Wells  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth. 

Major  Snelling,  \vho  says  he  made  some  attempt  to 
count  the  enemy's  force,  supposes  that  there  were  no 
more  than  seven  hundred  and  fifty  whites,  of  whom 
one  third  were  regulars,  and  the  rest  militia  and  volun 
teers — the  number  of  Indians  he  could  not  ascertain. 
As  he  was  going  to  his  lodgings,  after  having  satisfied 
himself  about  the  white  force,  he  saw,  he  says,  some 
hundred  and  fifty  Indians  in  array.     He  does  admit, 
however,  that  there  were  some  more  in  the  back  of 
the  town,  killing  horses,  and  stealing  cattle.     But  it 
is  very  evident,  that  Major  Snelling,  as  well  as  other 
witnesses,  meant  to  convey  to  the  Court  an  impres 
sion,  that  they  considered  the  Indian  force  very  in 
significant,  both  as  to  numbers  and  effect.     And  yet 
it  is  very  extraordinary,  that  when  my  conduct  would 
be  censurable,  in  proportion  as  the  Indian  force  in  the 
power  of  the  British  might  be  considered  numerous 
and  effective,  their  numbers  and  powers  are  augment 
ed.     I  am  charged  with  having  sent  out  too  small  a 
detachment  under  major  Van  Horn.     To  prove  that 
I  did  so,  the  major  has   testified,  that  according  to 
the  information  he  received,  three  hundred  Indians 
crossed  from  the  British  side  the  day  his  party  was 
routed.     It  is  necessary  to  heighten  my  criminality, 
that  in  one  instance  the  British  Indian  force  should 
appear  to  be  very  small  and  very  insignificant,  and 
in  the  other,  very  numerous,    and  very  formidable. 
It  is  well  known,  however,  that  all  the  savages  in  that 


GENERAL  HULL.  87 

quarter  had  immediately  after  the  fall  of  Michili 
mackinac,  joined  the  British.  I  had  had  in  council, 
between  the  fourteenth  and  twentieth  of  July,  the 
chiefs  of  nine  nations,  whose  warriours  amounted  to 
between  two  and  three  thousand,  or  more.  Is  it  not 
extremely  improbable,  that  with  a  large  force  of  this 
nature  at  their  disposal,  the  British  should  have  em 
ployed  but  a  small  part  of  it  in  their  enterprise  against 
Detroit  ?  Is  it  not  rather  to  be  presumed,  that  in  an 
undertaking  in  which  they  must  have  been  very  am 
bitious  of  success,  they  should  have  employed  all  their 
disposable  force,  whether  white  or  red  ? 

The  force  brought  against  me,  I  am  very  confident, 
was  not  less  than  one  thousand  whites,  and  at  least 
as  many  savage  warriours. 

But  it  was  not  only  against  this  force,  on  our  own 
shores,  I  was  to  defend  myself.  Their  batteries  from 
Sandwich  were  effectually  co-operating  with  them, 
and  their  ships  of  war  were  ready  to  lend  them  assis 
tance  in  the  moment  of  attack,  to  cover  their  retreat, 
and  to  afford  them  shelter  in  case  of  defeat. 

If  the  British,  landed  at  Spring  Wells,  were  not  much 
more  numerous  than  my  own  troops,  I  knew  they 
must  have  a  powerful  force  in  reserve,  which  t£ey 
could  bring  to  operate  upon  me,  either  by  crossing  them 
above  the  town  of  Detroit,  or  by  transporting  them 
in  their  ships  to  that  point,  and  thus  attack  the  fort 
on  all  sides,  and  place  my  army  between  their  fire. 
10 


98  DEFENCE  OF 

I  should  not,  however,  have  yielded  to  all  these  con* 
sideratious,  had  the  war  I  wras  carrying  on,  been  only 
against  civilized  men.  In  that  case,  those  only  who 
were  in  the  contest,  wrould  have  suffered.  But  I  knew 
how  sanguinary  and  remorseless  the  savages  would 
be,  should  my  army  be  subdued,  and  the  fortress  be 
obliged  to  yield.  The  whole  country  would  have 
been  deluged  with  the  blood  of  its  inhabitants — nei 
ther  wromen  nor  children  would  have  been  spared, 
The  large  detachment,  w?hich  was  out  under  the  com 
mand  of  colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass,  of  which  I 
could  get  no  intelligence,  and  the  detachment  under 
captain  Brush,  at  the  river  Raisin,  wrould  most  pro 
bably  have  been  the  victims  of  savage  fury,  which  is 
always  excited  by  battle,  and  rendered  more  sangui 
nary  by  victory.  These  appeared  to  me  the  certain 
and  dreadful  consequences  of  unsuccessful  resistance. 
If,  after  a  conflict,  I  should  have  been  able  for  that 
time  to  have  repulsed  the  enemy,  I  might  have  pur 
chased  fame,  and  have  avoided  all  I  have  suffered, 
and  what  I  now  suffer,  in  being  obliged  thus,  at  my 
time  of  life,  to  vindicate  my  honour,  and  plead  my 
cause  before  you.  But  at  what  price  should  I  have 
done  this  ?  How  many  of  the  lives  of ,  the  brave  men 
I  commanded,  would  it  have  cost  ?  How  many  of  the 
persons,  who  now  appear  to  witness  against  me,  might 
I  not  have  sacrificed  ?  It  might,  indeed,  Mr.  Presi 
dent,  have  given  me  an  honourable  grave — and  if 
mine  were  the  only  life  concerned,  I  wish  it  had  been 
so,  rather  than  that  the  foul  crimes  of  which  I  am 
accused  should  be  coupled  with  a  name,  to  which  my 


GENERAL  HULL.  99 

country  of  late,  as  well  as  heretofore,  has  acknow 
ledged  some  obligations. 

But  I  had  rather  even  that  this  should  be.  I  rather 
stand  before  you  accused,  as  I  am,  than  have  useless 
ly  and  wantonly  sacrificed  a  single  life,  though  it 
should  have  insured  me  immortal  fame. 

If  the  attack  of  the  enemy  had  been  repelled,  our 
triumph  would  have  been  but  temporary.  My  num 
bers  must  have  been  diminished  by  loss  in  battle. 
They  would  have  daily  lessened  by  the  cannon  of  the 
enemy  from  the  opposite  shore.  The  force  of  the  ene 
my,  augmented  as  it  was  by  reinforcements  under 
colonel  Proctor,  major  Chambers,  and  the  commander 
in  chief  general  Brock,  wrould  have  been  daily  aug 
menting.  The  force  from  Michilimackinac  and  St. 
Joseph's,  which  would  have  amounted  to  several  thou 
sand  savage  warriours ;  the  savages,  with  the  addi 
tion  of  some  hundred  white  men,  mentioned  in  the 
intercepted  letter  of  Mr.  Mac  Kenzie ;  collected  at 
Fort  William,  would,  in  a  few  days,  have  descended 
upon  us.  The  Canadian  militia  had  all  returned  to 
their  allegiance.  The  enemy's  naval  force  and  means 
of  transportation  on  the  lakes  were  augmented. 
There  was  no  co-operation  with  my  army  from  any 
quarter.  The  letters  I  had  received  from  generals 
Hall  and  Porter  had  not  only  satisfied  me  that  my 
expectations  in  this  respect  were  disappointed,  but 
that  no  diversion  in  my  favour  was  soon  to  be  expect 
ed.  My  army  was  in  a  corner,  surrounded  by  a  wil 


100  DEFENCE  OP 

derness  of  waters,  and  a  wilderness  of  woods.  All 
communication  with  my  country,  either  by  land  or 
water,  cut  off,  my  stores  of  provision  and  ammunition 
but  sufficient  for  a  short  duration  ;  add  to  all  this,  that 
at  the  moment  of  expected  conflict,  I  received  infor 
mation  that  a  part  of  my  own  troops  had  gone  over  to 
the  enemy,  and  that  a  larger  body  were  about  to  join 
him.  Under  such  a  combination  and  pressure  of  ad 
verse  circumstances,  the  army  must  have  yielded  in 
a  little  time,  notwithstanding  any  temporary  success, 
I  did  not  think  I  should  be  justifiable  or  even  excus 
able,  if  I  risked  a  battle  when  victory  could  purchase 
no  real  good.  And  when  the  consequence  of  defeat, 
or  even  the  consequences  of  being  driven  into  the 
fort,  would  be  to  submit  the  whole  country  which  I 
was  sent  to  protect,  and  that  part  of  my  force,  which 
was  on  detachment,  to  "  the  ruthless  ferocity  of  sav- 
"  ages,  armed  with  the  horrours  of  those  instruments 
'  of  carnage  and  torture,  which  are  known  to  spare 
*:  neither  age  nor  sex." 

From  such  calamity,  I  knew  a  capitulation  would 
be  a  protection.  The  British,  if  made  masters  of  the 
country  without  a  battle,  would  be  able  to  restrain 
their  merciless  allies,  which  they  could  not  do  after  a 
contest,  even  if  it  should  be  only  so  far  successful  as  to 
oblige  us  to  retreat  into  the  fort.  A  savage  will  have 
blood  for  blood,  though  he  draws  it  from  the  veins  of 
the  defenceless — victory  only  heightens  his  inhuman 
thirst. 


GENERAL  HULL.  101 

I  offered  a  capitulation  and  surrendered.  "  I  well 
"knew  the  high  responsibility  of  the  measure,  and 
"  take  the  whole  of  it  upon  myself.  It  was  dictated 
"  by  a  sense  of  duty,  and  a  full  conviction  of  its  ex 
pediency.  If  aught  has  taken  place  during  the 
"campaign,  which  is  honourable  to  the  army,  my 
"  officers  are  entitled  to  a  large  share  of  it.  If  the 
"  last  act  should  be  disapproved,  no  part  of  the  cen- 
"  sure  belongs  to  them.'* 

These,  Sir,  are  the  words  of  my  official  communi 
cation  of  this  unhappy  event  to  the  Secretary  at  War. 
I  repeat  them.  It  was,  Sir,  a  sense  of  duty  which 
drove  me  to  the  measure.  It  was  a  sense  of  what 
I  owed  to  the  protection  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
territory  I  had  so  long  governed.  I  felt  myself  bound 
to  sacrifice  every  private  feeling,  and  in  spite  of 
themselves,  to  save  from  useless  waste  the  blood  of 
the  brave  men  I  commanded.  Nor,  Sir,  will  I  con 
ceal,  that  in  the  midst  of  the  carnage  that  might  en 
sue  a  battle,  my  parental  feelings  saw  a  daughter  and 
her  offspring,  who  were  with  me  in  the  fort>  bleeding 
under  the  tomahawk  of  a  savage. 

If  these  be  considerations  unworthy  of  a  soldier, 
then  I  am  without  excuse.  Then,  indeed,  you  may 
pronounce  your  utmost  doom.  But,  do  not  let  me 
transmit  to  my  posterity  a  name,  tarnished  by  the 
foul  crimes  imputed  to  me.  I  say,  I  am  as  free  from 
the  sins  of  that  black  catalogue  as  any  man  who 
hears  me.  But  if  a  propitiation  be  necessary,  and  it 


102  DEFENCE  OF 

must  be  the  remnant  of  the  life  of  a  man,  whose  coun* 
try  has  heretofore  acknowledged  his  claims  to  her 
gratitude,  and  who  has  not  ceased  to  deserve  it — 
here  is  one  that  I  offer.  I  would  freely  part  with  it, 
if  you  will  not  take  from  me,  and  from  my  family  and 
posterity,  my  honour  and  character. 

I  now  appeal  with  some  confidence,  to  this  tribunal, 
for  their  decision  upon  the  accusations  which  I  have 
hitherto  considered.  Was  either  of  the  acts  to  which 
the  attention  of  the  Court  has  been  directed,  in  them 
selves,  and  abstractedly  considered,  unjustifiable,  or 
rather  (and  this  is  the  true  question)  was  either  of 
them  so  manifestly  wrong,  so  egregiously  erroneous, 
that  it  is  of  itself,  evidence  of  treason,  cowardice,  or 
iinofficer-like  conduct  ?  Are  there  not  so  many  rea 
sons  for  my  conduct,  in  regard  to  these  transactions, 
that  I  may  be  supposed  to  have  acted  honestly,  though 
it  should  now  appear  to  the  Court  that  it  was  erro 
neously  ? 

If  an  act  may  have  proceeded  from  pure  intentions, 
it  would  be  the  height  of  injustice  and  misanthropy, 
!o  impute  it  to  bad  motives. 

I  shall  now  proceed  to  make  my  defence  against 
the  otker  accusations.  I  shall  endeavour  to  arrange 
ihem  in  the  order  of  time  in  which  the  facts,  by  the 
specifications,  are  supposed  to  have  occurred. 

Hitherto,  Mr.  President,  my  defence  has  chiefly 
rested  on  documentary  evidence,  or  upon  facts  of 


GENERAL  HULL.  103 

general  notoriety.     As  to  all  that  follows,  the  charges 
depend  entirely  upon  parole  testimony. 

It  seems  extraordinary,  that  there  has  not  been  a 
witness  examined  on  the  part  of  the  prosecution  \vlio 
has  not  been  promoted  since  he  was  under  my  com 
mand. 

A  great  majority  of  the  young  gentlemen  who  have 
been  called  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  have  appeared 
decorated  with  their  two  epaulets.  These  have  been 
bestowed,  and  sometimes  with  the  augmentation  of  a 
star,  upon  gentlemen  who  began  their  military  ca 
reer  with  my  unfortunate  campaign. 

By  what  services  many  of  these  gentlemen  have 
merited  such  rapid  promotion,  I  have  not  learned. 
But  if  it  all  arises  out  of  their  achievements  while 
under  my  command,  I  must  say,  that  it  appears  to 
me  that  my  expedition  was  more  prolific  of  promo 
tion,  than  any  other  unsuccessful  military  enterprise 
I  ever  heard  of. 

It  cannot  be,  that  it  has  been  intended  to  give  a 
weight  to  the  testimony  of  these  witnesses,  by  giving 
them  ranks  and  honours,  which  it  would  not  other 
wise  have  Had.  But,  Sir,  when  my  military  charac 
ter  and  measures  are  to  be  tested  by  the  opinions  of 
gentlemen,  with  high  sounding  titles  of  military  rank, 
I  think  it  necessary  to  remind  the  Court,  that,  with 
the  exception  of  a  few  of  the  younger  officers,  there 


104  DEFENCE  OF 

are  none  of  them  who  have  not  been  promoted  to 
their  high  stations,  without  having  had  any  military 
experience,  and  without,  so  far  as  I  have  heard,  ever 
having  discovered  any  military  talents  or  genius. 

If  the  opinions  of  witnesses  on  military  conduct 
ought  in  any  case  to  be  listened  to,  (which  I  conceive 
ought  not  to  be,)  yet,  I  think  the  opinions  of  men 
of  these  descriptions,  ought  to  be  received  with  the 
greatest  caution. 

The  extraordinary  promotions  which  the  witnesses 
against  me  have  generally  attained,  I  think  may  be 
accounted  for  by  a  recurrence  to  the  fact,  of  which 
this  trial  has  afforded  the  most  conclusive  evidence ; 
which  is,  that  each  of  the  witnesses,  from  the  gene 
rals  to  the  youngest  and  lowest  officer  that  has  been 
called  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  is  himself,  in  his  own 
opinion  at  least,  a  hero. 

From  general  Mac  Arthur,  who  thought  himself 
capable  of  fighting  a  whole  garrison,  down  to  the 
lowest  rank,  every  officer  seems  to  have  thought,  that 
if  he  had  been  the  commanding  general,  or  if  I  had 
taken  his  advice,  all  would  have  gone  well.  No 
doubt,  they  have,  injustice  to  themselves,  made  these 
representations  to  the  government.  And  their  rank 
must  be  considered  as  a  reward  for  the  great  things, 
which  they  said  they  would  have  done,  rather  than 
to  have  been  acquired  by  any  actual  services. 


GENERAL  HULL.  105 

But,  Gentlemen,  before  I  proceed  to  examine  the 
parole  testimony,  let  me  call  your  attention  to  another 
subject  connected  with  it.  I  mean  the  indefatigable 
pains,  which  have  been  taken,  to  propagate  and  keep 
alive  the  most  hateful  prejudices  against  me.  Sir,  I 
believe  there  never  w^as  a  greater  outrage  committed 
on  the  administration  of  justice,  and  towards  an  in 
dividual,  than  was  the  publication  of  colonel  Case's 
(now  brigadier-general  Cass,)  letter  to  the  government 
of  the  tenth  of  September. 

That  such  a  letter  should  be  published,  under  the 
sanction  of  the  administration,  against  a  man,  whom 
the  administration  was  about  to  put  upon  trial  for  his 
life,  I  believe  is  a  proceeding  of  which  no  country 
on  earth  has  before  afforded  an  example. 

That  the  administration  should,  under  such  cir 
cumstances,  permit  the  publication  of  such  a  letter 
as  general  Cass's,  one  that  labours  to  represent  my 
conduct  in  the  most  odious  point  of  view,  and  takes 
pains  to  heighten  the  public  resentment  against  me, 
by  a  colouring  which  colonel  Cass  could  not  know 
of  his  own  knowledge,  was  true,  appears  to  me  to  be 
a  violation  of  every  principle  of  justice. 

The  Court  will  please  to  recollect,  that  colonels 
Cass  and  Mac  Arthur  left  Detroit  with  the  detach 
ment  to  the  river  Raisin  on  the  fourteenth  of  August, 
and  did  not  return  to  the  fort  till  the  evening  of  the 
sixteenth ;  of  course  they  could  not  know,  of  their 
own  knowledge,  what  passed  in  the  interim. 


106  DEFENCE  OF 

No  person,  reading  colonel  C ass's  letter,  but  would 
suppose,  he  was  an  eye  witness  of  all  he  relates. 

It  is  impossible  to  discover,  that  he  was  absent 
in  the  expedition  to  the  river  Raisin.  Yet  general 
Cass  states,  as  if  it  was  a  matter  within  his  own 
knowledge,  that  when  the  troops  received  orders  to 
retreat  into  the  fort,  "  one  universal  burst  of  indigna- 
"  tion  was  apparent  upon  the  receipt  of  this  order." 
I  beg  to  quote  from  this  letter  another  paragraph,  to 
shew  what  was  the  spirit  with  which  it  was  written ; 
the  design  of  its  publication  I  must  leave  the  Court 
to  infer. 

"  To  see  the  whole  of  our  men  flushed  with  victory, 
"  eagerly  awaiting  the  approaching  contest ;  to  see 
"  them  afterwards  hopeless,  dispirited,  and  despond- 
"  ing,  at  least  five  hundred  shedding  tears,  because 
44  they  were  not  allowed  to  meet  their  country's  foe, 
"  and  to  fight  their  country's  battles,  excited  sensa- 
a  tions,  which  no  American  has  ever  before  had." 

Would  not  every  one  imagine,  that  colonel  Cass 
was  here  describing  a  scene  which  passed  before  his 
own  eyes  ? 

Did  he  actually  see  at  least  five  hundred  men  shed 
ding  tears,  or  does  the  Court  believe  that  this  is  a 
representation  of  a  fact  which  really  occurred  ?  If  it 
were  so,  it  is  extraordinary  that  not  a  witness  has 
testified  to  it.  Captain  Mac  Commick  says,  he  ob- 


GENERAL  HULL.  107 

served  some  men  shedding  tears,  but  this  falls  greatly 
short  of  general  Cass's  five  hundred.  But  who  were 
these  weeping  troops  ?  It  is  not  to  be  presumed,  that 
it  was  intended  that  we  should  believe  they  were  the 
regulars ;  they  are  not  commonly  much  given  to  weep 
ing.  They  were  not  the  Michigan  militia,  because  a 
part  of  them  deserted,  and  the  rest  were  disposed  to 
go  over  to  the  enemy  rather  than  fight  him.  The 
men  then  who  shewed  this  very  extraordinary  sensi 
bility,  must  have  been  colonel  Cass's  patriotic  volun 
teers.  The  same  volunteers,  who  mutinied  in  the 
camp  at  Urbana,  and  \vould  not  march  till  they  were 
compelled  to  do  so  by  the  regular  troops.  The  same 
volunteers,  wrho  rode  the  officers  of  one  of  their  com 
panies  on  a  rail.  The  same  volunteers,  one  hundred 
and  eighty  of  whom  refused  to  cross  into  Canada; 
and  the  same  volunteers,  who,  when  they  had  an  op 
portunity,  under  major  Van  Horn,  to  gratify  their 
eager  wishes  to  meet  the  enemy  in  combat,  ran  away 
,  at  the  first  fire,  and  left  their  officers  to  be  massacred. 

If  .general  Cass  did  not  witness  this  scene,  why  did 
he  make  such  a  representation  ?  There  can  be  no 
other  reason,  than  that  this  kind  of  inflated  descrip 
tion  was  intended  to  recommend  himself  to  the  go 
vernment,  by  representing  himself  and  his  troops  in 
the  most  favourable  point  of  viewr,  and  me  in  the  most 
unfavourable,  that  even  hyperbolical  language  would 
admit. 

Sir,  this  is  not  the  only  means  that  have  been  re 
sorted  to,  to  excite  and  keep  alive  the  popular 


108  DEFENCE  OF 

clamour  against  me.  Others  of  my  officers  finding 
what  favour  the  publication  of  his  letter  gave  him,  in 
the  eyes  of  the  administration,  have  seen  that  the 
same  road  of  preferment  was  open  to  them  ;  and  the 
news-papers,  from  one  end  of  the  continent  to  the 
other,  have  been  filled  with  letters  concerning  me, 
expressed  in  terms  which  neither  truth,  justice,  nor 
even  the  laws  of  decorum  can  sanction.  Down  to 
this  very  time,  Sir,  the  same  system  is  pursued.  Now, 
while  I  have  been  on  my  trial,  publications  have 
appeared  in  the  public  prints  of  this  city,  commend 
ing  the  principal  and  leading  witness,  for  the  manner 
in  which  he  gave  his  testimony  against  me,  that  those 
who  were  to  come  after  him  might  be  encouraged  to 
follow  his  example. 

And,  Sir,  at  this  very  moment,  at  the  very  door  of 
this  building,  is  hawked  for  sale,  a  work  printed  within 
this  few  days  in  sight  of  this  capitol,  entitled  Views 
of  the  Campaigns  of  the  North-western  Army,  in 
which  my  conduct  or  motives  are  most  grossly  mis 
represented.  Who  are  they  that  thirst  so  for  my 
blood,  and  take  these  means  to  obtain  it  ? 

It  is  not  the  ostensible  author  of  this  performance. 
His  insignificance )  and  the  contemptible  talents  em 
ployed  in  the  work,  shew  him  to  be  too  mean  to  have 
a  motive  of  his  own.  I  know  not  who  may  be  the 
authors  or  instigators  of  such  outrages  upon  justice. 
If  such  things  are  permitted,  and  can  have  any  influ 
ence,  then  the  scales  ought  to  be  torn  from  the  hand 


GENERAL  HULL.  109 

of  the  figure  which  adorns  the  hall  wherein  you  sit. 
She  ought  only  to  be  left  the  sword  with  which  she 
is  decorated,  and  she  ought  to  wave  that  as  an  emblem, 
that  vengeance,  and  not  justice,  is  administered  unckr 
this  roof. 

But,  Gentlemen,  for  whatever  purpose  these  acts 
may  have  been  intended,  I  rely  with  a  perfect  confi 
dence  that  you  will  rise  superiour  to  thew.  If  I 
wanted  other  assurance  of  it  than  that  which  is  de 
rived  from  your  characters,  I  should  have  it  in  the 
patience  and  impartiality  with  which  this  prosecu 
tion,  so  far  as  depended  on  you,  has  been  conducted. 

Before  I  enter  on  an  examination  of  the  parole 
testimony,  I  must  be  permitted  to  remark,  that  I  can 
not  but  think  that  the  course  which  has  been  pursued, 
of  examining  each  witness  in  the  presence  of  the  rest, 
lias  been  unfortunate  for  me.  Till  this  Court  de 
cided  that  it  should  be  so,  I  did  think  it  was  a  well 
established  rule  of  martial  law,  that  the  witnesses 
should  be  examined  separately.  The  justice  and 
propriety  of  this  rule,  I  have  very  sensibly  felt  on  this 
occasion.  In  a  case  where  so  much  may  depend 
upon  the  language  or  phrases  in  which  the  witnesses 
express  themselves,  it  would  have  been  desirable, 
that  each  should  have  been  left  to  the  necessity  of 
selecting  his  own  language  to  express  his  meaning. 
But  according  to  the  course  pursued,  each  witness 
was  at  liberty  to  adopt  the  words,  which  had  been 
used  by  any  other  witness  on  the  same  point.  The 
11 


110  DEFENCE  OF 

disposition  of  several  of  the  witnesses  to  do  so,  has 
been  very  plainly  manifested  by  their  answering, 
when  interrogated  as  to  my  personal  behaviour,  that 
H  was  the  same  as  had  been  represented  by  a  prior 
witness. 

It  is  true,  Gentlemen,  that  the  Judge  Advocate 
would  not  accept  these  answers,  and  I  presume  has 
not  taken  them  down,  but  they  nevertheless  shew  the 
natural  disposition  of  the  witness  to  borrow  the  words 
of  another,  and  I  have  no  doubt  they  have  very  con 
scientiously,  and  often  without  knowing  it,  borrowed 
ideas  also. 

Gentlemen,  in  these  Courts  Martial,  where  the 
members,  among  whom  there  may  be  great  inequality 
of  grades,  are  intended  to  be  put  upon  an  equal  foot- 
Ing  as  judges,  care  has  been  taken,  to  avoid,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  influence  likely  to  arise  from  authority. 
It  is  on  this  account  that  the  opinion  of  the  youngest 
member  is  always  first  taken.  And  it  was  on  the 
same  account,  as  I  conceive,  that  the  rule  was  es 
tablished,  that  witnesses  should  be  examined  sepa 
rately,  that  the  younger  might  not  be  influenced  in 
his  testimony  by  what  might  be  said  by  his  superiour. 
It  would  be  contrary  to  experience  of  the  human 
disposition,  to  suppose,  that  after  a  subaltern  has 
heard  two  or  three  generals  and  officers  of  higher 
rank  than  himself  testify,  to  whose  authority  he  is 
perhaps  subservient,  or  to  whose  good  word  he  may 
have  owed  or  expects  to  owe  his  promotion,  he  wil! 


GENERAL  HULL.  Ill 

be  willing  to  contradict  what  his  superiours  have  said, 
or  even  to  make  a  representation  which  will  vary 
i'rom  theirs. 

If  on  any  case,  Sir,  the  weight  of  this  sort  of  influ 
ence  could  be  felt  on  the  testimony,  the  course  pur 
sued  on  this  occasion  would  give  it  the  fairest  scope. 
For  the  witnesses  seem  to  have  been  arranged  and 
produced,  in  the  first  instance,  very  much  according 
to  their  rank,  (except  colonel  Miller.)  After  the  Ge 
nerals  had  been  examined,  then  came  the  subordi 
nates.  The  exception  to  this  general  course  as  to. 
colonel  Miller  struck  me  as  a  little  singular.  I  did 
not  know  why  he  should  have  been  examined  the 
last,  particularly  as  he  was  the  highest  officer  of  the 
regular  army  which  had  been  engaged  in  the  cam 
paign.  He  was  with  me  during  the  whole  time,  and 
had  the  most  intimate  knowledge  of  the  transactions 
to  which  the  other  Gentlemen  testified.  But  when 
I  found  that  colonel  Miller's  testimony  was  much 
less  unfavourable  to  me  than  the  testimony  of  the 
witnesses  who  had  preceded  him,  and  that  he  would 
not  support  them  in  the  most  material  parts  of  their 
testimony,  I  was  at  no  loss  to  account  for  this  course 
of  proceeding. 

The  next  accusation  which  I  shall  consider,  is  spe 
cified  under  the  charge  of  unofficer-like  conduct,  and 
refers  to  the  commencement  of  the  march  of  the  ar 
my.  It  is  in  substance,  that  from  the  ti*ne  I  took  the 
command,  I  omitted  to  exercise,  inspect,  train,  review, 


112  DEFENCE  OF 

and  order  the  troops.  I  cannot  believe,  Gentlemen, 
that  it  will  be  necessary  for  me  to  say  much  on  this 
subject.  I  did  expect,  that  if  any  part  of  my  conduct 
could  have  escaped  the  censure  of  my  enemies,  it 
would  have  been  the  manner  in  which  I  led  the  troops 
through  the  wilderness.  When  it  is  recollected,  what 
an  extent  of  road  it  was  necessary  for  me  to  cut ; 
that  a  great  proportion  of  the  men  were  constantly 
employed  in  this  duty ;  that  those  who  were  not  so, 
were  most  generally  fatigued  with  their  turn  of  this  la 
borious  service,  I  believe  the  Court  will  think  with 
colonel  Miller,  that  there  was  neither  time,  nor  op-* 
portunity,  for  that  sort  of  discipline  and  exercise, 
which,  under  other  circumstances,  would  have  been 
proper.  The  commandants  of  regiments  have  testi 
fied,  that,  as  to  their  respective  commands,  there  was 
no  omission  of  what  was  their  duty  in  this  respect. 
The  fault  charged  to  me  is  then,  that  in  the  depths  of 
the  forest,  through  which  we  were  marching,  I  did 
not  call  off  my  fatigue  parties,  guards,  and  advances, 
and  go  through  the  ceremonies  of  military  parade. 
And  yet,  as  if  every  thing  that  I  could  have  done, 
must,  in  the  opinion  of  my  officers,  be  condemned, 
my  omissions  to  have  these  parades  are  not  more 
severely  censured  than  my  conduct  has  been  for 
making  some  display  of  the  troops,  and  passing  them 
in  review  on  some  few  occasions,  when  I  thought  it 
was  consistent  with  our  situation.  When  the  corps 
passed  me  by  sections,  after  we  had  crossed  the  Miami, 
general  Mac  Arthur  thinks  it  was  not  a  review,  be 
cause  I  was  not,  according  to  his  experience,  in  the 


GENERAL  HULL.  113 

situation  which  a  reviewing  general  ought  to  have 
been  ;  though,  he  admits  that  the  officers  at  the  heads 
of  sections  saluted  me,  and  he  admits  that  it  is  possible 
he  might  have  saluted  me  himself.  At  the  river 
Raisin,  I  also  passed  the  troops  in  review.  I  did  the 
same  at  Spring  Wells,  and  marched  the  troops  from 
thence  to  Detroit  and  back.  But  these  parades  seem 
to  have  excited  the  indignation  of  general  Mac  Ar 
thur,  as  it  did,  according  to  his  testimony,  of  other 
officers  ;  but  for  what  reason  I  have  not  been  able  to 
learn.  The  truth  is,  that  from  the  moment  we  com 
menced  our  march,  the  troops  were  always  under  my 
eye.  I  saw  them  on  their  line  of  march.  I  saw  them 
in  their  working  parties,  and  in  their  encampments.  I 
thought  it  would  be  as  ridiculous-  as  useless  to  make 
parades  in  the  midst  of  the  woods.  Whenever  the 
country  opened,  so  that  there  was  any  room  for  dis 
play,  I  availed  myself  of  it;  not  only  that  I  might 
see  the  troops,  and  put  them  in  military  array,  but  I 
thought  it  would  have  a  good  effect  to  shew  our  line 
to  the  best  advantage  at  the  little  settlements  which 
we  passed,  and  on  our  arrival  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Detroit. 

I  shall  trouble  the  Court  with  nothing  further  in 
relation  to  this  charge,  than  the  following  quotation 
from  general  Cass  and  colonel  Miller's  testimony :  ge 
neral  Cass  states,  that  "  from  the  time  they  left  Urbana, 
"  the  inarch  was  conducted  with  all  possible  expedition. 
"  There  was  no  time  to  discipline  the  troops."  Colo 
nel  Miller,  on  his  cross-examination,  gays,  "  On  the 


114    ^  DEFENCE  OF 

"  march  there  was  no  opportunity  to  discipline  the 
"  troops.  The  fatigues  of  the  march,  and  cutting  the 
"  road,  and  making  the  encampments,  were  as  much 
"  as  the  troops  could  endure." 

Connected  with  the  accusation  which  I  have  last  an 
swered,  is  another  which  is  in  substance,  that  I  did  not 
during  the  march,  prepare,  and  make  known,  an  order 
of  battle.  That  I  prepared  and  published  an  order  of 
march  is  admitted;  a  plan  of  it,  which  has  been  proved 
by  several  witnesses,  is  before  you.  This  plan,  as  ap 
pears  from  the  testimony  of  general  Van  Rensselear. 
and  other  witnesses,  is  that  which  was  adopted  by  gene 
ral  Wayne,  in  the  expedition  which  he  commanded 
and  marched  through  the  same  country.  This  order 
of  march  was  in  fact  an  order  of  battle,  or  at  least,  so 
little  change  of  the  disposition  of  the  troops  was  ne 
cessary,  in  case  of  an  attack,  that  it  could  be  made 
in  a  moment,  and  was  so  obvious  that  it  could  never 
be  mistaken.  It  is  remarkable,  that  the  commanding 
officers,  whose  testimony  was  expected  to*support 
this  accusation,  all  say,  -that  they  knew  how  their  re 
spective  corps  were  to  form  in  case  of  attack;  though, 
as  they  say,  they  never  heard  of  any  order  of  battle. 
It  seems  then,  that  an  order  of  battle  was  made  known, 
and  the  accusation  must  then  rest  upon  the  allegation, 
that  the  order  was  not  made  or  published  by  me. 

General  Cass's  testimony  on  this  subject  is  as  follows: 
"  I  think,  when  we  arrived  near  the  river  Huron,  or 
"between  that  and  Swan  Creek,  the  commanding 
a  officers  of  regiments,  under  an  expectation  of  an 


GENERAL  HULL.  115 

c*  attack,  applied  to  the  general,  and  he  permitted  them 
"  to  form  an  order  of  battle.  I  do  not  recollect,  that 
"  the  general  assisted  in  making  the  order.  I  think 
"  the  plan  originated  with  colonel  Miller.  I  do  not 
"  recollect  that  the  order  was  afterwards  submitted  to 
•'  general  Hull.  I  presume  there  was  an  orderly  book, 
;i  as  orders  were  issued." 

General  Mac  Arthur's  testimony  on  this  point  is  as 
follows  :;"  On  the  day  we  passed  the  river  Raisin  our 
;'  march  was  about  nine  miles,  and  we  encamped  near 
"  Swan  Creek.     Rumours  were  among  the  inhabitants 
"  that  we  should  be  attacked  by  Indians,  who  were 
"  assembled  at  the  Huron,  about  six  miles  in  advance. 
"  Myself,  and  colonel  Findlay,  called  on  the  General, 
"and  stated  that  some  plan  of    battle  ought  to  be 
"  agreed  upon.     In  the  march  my  regiment  was  di- 
"  vided;  a  battalion  marched  on  each  side  of  the  road, 
"  in  the  rear  of  colonels  Findlay  and  Cass.  I  mentioned 
l*  to  the  General,  that  thus  situated,  it  was  impossible 
"  for  me  to  be  with  both  my  battalions,  and  I  wished 
"  to  be  permitted,  in  case  of  attack,  to  form  them  in 
" one  line.     The  General  thought  it  would  be  well 
"  enough  to  do  so.     I  suggested  the  propriety  of  my 
"  battalions  being  so  formed  on  the  march,  in  the  rear 
"  of  the  regiments,  as  that,  in  case  of  an  attack,  I 
"  might  swing  my  regiment  round,  and  form  the  rear 
"  line  of  a  hollow  square.     The  General  gave  me  his 
"  permission  to  adopt  this  plan,  I  then  left  him,  whether 
-I  left  the  other  officers  with  him  or  not,  I  do  not  know." 
Major  Jessup  testifies,  that  I  issued  orders  on  the 


116  DEFENCE  OF 

march;  that  they  were  generally  sent  to  him  by 
one  of  my  aids-de-camp ;  that  he  assembled  the 
adjutants,  and  communicated  to  them  my  orders.  He 
further  staled,  that  the  orderly  books  generally  were 
surrendered,  but  that  captain  Mac  Commick  and 
captain  Rutleff,  who  were  adjutants  of  Mac  Arthur 
and  Findlay's  regiments,  had  preserved  theirs.  It  un 
fortunately  happens,  that  these  books  have  not  been 
brought  on  hy  these  gentlemen.  Had  they  been  so, 
it  would  then  have  appeared  what  orders  I  did  issue, 
and  this  matter  would  not  have  been  left  to  the  un 
certain  recollection  of  witnesses. 

As  I  am  accused  of  having  omitted  to  issue  orders, 
and  of  having  given  improper  orders,  I  submit  to  the 
Court,  whether  I  had  not  a  right  to  expect,  that  the  or 
derly  books,  which  were  in  the  possession  of  witnesses, 
brought  forward  by  the  prosecution,  would  have  been 
produced;  especially  as  I  requested  major  Jessup 
might  be  summoned,  with  a  duces  tccum,  to  bring  be 
fore  the  Court  all  the  official  documents  in  his  posses 
sion,  and  the  orderly  book.  But  I  proceed  to  exa 
mine  the  testimony  in  relation  to  the  order  of  battle. 

Colonel  Miller  testifies,  "  That  an  order  of  march 
u  was  published  at  Urbana,  and  was  generally  known 
"  to  the  army ;  that  the  army  commonly  marched  ac- 
u  cording  to  that  order.  It  was  my  understanding, 
u  says  colonel  Miller,  that  in  case  of  an  attack  in 
u  front,  my  regiment  was  to  form  the  line  in  front.  In 
"  case  of  an  attack  on  the  right  flank,  we  were  to 


GENERAL  HULL.  117 

c  form  by  facing  the  enemy ;  and  so  in  case  of  an  at- 
k{  tack  on  the  left.  This  was  a  general  understanding, 
"  but  I  do  not  recollect  to  have  seen  any  order  to  this 
"  purport,  either  written  or  verbal.  I  understood  it 
"  from  conversations  with  general  Hull,  and  I  believe 
"  it  was  so  understood  by  the  other  officers.  The 
"  General  told  me,  that  the  order  of  march  which  he 
"  had  adopted,  was  that  which  had  been  pursued  by 
*''  general  Wayne.  I  know  nothing  to  the  contrary." 
Colonel  Miller  adds,  "of  the  General's  having  been 
*'  almost  always,  when  we  were  on  the  march,  in  a 
"  situation  to  direct  the  movements  of  the  troops.  For 
•'  the  greatest  part  of  the  time,  the  General  rode  near  me 
Ci  in  front.  Sometimes  he  passed  to  the  rear.  Gene- 
"  rally  the  army  encamped  in  a  hollow  square.  After 
^  we  apprehended  danger,  we  commonly  formed  a 
"  breast-work,  and  encamped  within  it.  By  a  general 
"  order,  each  line  was  to  form  in  front  of  its  tents,  if 
"  attacked  in  camp.  There  was  also  a  general  order 
"  for  turning  out  the  troops  by  taps  of  the  drum,  pro- 
-'  ceeding  from  head-quarters  along  the  lines.  This 
"  method  was  practised,  and  the  troops  were  called  to 
c;  arms  every  morning,  before  dawn,  by  these  signals." 

I  believe,  Gentlemen,  that  this  is  the  whole  of  the 
testimony,  on  this  point,  which  can  be  considered  as 
of  any  importance.  It  cannot  be  disputed  then,  but 
that  there  was.  an  order  of  battle ;  but  general  Cass's 
testimony  seems  intended  to  leave  an  impression,  that 
the  order  did  not  originate  with  me,  but  that  it  was 
suggested  by  my  officers,  and  adopted  by  them,  with 


113  DEFENCE  OF 

my  assent,  without  my  having  given  myself  much 
trouble  about  it.  I  cannot  but  think,  that  in  this  in 
stance  there  is  a  display  of  the  spirit  with  which 
much  of  testimony  has  been  given  in  this  cause.  It 
seems  to  have  been  determined,  that  I  shall  not  even 
share  in  the  credit  of  any  thing  that  was  done  that 
ought  to  have  been  done.  My  officers  claim  every 
thing  that  is  meritorious  as  theirs. 

General  Cass  says,  he  does  not  recollect  whether  I 
assisted  in  making  the  order,  or  whether  it  was  sub 
mitted  to  me  after  it  was  made.  This  is  one  of  the 
instances  in  which  it  is  extremely  unfortunate  for  me, 
that  the  recollection  of  the  witnesses  entirely  fails 
them  as  to  matters  of  the  greatest  importance,  and 
which  might  be  decisive,  if  in  my  favour,  as  to  the 
particular  accusation ;  while  their  memories  serve  them 
with  remarkable  correctness  and  minuteness,  as  to 
circumstances  which  are  unfavourable  to  me. 

I  hope  I  may  be  permitted  to  digress,  so  far  as  to 
remark  another  instance  of  the  same  unfortunate 
want  of  recollection,  though  it  relates  to  a  different 
point. 

Major  Jessup,  after  having  stated,  that  he  came  to 
me  in  the  fort,  after  the  flag  was  hoisted  on  the  six 
teenth  of  August,  adds,  "  I  inquired  of  the  General  if 
"  it  were  possible  we  were  about  to  surrender.  The 
"  General  said  something  about  the  enemy's  force,  and 
"  something  about  terras,  which  I  do  not  recollect." 


GENERAL  HULL.  119 

Major  Jessup  then  goes  on  to  state  very  particular 
ly  what  he  said  to  me,  to  express  his  strong  aversion 
to  the  surrender.  I  have  surely  great  reason  to  re 
gret,  that  major  Jessup's  memory  would  not  enable 
him  to  state  what  I  said,  when  it  might  have  been  so 
important  to  shew  the  motives  of  my  conduct,  while 
-  every  thing  that  he  said  to  me,  which  was  calculated 
to  set  his  own  conduct  in  the  most  favourable  point  of 
view,  made  so  deep  an  impression  on  his  mind,  that 
he  could  undertake  to  relate  the  very  expressions  he 
had  used.  But  to  return  to  what  respects  the  order  of 
battle. 

General  Mac  Arthur  states,  that  after,  on  his  sug 
gestion,  he  had  settled  with  me  how  he  was  to  swing 
his  regiment  in  case  of  an  attack,  "  I  then  left  the 
"  General ;  whether  I  left  the  other  officers  with  him, 
"  or  not,  I  do  not  know."  It  appears  then,  that  this 
arrangement,  about  the  order  of  battle,  was  concluded 
in  the  presence  of  other  officers ;  what  others,  general 
Mac  Arthur  does  not  state. 

Colonel  Miller  says,  he  understood,  from  conversa 
tions  with  me,  what  was  to  be  the  disposition  of  his 
corps,  in  case  of  an  attack. 

Thus  it  appears,  that  colonel  Mac  Arthur,  colonel 
Cass,  colonel  Pindlay,  and  colonel  Miller,  all  knew 
what  they  were  to  do,  if  an  enemy  was  to  approach 
us.  What  foundation  is  there  then  for  a  charge,  that 


120  DEFENCE  OF 

no  order  of  battle  was  made  known  ?  If  the  subordi 
nate  officers  were  not  instructed  as  to  their  duty,  in 
the  event  of  an  attack,  was  it  not  the  fault  of  these 
commandants  of  corps  and  not  mine  ?  Suppose  there 
bad  been  no  written  order  of  battle;  but  that  after  the 
order  of  march,  which  so  nearly  approached  the  order 
of  battle,  had  been  formed,  I  had  explained  to  the 
commandants  the  disposition  I  intended,  in  case  of  an 
attack ;  could  any  man  say,  I  was  deficient  in  duty, 
because  I  had  not  explained  my  intentions  in  a  writ 
ten  order  ?  I  believe  no  one  acquainted  with  military 
history  or  practice,  will  think  a  general  is  bound  to 
make  an  exposure  of  his  plans,  in  every  orderly  book 
in  his  army.  If  the  witnesses,  in  whose  opinions 
these  charges  and  specifications  have  been  framed, 
have  entertained  such  erroneous  ideas  of  the  duties  of 
a  commander,  as  this  accusation  seems  to  indicate,  I 
hope  now,  that  some  of  them  have  attained  a  rank 
which  may  give  them  the  command  of  armies,  they 
will  learn,  that  to  give  a  general  publicity  in  their 
orderly  books  to  their  designs  in  case  of  an  attack, 
will  be  a  departure  from  their  duty,  and  that  they 
may  often  thereby  afford  their  enemy  an  opportunity 
of  gaining  information,  which  he  ought  not  to  have. 

As  to  the  order  of  battle  at  night,  it  is  proved  by 
the  testimony  of  colonel  Miller,  that  that  was  settled 
by  a  general  order,  which  was  made  known  to  all; 
and  when  the  Court  considers  what  was  the  nature 
of  our  lines  of  march ;  how  nearly  it  approached  the 
only  order  of  battle,  which  could  have  been  proper, 


GENERAL  HULL.  121 

'in  the  warfare -which  we  were  to  expect;  how  in 
stantly  the  order  of  march  was  made  the  order  of  bat 
tle  ;  and  consider  also,  that  I  was  always  at  the  head 
of  the  troops  while  they  were  on  the  inarch,  I  am 
persuaded  the  Court  will  think,  there  is  no  foundation 
for  this  accusation.  If  it  has  not  originated  in  malice, 
it  certainly  has  in  ignorance. 

I  am  unwilling  to  detain  the  Court  longer  on  a 
charge,  which,  in  my  own  opinion,  is  sufficiently  an 
swered;  but  I  know  I  ought  not  to  place  so  much 
confidence  in  my  own  opinion,  as  not  to  avail  myself 
of  any  thing  which  may  have  an  influence  on  the 
opinions  of  others.  I  must  therefore  advert  to  other 
testimony,  which  I  believe  ought  to  be  conclusive  on 
this  point.  I  mean  my  letters  to  the  War  Department 
Those  to  which  I  shall  refer  for  this  purpose,  the 
Court  will  recollect  were  read  by  the  Judge  Advo 
cate.  If  I  had  offered  them,  they  Certainly  would  not 
have  been  conclusive  evidence  in  my  favour;  but 
when  introduced  on  the  part  of  the  prosecution,  so 
far  as  they  establish  any  thing  in  my  favour,  they  are 
as  good  evidence  as  they  are  to  prove  any  thing 
against  me.  It  would  be  a  manifest  violation  of  jus 
tice,  if  this  sort  of  testimony  should  be  resorted  to  for 
my  crimination,  and  I  should  not  be  permitted  to 
avail  myself  of  it,  so  far  as  it  might  serve  for  my 
exculpation.  It  is  a  general  rule,  which  applies  to  the 
administration  of  justice  in  all  courts,  that  wherever 
a  document  is  read  by  one  side,  the  whole  of  it  be 
comes  evidence,  of  which  either  party  may  avail 
12 


122  DEFENCE  OF 

himself.  I  beg  leave  to  remind  the  Court  that  this 
rule  has  been  acknowledged  by  the  Judge  Advocate* 
The  Court  will  recollect,  that  in  the  course  of  the 
examination  of  captain  Fuller,  major  Parker  objected 
to  take  down  his  answer  to  a  question  which  1  put 
to  the  witness,  as  being  unnecessary,  because  the  fact 
as  to  which  I  interrogated  him,  was  sufficiently 
proved  by  my  letters  to  the  Secretary  at  War. 

In  my  letter,  dated  Solomon's  Town,  eighteenth 
June,  eighteen  hundred  and  twelve,  I  say,  "  My  or- 
*'  der  of  march  is  in  two  columns,  with  strong  front 
"  and  rear  guards  ;  the  columns  flanked  by  the  rifle- 
"men  and  cavalry,  where  the  ground  will  admit;  the 
"  baggage,  provisions,  &c.  between  the  columns.  The 
a  army  has  been  practised  from  the  two  columns  to 
"  form  two  lines,  either  in  front,  rear,  or  on  either 
"  flank,  or  to  form  a  square  facing  outward.  My  order 
"  of  encampment  at  night  is  a  square,  facing  outward 
c  with  all  the  baggage  in  the  centre,  &c." 

My  letters  of  the  twenty-fourth  June,  eighteen 
hundred  and  twelve,  from  near  Blanchard's  Creek, 
enclosed  to  the  Secretary  at  War  the  order  of  march 
which  has  been  given  in  evidence.  Among  the 
manuscript  notes  subjoined  to  that  order,  is  one  in  the 
following  words :  "  The  columns  are  in  a  situation  to 
u  form  two  lines  in  front,  rear,  or  on  either  flank,  or  to 
"  form  a  square." 

After  these  observations,  I  cannot  but  be  satisfied, 
that  the  Court  will  think  that  there  was  no  grountl 


GENERAL  HULL.  123 

for  charging  me  with  neglecting  to  discipline  and  re 
view  my  troops,  or  omitting  to  prepare  and  make 
known  an  order  of  battle. 

The  next  accusations  that  I  shall  consider  are,  that 
I  neglected  to  repair  and  put  in  order  the  cannon  at 
Detroit ;  and  to  put  the  place  in  a  state  of  defence  : — 
tliat  I  did  not  seasonably  repair,  and  put  in  a  state 
of  service,  the  artillery  necessary  for  the  operations  in 
Canada ;  and  that  I  did  not  transport  them  to  the 
enemy's  shore,  so  soon  as  I  ought  to  have  done.  I 
have  already  had  occasion  incidentally  to  notice  these 
accusations,  and  I  shall  give  no  further  answer  to 
them  than  to  refer  the  Court  to  the  testimony  of 
captain  Dallaba.  He  states,  that  when  I  arrived  at 
Detroit,  "  the  fort  was  generally  in  good  order,  and 
"  in  a  good  state  of  repair."  On  his  cross-examina 
tion,  captain  Dallaba  says,  "  the  fort  was  in  the  state 
"  of  defence  I  have  described,  except  as  to  some  im- 
"  material  matters,  on  the  fourth  day  of  July,  before 
"  the  arrival  of  the  army.  Afterwards,  something 
"  was  done  with  the  ordnance  stores,  and  mounting 
"  the  cannon ;  but  every  thing  designed  for  the  de- 
•'  fence  of  the  fort  exclusively,  was  completed  on  the 
"'  fourth  of  July.  After  the  general's  arrival  at  De- 
"  troit,  industry  and  exertions  were  used  to  put  in 
"  order  the  field  pieces  and  heavy  artillery  for  the 
"  siege  of  Maiden.  This  was  done  (says  the  witness) 
•'  under  my  sup'edntendance,  and  by  order  of  general 
•MIuIL" 


(24  DEFENCE  OF 

This  witness  was  examined  on  the  eighth  o£  Fe 
bruary:  four  days  afterwards,  on  the  twelfth,  he  is  again 
called,  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  and  then  he  testifies 
as  follows,  "  I  have  before  stated,  that  no  alterations 
•(  had  been  made  subsequently  to  the  fourth  of  July, 
';  for  defence  of  the  fort. 

"Some  few  artificers,  immediately  after  the  arrival 
;c  of  general  Hull,  went  to  work  to  repair  and  mount 
kfi  some  heavy  cannon  on  trucks,  to  be  placed  in  the 
"  batteries  on  the  banks  of  the  river.  And  some  re* 
"  pairs  were  made  to  three  brass  field  pieces,  and  a 
v*  small  quantity  of  ammunition  was  fixed  for  them. 
"  But  no  order  was  received,  to  my  knowledge,  to 
"  prepare  the  heavy  field  artillery,  till  after  the  army 
"  went  to  Canada.  I  have  the  order,  and  think  it 
'-was  dated  on  the  fifteenth  or  sixteenth  of  July." 

I  have  already  made  some  remarks  on  this  test!-, 
mony,  and  stated,  that  the  order  was  in  fact  given  on 
the  fourteenth  of  July.  Till  that  time,  the  artificers 
had  been  otherwise  employed.  I  will  remind  the 
Court  here  of  the  objection  I  offered,  and  which  was 
overruled  by  the  Court,  to  this  mode  of  re-examining 
a  witness.  If  to  examine  the  witnesses,  in  the  pre 
sence  of  each  other  be  a  departure  from  the  usages  of 
Courts  Martial,  it  is  certainly  a  much  wider  and  more, 
important  deviation  from  that  usage,  to  call  up  a  wit 
ness,  arid  to  allow  him  to  make  important  alterations 
in  his  testimony,  after  he  has  been  listening  for  days 
to  the  testimony  of  other  witness,  I  now  uiar|.< 


GENERAL  HULL.  125 

this  irregularity,  as  I  conceive  it  to  be,  for  the  sake 
of  presenting  it,  as  \vell  as  the  fact  of  all  the  witnesses 
having  been,  pursuant  to  a  determination  of  this 
Court,  examined  in  the  presence  of  each  other,  to  the 
attention  of  the  high  officer,  who  has  authority  to 
review  these  proceedings. 

Colonel  Miller  testifies,  that  he  "discovered  no 
"  want  of  exertion  in  respect  to  preparing  the  heavy 
"  and  light  field  artillery,  after  the  army  arrived  at 
'•  Detroit" 

General  Taylor  says,  "  I  believe  no  time  was  lost 
"  in  preparations.  Timber  and  some  large  wheels  were 
'*  got  out." 

Again,  the  same  witness  says,  that  he  visited  the 
artificers  every  day,  to  hurry  the  preparations,  with 
orders  from  general  Hull ;  "  and  I  must  say,  (adds  the 
u  witness)  that  general  Hull  shewed  great  anxiety  in 
u  getting  the  artillery  ready." 

I  pray  leave  to  make  one  remark  on  this  language 
of  general  Taylor's,  which  I  am  aware  may  have  the 
appearance  of  being  hypercritical ;  but  I  beg  the  in 
dulgence  of  the  Court,  till  I  have  explained  my  rea 
sons  for  noticing  a  circumstance  apparently  trivial. 
Why  should  general  Taylor  preface  his  testimony  of 
this  fact  in  my  favour,  with  the  phrase,  "  I  must  say  T~ 
It  seems  as  if  to  state  any  circumstance  favourable  to 
me  was  the  result  of  a  compulsion,  to  which  his  mind 
12* 


126  DEFENCE  OF 

unwillingly  submitted.  In  this  instance,  he  speaks  like 
a  penitent,  whose  conscience  obliges  him  to  make  the 
acknowledgment  of  a  fact,  which  his  inclination  would 
prompt  him  to  conceal.  I  had  a  right  to  expect,  that 
when  the  witnesses  could  testify  any  thing  in  my 
favour,  they  would  speak  in  the  same  unreserved 
language,  which  they  used,  when  they  intended  to 
expose  my  misconduct. 

Upon  most  occasions,  observations  on  circum 
stances  apparently  so  light,  might  not  be  proper  or 
necessary.  But,  Gentlemen,  I  beg  you  to  recollect, 
that  the  witnesses  have  undertaken  to  interpret  my 
looks,  and  have  ventured  to  infer  from  my  countenance, 
from  my  appearance  and  manner,  what  was  passing  in 
my  mind,  and  by  what  motives  I  was  actuated.  They 
have  not  hesitated  to  express  opinions  derived  from 
no  other  indications,  when  they  knew,  that  these 
opinions  might  affect  my  honour  and  my  life.  It 
cannot  be  improper  then,  that  I  should  ask  you  to 
remark  even  the  slightest  expression  of  a  witness, 
which  I  may  think  will  betray  the  disposition  with 
which  he  testifies.  It  is  with  reluctance  that  I  at 
tempt  to  impeach  the  testimony  of  any  witness  who 
has  been  called  against  me.  I  have  been  taught  to 
venerate  a  soldier  from  my  infancy.  I  know  that 
the  profession  of  arms  generally  adds  lustre  to  the- 
most  noble  virtues.  But  I  know  that  men  do  not 
©hange  their  natures  by  becoming  soldiers,  nor  by 
attaining  the  most  elevated  rank.  And  when  they 
can  reconcile  to  themselves  to  aeeuse  me  of  eowartf- 


GENERAL  HULL.  127 

iee,  from  appearances  so  fallacious,  surely  I  may  re 
mark,  that  expressions  they  have  used  indicate  bias, 
partiality,  or  prejudice. 

Without  detaining  the  Court  with  a  particular  re 
capitulation  of  more  of  the  evidence  on  this  point} 
I  shall  content  myself  with  referring  it  to  the  very 
important  and  decisive  testimony  of  captain  Dyson, 
to  the  testimony  of  captain  Bacon,  and  finally  to  the 
testimony  of  Mr.  Watson ;  who  says,  that  after  my 
arrival  at  Detroit,  no  man  could  have  been  more  in 
dustrious  and  indefatigable  than  I  was. 

I  proceed  to  a  new  subject,  and  shall  now  make 
my  defence  against  the  accusation,  which  is  in  sub 
stance  ;  that  I  did  not  avail  myself  of  the  opportu 
nity,  which  the  defeat  of  the  enemy  by  colonels  Cass^ 
and  Miller,  and  their  possession  of  the  bridge  over 
the  river  Aux  Canards,  on  the  eighteenth  of  July  af 
forded  of  making  an  attempt  on  Maiden ;  and  that  I 
did  not  maintain  possession  of  the  bridge.  This 
forms  the  sixth  specification,  under  the  charge  of  un~ 
officer-like  conduct. 

The  exposition  I  have  already  presented  of  my 
views  and  designs  when  I  crossed  to  Canada,  would, 
I  humbly  conceive,  afford  a  sufficient  answer  to  these 
accusations.  I  did  not  think  it  expedient  to  attack 
Maiden,  under  any  circumstances,  which  existed 
previous  to  our  leaving  Canada.  Why  I  thought  it 
inexpedient  I  have  already  explained.  The  advan* 


123  DEFENCE  OF 

-% 

tages  which  I  thought  were  to  be  gained  by  delay  ; 
a  regard  which  my  orders  compelled  me  to  pay  to  the 
security  of  my  own  posts ;  the  necessity  of  keeping 
open  my  communication ;  the  certain  consequences 
of  defeat,  and  the  probable  consequences  of  victory, 
have  all  been  considered,  in  making  my  defence 
against  the  charge  of  undue  delay  in  Canada.  If  I 
was  justifiable,  or  even  excusable,  in  deferring  the  at 
tack  on  Maiden,  I  must  be  so  in  having  omitted  to 
avail  myself  of  the  possession  of  the  bridge,  and  in 
not  having  attempted  to  maintain  it.  It  would  have 
been  absurd  to  have  attempted  to  maintain  a  post  so. 
far  in  advance,  unless  it  was  with  a  view  to  an  im 
mediate  movement  on  Maiden.  But  I  beg  the  Court 
to  advert  to  the  date  of  this  transaction.  It  was  not 
on  the  eighteenth  oi'  July,  as  mentioned  in  the  speci 
fication,  but  on  the  seventeenth,  as  appears  by  my 
letter  to  colonel  Cass.  This  was  the  fifth  day  after  we 
moved  into  Canada.  At  that  time,  the  deliberations 
of  my  officers  in  Canada  had  uniformly  resulted  in  the 
expression  of  an  opinion,  that  the  attempt  on  the 
enemy's  fortress  should  be  deferred,  till  the  artillery 
was  prepared;  and  it  wras  immediately  after  the 
council  at  Sandwich,  in  which  colonel  Cass  himself, 
as  appears  by  the  testimony  of  judge  Witherill,  had 
advised  that  the  attack  on  Maiden  should  not  be  made 
without  cannon. 

My  views  in  sending  this  detachment,  or  rather  in 
permitting  general  Cass  to  march  it,  appear  from  his 
testimony.  I  meant  it  as  a  reconnoitring  party,  and 


GENERAL  HULL.  129 

by  no  means  intended  that  the  commanding  officer 
should  pursue  measures  which  might  expose  the  de 
tachment  to  he  sacrificed,  or  oblige  me  to  abandon 
the  system  I  had  adopted,  by  leading  my  whole  army 
to  its  support.  Colonel  Cass  testifies,  that  a  day  or 
two  after  colonel  Mac  Arthur  was  detached  to  the  river 
Trench,  he  (colonel  Cass,)  requested  me  to  permit 
him  to  reconnoitre  the  ground  between  Sandwich  and 
Maiden ;  that  I  did  permit  it,  and  a  detachment  of 
two  hundred  and  eighty  men  were  ordered  for  that 
service. 

General  Taylor  states,  that  he  was  present  when 
news  arrived  that  colonel  Cass  had  taken  the  Aux 
Canards  bridge.  "  That  I  expressed  my  astonishment, 
"  that  colonel  Cass  should  have  commenced  hostilities, 
'•*  as  I  was  not  ready  with  the  artillery ;  that  I  appeared 
"  to  be  irritated,  because  colonel  Cass  had  taken  upon 
"  himself  to  act,  without  my  authority :  the  detach- 
"  ment  having  only  been  sent  out  for  observation," 

It  cannot  be  doubted,  but  that  genera!  Cass  knew 
my  views,  and  the  objects  of  his  detachment.  How 
far  he  was  justifiable,  in  pursuing  measures  so  con 
trary  to  them,  not  only  in  making  an  attack,  which 
might  have  forced  me  to  a  general  and  decisive  action 
for  his  support,  but  after  my  verbal  orders  to  retire, 
persisting  to  maintain  his  situation,  till  he  tried  the 
effect  of  a  written  remonstrance  to  me,  it  is  unneces 
sary  now  to  consider.  I  do  now  believe,  that  the 
of  this  proceeding  was  a  manoeuvre,  to  afford 


130  DEFENCE  OF 

grounds  for  new  clamours  against  me,  and  weaken 
my  authority.  My  officers,  long  before  they  had  ma 
tured  their  conspiracy  to  wrest  the  command  from 
me  by  actual  violence  to  my  person,  had  formed  a 
plan,  of  which  I  firmly  believe  this  was  a  part,  to 
place  me  in  such  situations  as  would  oblige  me  to  be 
obedient  to  their  schemes.  If  any  thing  successful 
was  done,  they  would  claim  all  the  merit.  In  case 
of  disaster,  the  blame  eould  easily  be  thrown  on  the 
commanding  general.  If  I  had  led  the  army  to  the 
Canards,  which  probably  I  must  have  done  to  have 
maintained  the  bridge,  instead  of  its  being  alleged 
against  me  as  a  crime,  that  I  did  not  do  so,  do  you 
not  believe,  Gentlemen,  in  case  we  had  been  defeated, 
I  should  have  been  charged  with  misconduct,  in  hav 
ing  acted  in  opposition  to  the  advice  of  all  the  coun 
cil,  not  to  move  on  Maiden  without  artillery  ?  And 
when  it  is  considered,  that  colonel  Mac  Arthur  was 
absent  with  a  large  detachment ;  that  I  had  received 
no  intelligence  from  him ;  that  I  was  under  great  un 
easiness  on  his  account,  I  do  think  that  if  I  had  left 
him  in  my  rear,  and  with  onlv  a,  part  of  my  army  had 
taken  ground,  which  might  have  been  the  field  of  a 
general  action  with  the  enemy's  whole  force,  which 
was  then  either  in  respect  to  its  regulars,  militia,  or 
savages,  unascertained,  and  at  that  time  but  incon 
siderably  weakened  by  desertion,  I  should  have  beea 
highly  culpable. 

Colonel  Miller's  account  of  this  transaction  is  as 
follows :  "in  answer  to  a  message  sent  to  general  HwJJ, 


GENERAL  HULL.  131 

*  'he  sent  us  an  order  to  return.  The  purport  of  his 
v-  message  was,  that  he  could  not  soon  be  ready  for 
""  the  attack  on  Maiden,  and  could  not  think  of  divid- 
:'  ing  the  army.  We  then  wrote  to  him  and  pressed 
"  in  strong  terms  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the 
*'•  bridge,  in  answer  to  which  he  sent  a  written  dis- 
"•cretionary  order  to  us,  expressing  his  anxiety  about 
;c  general  Mac  Arthur,  &c." 

This  order  has  been  proved.    It  is  in  the  following 
words  : 

SANDWICH,  July  17,  1812. 
SIR, 

I  have  received  your  letter  of  this  morn 
ing.  To  my  astonishment  I  have  received  not  the 
least  information  from  Mac  Arthur.  It  is  possible 
something  unpleasant  has  taken  place.  It  will  pro 
bably  be  a  week  before  the  cannon  will  be  mounted. 
I  am  sensible  of  the  advantages  of  holding  the  bridge.. 
I  would  not,  however,  hazard  too  much  for  the  pur 
pose.  The  enemy  may  pass  the  ford  above,  and 
come  in  the  rear.  I  will,  however,  leave  it  to  your 
discretion,  and  colonel  Miller's,  under  all  the  circum 
stances  of  the  case  to  do  that  which  you  judge  most 
expedient.  Twelve  miles  is  a  great  distance,  and 
the  enemy  can  either  land  in  boats  above  the  mouth 
of  the  river,  or  pass  at  the  ford  to  attack  you.  You 
know  the  ground  better  than  I  do,  and  as  I  before 
observed,  I  will  leave  the  measure  and  the  force  to 


toi>  DEFENCE  OF 

your  discretion  and  colonel  Miller'?,  and  the  be&l 
mode  of  security  to  the  party. 

I  am  very  respectfully, 

your  most  obedient  servant. 
WILLIAM  HULL, 

Brigadier  General,  commanding, 

Colonel  CASS. 

Colonel  Miller  further  testifies,  that,  "  upon  the  re^ 
"  ceipt  of  this  letter,  the  officers  were  called  together. 
"  and  it  was  decided,  that  unless  the  bridge,  being 
n  twelve  or  fourteen  miles  from  our  camp,  and  only 
"  four  or  five  from  the  enemy,  could  be  supported  by 
"  our  whole  force,  we  had  better  return ;  and  that  as  we 
"  had  not  the  disposition  of  the  whole  force,  which 
"  was  thought  necessary,  we  ought  not  to  take  the 
""  responsibility." 

This  testimony,  I  think,  developes  too  plainly  to 
be  misunderstood,  the  design  of  these  proceedings, 
I  was  to  be  compelled  to  abandon  my  own  plans,  and 
to  adopt  those  of  my  officers.  I  was  to  be  compelled 
to  lead  my  whole  force  in  a  manner  under  the  walls 
of  Maiden,  without  being  provided  with  artillery,  and 
I  was  urged  to  do  this,  by  the  commandant  of  the  de 
tachment,  who  but  a  day  or  two  previously  had  given 
a  decisive  opinion,  in  council,  that  the  attack  on 
Maiden  should  not  be  made  till  the  ordnance  was 
prepared. 


GENERAL  HULL.  133 

But  when  it  was  found,  that  my  order  left  the  offi 
cers  of  the  detachment  a  discretion,  and  that  if  an 
attempt  to  maintain  the  bridge  should  be  attended 
with  any  disaster,  the  officers  must  share  the  respon 
sibility,  then  there  was  no  doubt  as  to  the  measures 
to  be  pursued.  It  would  have  disappointed  the  whole 
design  if  I  should  escape  any  part  of  the  odium. 

But  however  this  affair  of  the  bridge  has  been 
magnified,  it  is  a  fact,  that  the  possession  of  that  pass 
by  the  enemy  never  was  contemplated  as  an  obstacle 
to  a  movement  on  Maiden.  They,  in  truth,  never 
attempted  to  maintain  possession  of  it.  Colonel 
Cass's  rencontre  was  only  with  a  reconnoitring  party. 
According  to  the  testimony  of  colonel  Miller,  they 
saw  no  more  than  fifty  of  the  enemy.  He  says  they 
had  about  twenty  five  men  on  the  bridge,  and  about 
twenty  five  on  our  side,  and  that  some  men  were  dis 
covered  in  the  woods.  After  this,  there  were,  as  ap 
pears  from  the  testimony  of  colonel  Cass,  repeated  de 
tachments  sent  from  Sandwich  to  the  bridge.  They 
always  found  it  unoccupied  by  the  enemy.  It  could 
then  have  been  no  object  to  have  moved  the  army  to 
that  post,  until  the  attack  on  Maiden  was  determined 
upon. 

It  is  curious  to  observe,  what  trivial  and  irrelevant 
circumstances  ingenuity  can  bring  together  to  create 
false  appearances.  Some  of  the  gentlemen,  who 
were  prisoners  with  the  enemy  at  the  time  of  this 
Iransaction,  have  been  produced  to  testify,  that  when 
13 


T34  DEFENCE  OP 

accounts  reached  Amherstburgh  that  our  detachment 
had  appeared  in  the  Aux  Canards,  it  created  great 
consternation ;  and  it  was  intended  that  it  should  be 
believed,  that  the  enemy  were  ready  to  abandon  their 
post  at  our  approach.  But  it  turns  out,  upon  further 
explanation  from  witnesses  of  the  same  description, 
ihat  the  disposition  to  fly  was  only  manifested  by  the 
town's  people,  who  thought  it  unnecessary  to  expose 
their  persons  and  effects  in  a  place  which  was  likely 
to  be  invested.  This,  so  far  from  being  evidence  of 
an  intention  to  yield  the  place  without  contest,  is  not 
an  unfrequent  measure  when  the  most  obstinate  re 
sistance  is  intended. 

In  my  letter  to  the  Secretary  at  War  of  the  nine 
teenth  of  July,  I  mention  the  affair  at  the  Aux  Ca 
nard  bridge,  and  say,  great  credit  is  due  to  colonel 
Cass  and  his  detachment.  For  firmness,  to  colonel 
Cass  and  the  other  volunteers,  when  supported  by  the 
proportion  of  regulars,  which  were  with  them  in  this 
first  encountre  with  any  enemy,  I  did  think  credit 
was  due,  both  to  men  and  officers. — But  when  I  wrote 
that  letter,  I  had  not  the  same  view  of  the  designs 
formed  against  me  which  subsequent  circumstances 
hav?  expressed.  I  did  not  then  see,  that  a  plan 
which  has  been  so  successful,  was  settled  to  make 
my  destruction  a  merit,  which  was  to  give  another 
my  place,  and  some  of  his  accomplices,  rank  and 
fortune. 

I  am  charged  with  unofficer-like  conduct  in  suffer 
ing  my  communication  with  the  river  Raisin  to  be 


GENERAL  HULL.  135 

cut  off.  This  imputation  is  among  the  last  that  I  ex 
pected  to  find  in  the  catalogue  of  my  accusations. 
If  it  had  been  intended  to  shew,  that  nothing  that  I 
did,  or  intended  to  do,  could  escape  censure,  this  spe 
cification  would  afford  strong  evidence  of  such  a  dis 
position.  For  the  means  that  I  took  to  open  this 
communication  are  also  made  the  subjects  of  accusa 
tion.  The  detachment  under  colonel  Van  Horn, 

lh!™ ^.^"gnfWflfo  ftfo^*nkfflHfrr,fiai 

Cass,  although  they  were  all  measures  which  were 
dictated  by  the  strong  necessity,  which  I  saw  and 
felt,  to  keep  open  the  communication  in  question,  are 
all  set  down  as  instances  of  misconduct.  But  I 
would  ask  those,  at  whose  instigation  these  charges 
have  been  made,  what  measures  I  should  have  pur 
sued  to  have  effected  this  object  ?  It  must  be  remem 
bered,  that  it  was  utterly  in  vain  to  have  opened  the 
communication  to  the  river  Raisin  only.  No  sup 
plies  could  come  from  thence  that  were  not  drawn 
from  the  western  states.  I  must  therefore  have  pro 
tected  the  road  all  the  way  from  Ohio.  Was  this  to 
have  been  done  by  stretching  back  so  great  a  dis 
tance  with  a  sufficient  force  ?  If  so,  my  whole  army 
would  have  been  insufficient  for  the  purpose.  The 
two  hundred  men  I  sent  under  major  Van  Horn  my 
two  senior  officers  thought  insufficient.  In  their 
opinion,  I  ought  to  have  detached,  for  this  duty,  one 
of  their  regiments.  Colonel  Miller,  after  he  had  de 
feated  the  enemy,  had  more  than  five  hundred  men 
left,  and  was  within  fourteen  miles  of  his  destination, 


136  DEFENCE  OP 

He  thought  it  necessary  to  send  back  to  me  for  a  re 
inforcement  of  one  hundred  and  fifty,  or  two  hundred, 
before  he  could  proceed,  although  he  knew  that  at  the 
river  Raisin  he  was  to  be  joined,  and  would  be 
strengthened  in  his  march  back,  by  the  detachment 
under  captain  Brush,  which  had  escorted  the  provi 
sions  to  the  river  Raisin.  If  so  great  a  number  of 
men  was  requisite  merely  to  force  a  passage  to  the 
_i —  Tj_i.i  ~— j  u_u  i,^,,r  ™,WOf  &  nortion  of  my 
army  would  have  been  necessary  to  keep  open  u,t 
road  to  Ohio,  or  even  that  portion  of  it  which  was 
between  Detroit  and  the  river  Raisin  ? 

I  think  it  must  appear  to  the  Court,  that  I  could 
not  have  kept  open  this  extensive  line  of  communi 
cation,  without  distributing  my  whole  army  along  the 
road ;  and  yet,  according  to  the  inferences  to  be  drawn 
from  the  charges  and  specifications,  I  was  criminal 
in  not  carrying  on  an  offensive  war  in  Canada,  and 
in  not  performing,  at  the  same  time,  another  service, 
which  would  have  required  all  my  troops. 

That  this  communication  ought  to  have  been  kept 
open  is  most  certain,  I  did  expect  it  would  have  been. 
I  did  suppose  that  a  force  would  have  been  sent  after 
me,  adequate  not  only  to  this  purpose,  but  to  augment 
my  army.  The  grounds  I  had  for  these  expectations 
will  appear  /rom  documents,  which  are  before  the 
Court,  to  some  of  which  I  have  already  adverted. 

It  is  alleged,  that  I  was  guilty  of  misconduct  in 
sending  the  detachment  under  major  Van  Horna  be- 


GENERAL  HULL.  137 

cause  it  was  inadequate  to  the  purpose  for  which  it 
was  intended.  The  proof  of  the  inadequacy,  I  presume, 
is,  that  it  was  defeated.     It  appears,  however,  that  it 
was  not  owing  to  want  of  numbers  that  this   defeat 
happened.     According  to  major  Van  Horn's  own  ac 
count,  the  party  that  attacked  him,  he  judged  from 
the  fire,  was  from  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  two  hun 
dred.     This  was  conjecture,  for  more  than  forty  sav 
ages  were  not  seen.     But  these  volunteers,  the  same 
patriotic  men  who  are  said  to  have  wept  so  bitterly 
because  they  were  not  allowed  to  fight  at  Detroit, 
fled  in  the  first  moments  of  an  attack,  with  the  utmost 
disorder  and  precipitation.     Had  not  this  been  the 
case  the  detachment  was  sufficient.     If  it  had  fought 
the  enemy,  there  can  be  no  doubt  but  it  would  have 
made  its  way  good  to  the  river  Raisin,  where  it  would 
have  been  joined  by  a  large  detachment  under  cap 
tain   Brush.     If  the  detachment  had  been  ever  so 
large,  it  would  have  been  insufficient,  if  the  men  be 
haved  no  better  than  those  major  Van  Horn  com 
manded  did  upon  this  occasion.     But,  Sir,  the  true 
foundation  for  this  charge  is,  that  I  did  not  think  pro 
per  to  be  obedient  to  the  advice  of  my  two  senior 
officers.     It  was  placed  in  this  black  catalogue,  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  giving  them  an  opportunity  of  pro 
claiming  to  the  world  their  own  superiour  sagacity 
and  judgment.     It  was  to  give  them  an  opportunity 
to  prove  by  their  own  testimony,  that  whatever  I  did 
was  wrong,  and  that  whatever  they  advised  would 
have  been  right. 
13* 


138  DEFENCE  OF 

But  possibly  I  ought  to  have  suffered  the  advice  of 
these  officers  upon  this  occasion  to  have  had  more 
weight.  I  should  have  reflected,  that  they  had  the 
best  opportunity  of  knowing  the  character  of  their 
own  troops,  and  might  have  anticipated  their  shame 
ful  conduct ;  but  then  I  think,  I  have  reason  to  com 
plain,  that  colonels  Cass  and  Mac  Arthur  were  not  at 
this  time  as  candid,  as  they  were  when  it  was  pro 
posed  to  attempt  Maiden  by  assault,  and  that  they  did 
not  tell  me,  as  they  did  then,  that  they  could  not  be 
responsible  for  their  men.  If  they  had  told  me  this, 
I  might  have  thought  it  right  to  increase  the  force  of 
the  detachment,  and  to  have  added  to  it  some  regu 
lars;  whose  presence  might,  as  it  did  at  the  Aux  Ca 
nards,  have  encouraged  the  volunteers  to  have  faced 
the  enemy,  or  made  them  more  afraid  to  run  away 
than  to  fight. 

The  next  accusation  is  one,  that  can  only  have 
been  set  down  to  swell  the  list  of  offences  imputed 
to  me;  for  it  is  without  any  manner  of  foundation. 
It  charges  me  with  unofficer-like  conduct,  in  having 
detached  colonel  Miller  on  the  eighth  of  August,  and 
not  having  supplied  him  with  provisions,  when  he  was 
near  Brownstown. 

While,  Sir,  I  feel  myself  bound  to  acknowledge  the 
liberality  with  which  I  have  been  treated  by  the 
Judge  Advocate,  in  the  course  of  this  trial,  and  the 
delicacy  with  which  he  has  in  general  refrained  from 
repeating  the  odious  epithets,  which  are  so  profusely 


GENERAL  HULL.  139 

and  wantonly  used  in  the  specifications,  I  cannot  but 
regret,  that  he  has,  in  respect  to  this  charge,  departed 
from  his  general  observance ;  and  that  he  should,  upon 
such  evidence  as  was  before  him,  have  thought  him 
self  justifiable  in  imputing  to  my  misconduct,  on  this 
occasion,  an  useless  waste  of  American  blood.  Sir, 
the  American  blood  that  was  spilled  in  the  contest  at 
Brownstown  was  gloriously  shed.  It  purchased  a 
victory  that  did  honour  to  our  arms.  True,  it  was 
ineffectually  shed — but  to  lay  the  failure  of  the  enter 
prise  to  me,  and  to  reproach  me  with  this  waste  of 
blood,  is  as  unjust  as  it  is  inhuman. 

I  do  not  understand,  that  I  am  supposed  to  have 
done  wrong  in  sending  the  detachment,  or  in  not 
making  it  of  greater  force.  By  the  testimony  of 
colonel  Miller  it  appears,  that  he  marched  with  six 
hundred  men,  instead  of  five  hundred,  as  is  mentioned 
in  the  specification.  But  the  misconduct  imputed  to 
me  is,  as  I  understand,  solely,  that  I  omitted  to  sup 
ply  colonel  Miller  with  provisions  after  the  battle  at 
Brownstown.  With  respect  to  the  want  of  provisions, 
it  appears,  that  the  detachment  was  amply  provided 
when  it  left  Detroit.  The  march  they  were  to  per 
form,  was  about  thirty  miles;  and  colonel  Miller 
states,  that  they  wrere  furnished  with  a  supply  for  two 
days  when  they  set  out.  But  he  says,  that  the  pro 
visions  were  thrown  away  with  the  men's  knapsacks 
when  they  were  attacked,  and  though  he  represents 
the  enemy  to  have  been  entirely  beaten,  and  so  far 
driven  from  off  his  rout,  that  captain  Maxwell  went 


140  DEFENCE  OF 

from  him  to  Brownstown  and  back,  and  reported, 
that  the  enemy  were  all  gone ;  and  though  colonel 
Miller  states,  that  he  returned  to  the  battle  ground 
with  his  whole  force,  and  was,  in  fact,  undisturbed  on 
that  ground  nearly  two  days,  yet  he  says  in  his  cross- 
examination,  that  the  provisions  were  not  recovered, 
because  he  could  not  suffer  his  men  to  separate  to 
take  them  up.  I  cannot  conceive  what  necessity 
there  could  have  been  for  his  men's  separating.  It 
appears  to  me,  that  he  would  only  have  had  to  march 
his  whole  detachment  over  the  ground  where  the  at 
tack  was  made,  and  the  provisions  might  have  been 
recovered  with  as  much  security  to  the  detachment,  as 
when  they  were  remaining  inactive  in  the  position  to 
which  they  had  retrograded.  Colonel  Miller,  in  his 
account  of  this  transaction,  states,  that  he  considered 
that  his  victory  opened  the  communication  to  the 
river  Raisin  sufficiently  for  him  to  have  proceeded — 
that  on  the  evening  of  the  day  on  which  the  battle 
was  fought,  that  is,  the  ninth,  he  sent  major  Snelling 
to  make  a  report  to  me,  to  inform  me  of  the  loss  of 
the  provisions,  and  to  request,  that  I  would  send  boats 
or  waggons  with  provisions,  and  to  take  back  the 
wounded.  He  was  also  to  request  a  reinforcement  for 
colonel  Miller,  which  colonel  Miller,  on  his  cross-ex 
amination  says,  he  suggested  should  be  from  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  to  two  hundred  men.  Colonel  Miller 
also  states,  that  colonel  Mac  Arthur  came  down  the 
next  morning  (that  is  on  the  tenth)  with  eight  or  nine 
boats,  and  brought  with  him  no  more  than  two  barrels  of 
flour,  one  barrel  of  pork,  and  half  a  barrel  of  whiskey  j — 


GENERAL  HULL.  141 

that  the  place  where  the  battle  was  fought  was 
about  fourteen  miles  from  Detroit,  and  sixteen  to  the 
liver  Raisin,  between  Maguago  and  Brownstown  ;  it 
being  late  in  the  day  before  the  wounded  men  could 
be  got  on  board  the  boats,  he  knew  that  he  could  not 
get  through  before  the  next  night,  (that  is  the  eleventh) 
moving  as  cautiously  as  they  ought  to  do ; — that  the 
men  still  complaining  of  hunger,  he  concluded  that 
he  could  send  to  Detroit  that  evening,  (that  is  the 

•»~~*u)  .. I'u. r~^,T'r,i^««    *]-,o  ««vf    rvinrning ;     -that 

he  accordingly  sent  an  express  to  me  on  the  evening 
of  the  tenth,  requesting  that  I  would  send  him  two 
day's  provisions ; — that  no  messenger  from  me  came 
to  him  till  sun  down  the  next  day,  (that  is  the  eleventh) 
that  the  messenger  informed  him,  he  had  been 
detained  by  losing  his  way; — that  this  messenger 
brought  him  an  order  from  me  to  return  to  Detroit, 
and  informed  him  that  he  would  find  provisions  at  the 
river  Ecorce ; — that  on  the  same  evening  he  took  up 
Ms  march  for  Detroit,  and  arrived  there  the  next  day, 
(the  twelfth ;)  that  his  force  wras  two  hundred  and 
eighty  regulars,  and  three  hundred  and  twenty  militia, 
some  of  the  Michigan  militia,  and  some  of  the  Detroit 
horse; — that  the  militia  behaved  well; — that  his  loss 
was  seventeen  killed,  and  sixty-four  wounded. 

Sir,  it  has  always  appeared  to  me  most  unaccount 
able,  that  colonel  Miller,  after  he  had  disposed  of  his 
wounded  men  on  the  tenth,  and  when,  according  to 
his  own  testimony,  he  considered  that  his  victory  had 
opened  his  communication  to  the  river  Raisin,  did  not 


142  DEFENCE  OF 

•proceed.  He  had  but  sixteen  miles  to  march.  He  re 
mained  in  the  position  he  had  taken  from  the  even 
ing  of  the  tenth,  when  he  had  embarked  his  wounded 
men,  till  the  evening  of  the  eleventh,  that  is  twenty- 
four  hours,  when  he  might  have  accomplished  his 
march,  as  I  should  think,  in  four  or  five  hours.  At  the 
end  of  it  he  was  sure  not  only  to  meet  the  provisions 
he  was  sent  to  escort,  but  a  strong  reinforcement  from 
the  detachment  under  captain  Brush.  He  says,  how- 

ever,  tliat  rn-i  the*  o-«^r>incr  r>f  tlito   fp>n*Vi     }•>&  r!<3tp>rminpfl 

to  halt  where  he  was,  and  to  wait  the  return  of  an  ex 
press  from  me,  because  he  should  be  obliged  to  move 
with  so  much  caution ;  that  he  knew  he  could  not  get 
through  until  the  next  night — a  very  extraordinary 
caution  indeed  must  have  been  necessary,  that  could 
have  retarded  for  so  long  a  time  the  march  of  a  body 
of  troops  for  sixteen  miles,  through  a  space,  which  it 
had  been  ascertained  by  the  report  of  captain  Maxwell, 
was,  as  far  as  Brownstowri  at  least,  free  from  an  ene 
my.  But  if  the  want  of  provisions  was  a  reason  for 
not  proceeding  to  the  river  Raisin,  why  did  not  colo 
nel  Miller  push  on  to  Brownstown — there  was  an  In 
dian  settlement,  which,  without  doubt,  was  at  least 
capable  of  supplying  his  immediate  wants,  and  from 
which  he  could  not  have  been  distant  but  a  very  few 
miles.  If  there  he  could  have  got  but  one  meal  for 
his  troops,  it  does  appear  to  me,  that  there  would  not 
have  been  any  great  enterprise  in  undertaking  the 
rest  of  the  march,  which  might  have  been  twelve  or 
fourteen  miles,  without  any  further  provisions.  It  did 
appear  to  me  not  less  extraordinary,  that  when  colonel 


GENERAL  HULL,  143 

Miller  advised  me  when  he  had  gained  so  decisive 
a  victory  that  he  considered  his  road  to  the  river 
Raisin  as  opened,  and  he  had  ascertained  that  there 
was  no  enemy  between  him  and  Brownstown,  that 
he  should,  at  the  same  time,  have  made  a  demand 
on  me  for  a  reinforcement  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  or 
two  hundred  men — when,  after  his  battle,  he  had  five 
hundred  and  twenty  effective  men,  two  hundred  and 
eighty  of  whom  were  of  his  own  regiment,  and  were 
almost  the  whole  force  of  that  description  which  I 
had  under  my  command.  Let  me  here  remark,  if  so 
great  a  force,  that  is  to  say,  between  seven  and  eight 
hundred  men,  were  necessary,  to  force  their  way  to 
the  river  Raisin,  what  proportion  of  my  troops  must 
have  been  necessary,  not  only  to  keep  open  the  com 
munication  for  that  distance,  but  to  guard  the  line  all 
the  way  to  the  state  of  Ohio  ? 

But  it  is  not  my  business  to  examine  the  conduct 
of  colonel  Miller,  further  than  to  shew,  that  when  I 
despatched  him  with  so  large  a  detachment,  with  ra 
tions  for  two  days,  I  had  made  every  provision  which 
I  had  any  reason  to  think  his  exigencies  would  re 
quire. 

When,  however,  I  received  his  demand  for  provi 
sions,  I  took  every  measure  that  the  duty  of  my  sta 
tion  required  to  supply  him.  Colonel  Mac  Arthur 
was  charged  with  this  service,  and  I  beg  to  present 
to  the  Court  his  account  of  the  manner  in  which  he 
performed  it. 


144  DEFENCE  OF 

"  On  the  day  we  crossed  from  Canada,"  says  colo 
nel  Mac  Arthur,  (that  is  the  eighth  of  August,)  "  Colo- 
"  nel  Miller  was  sent  with  a  detachment  for  the  pur- 
"  pose,  as  was  stated,  of  opening  a  communication 
"  with  the  river  Raisin.  The  night  succeeding  colo- 
"  nel  Miller's  battle  at  Maguago,  (perhaps  the  ninth,) 
"  the  General  sent  for  me — the  night  was  wet ;  he  in- 
"  formed  me  of  the  battle,  and  directed  me  to  take  one 
"  hundred  of  my  regiment,  to  take  the  boats  along 
"  the  river,  and  to  descend  to  colonel  Miller's  en- 
"  campment,  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  up  the  wound- 
"  ed  men.  He  directed  me  to  get  one  day's  provision 
"for  colonel  Miller's  detachment.  I  called  at  the 
"  commissary's  and  was  detained  three  or  four  hours 
"  in  getting  it — I  got  what  I  could." 

% 

It  has  been  my  misfortune,  Sir,  that  I  have  not 
been  able  to  obtain  the  testimony  of  Mr.  Beard,  the 
commissary.  He  has  been  regularly  summoned  by 
the  Judge  Advocate,  at  my  request;  and  1  have  se 
veral  times  written  to  him,  but  he  has  not  made  his 
appearance.  The  Judge  Advocate,  however,  with 
Iris  wonted  candour,  has  admitted  a  document  which 
in  somemeasure  supplies  his  testimony.  It  is  an  order 
which  I  issued  to  the  contractor  on  the  ninth  of  Au 
gust,  for  delivering  rations  to  colonel  Mac  Arthur  for 
colonel  Miller's  detachment.  The  receipt  of  which 
order  is  acknowledged  by  the  contractor,  or  a  copy 
thereof,  which  is  in  the  following  words : 

"  The  contractor  will  issue  six  ^hundred   rations 
"  of  bfead  or  flour,  six  hundred  rations  of  pork,  and 


GENERAL  HULL.  143 

£i  twelve  hundred  rations  of  whiskey,  to  be  sent  to  the 
*4  detachment  under  the  command  of  lieutenant  colo- 
«  nel  Miller. 

"  By  order  of  brigadier  general  Hull, 

"  H.  H.  HlCKMAN, 

August  9th,  1812.  "  Captain,  Infantry." 

"  (CORRECT  COPY.) 

"  ».  BEARD." 

Now,  Sir,  it  appears  that  general  Mac  Arthur  knew, 
that  one  purpose  of  sending  him  to  colonel  Millers* 
detachment  was  to  carry  provisions.  He  says,  I  di 
rected  him  to  take  one  day's  provisions  for  colonel 
Miller's  men ;  that  he  was  detained  by  the  contractor 
three  or  four  hours,  and  took  what  he  could  get.  And 
it  appears  that  he  arrived  at  colonel  Miller's  encamp 
ment  with  only  two  barrels  of  flour,  one  barrel  of 
pork,  and  half  a  barrel  of  whiskey.  When  I  had 
given  the  order  to  colonel  Mac  Arthur,  to  take  the 
provisions ;  when  I  had  issued  the  order  to  the  proper- 
officer  to  issue  them  to  him,  had  I  not  done  eveiyflk 
thing  that  was  incumbent  on  me,  as  commanding 
officer  ?  Was  it  my  duty  to  go  to  the  commissary's 
store,  and  to  superintend  the  issues  ?  If  colonel  Mac 
Arthur  found  the  commissary  disobedient  to  my  order, 
and  unduly  detaining  him,  why  did  he  not  report  to 
me  ?  How  will  colonel  Mac  Arthur  excuse  his  having 
departed  on  this  service,  witho^having  with  him  the 
quantity  of  provisions  I  had  ordered  ?  Is  it  sufficient 
for  him  to  say,  that  he  took  what  he  could  get  ?  If 
14 


146  DEFENCE  OP 

there  was  any  deficiency  lie  ought  to  have  informed 
me  of  it;  he  could  have  had  communication  with  me 
in  five  minutes.  If  want  of  provisions  was  the  rea 
son  why  the  American  blood  that  was  spilled  at  the 
battle  of  Brownstown  was  shed  in  vain,  I  again  ask; 
was  it  not  most  unjust  to  charge  that  waste  to  me  ? 

On  the  tenth  of  August,  I  issued  another  order  for 
provisions  for  colonel  Miiler'sHdetachment.  This  has 
also  been  read,  and  is  in  the  following  words  : 

"DETROIT,  August  10th,  1812. 
"  The  contractor  will  issue,  for  colonel  Miller's  de- 
"  tachment,  two  thousand  complete  rations. 

«  A.  F.  HULL, 

"  Aid-de-camp.'' 

These  provisions  were  sent  by  the  contractor  to 
colonel  Miller's  detachment.  Colonel  Miller  met 
them  on  his  return,  and  brought  them  back  with  him. 

An  accusation  of  the  same  nature  with  that  which 
I  last  considered,  is,  that  I  also  omitted  to  supply  with 
provisions  the  detachment  which  left  Detroit  on  the 
fourteenth  of  August,  under  colonela,Mac  Arthur  and 
Cass.  General  Mac  Arthur's  testimony  on  this  sub 
ject  is  as  follows :  That  on  the  fourteenth  of  Au 
gust,  about  noon,  as  he  thought,  I  sent  for  him,  and 
informed  him,  that  I^iadjust  received  intelligence 
from  captain  Brush,  Hiat  he  had  arrived  at  the  river 
Raisin  with  provisions,  and  said,  I  wished  to  send 
out  a  detachment  to  meet  him.  That  he  replied,  he 


GENERAL  HULL.*  147 

was  ready  to  obey  my  order.  Colonel  Cass  said  the 
same  thing.  That  they  (the  witness  and  colonel 
Cass)  then  returned  to  camp,  and  shortly  after  receiv 
ed  an  order  to  detach  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  from 
each  of  their  regiments.  That  in  the  evening  I  came 
along,  and  asked  if  they  were  ready  to  march.  The 
witness  answered,  that  they  were  not,  but  as  usual  had 
not  a  bite  of  any  thing  to  eat.  That  I  said  the  de 
tachment  must  not  be  delayed,  and  I  would  send 
provisions  after  them.  The  witness  then  gives  an 
account  of  the  proceedings  of  the  detachment  till  its 
return  to  Detroit,  and  states,  that  they  never  received 
any  provisions  from  the  fort. 

I  cannot  but  think,  that  this  account  of  general 
Mac  Arthur's  conduct,  though  given  by  himself,  will 
excite  the  surprise  of  the  Court. 

He  was  ordered  to  march  a  detachment  at  about 
twelve  o'clock.  He  does  not  move  till  evening,  and 
I  then  find  that  he  has  not  obeyed  the  order.  He 
gives  me  to  understand  that  he  has  been  waiting  for 
provisions.  If  there  was  no  order  for  provisions,  why 
did  he  not  apply  to  me  on  the  subject  ?  But  there  was 
one,  and  I  think  general  Mac  Arthur's  testimony 
shews  it. 

When  he  sees  me,  he  does  not  complain  of  the 
want  of  an  order,  but  that  he  cannot  get  the  provi 
sions.  If  there  was  an  order,  and  the  proper  officer 
did  not  obey  it,  why  was  not  the  disobedience  report- 


148  DEFENCE  OF 

ed  to  me  ?  Instead  of  pursuing  so  obvious  a  course, 
colonel  Mac  Arthur  chose  rather  to  remain  in  his 
camp  five  or  six  hours,  and  if  I  had  not  accidentally 
met  with  him,  how  much  longer  lie  would  have  con 
sidered  his  delay  warranted  by  the  same  cause,  it  is 
Impossible  to  say.  It  does  appear  to  me,  that  this 
conduct  of  general  Mac  Arthur  is  very  unaccounta 
ble.  Perhaps  he  had  no  inclination  for  the  service 
he  had  been  ordered  to  perform,  or  it  may  be,  he 
thought,  that  by  the  delay,  or  by  going  without  pro- 
visions,  he  should  bring  blame  on  me.  The  beha 
viour  of  general  Mac  Arthur  upon  these  two  occa 
sions,  thrt  is  to  say,  in  respect  to  the  provisions 
which  he  was  to  take  for  colonel  Miller,  and  in  re 
spect  to  provisions  for  his  own  detachment,  it  appears 
1o  me,  manifests  very  strongly  that  there  was  some 
hidden  motive  for  his  conduct.  And  in  this  last  in-" 
stance  there  is  a  mystery,  which  I  am  sure  is  not  ex 
plained  by  any  thing  he  has  said.  It  never  can  be 
believed  that  he  waited  so  many  hours,  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  an  order  for  provisions,  or  if  he 
had  an  order,  that  his  delay  was  merely  for  the  pur 
pose  of  having  it  executed.  If  his  only  object  had 
been  to  procure  provisions,  the  means  of  doing  so,  by 
an  application  to  me,  were  so  obvious  and  direct,  that 
he  could  not  have  hesitated  to  pursue  it.  But  if  the 
Court  will  recollect  that  at  this  time  the  conspiracy 
had  been  formed  to  take  the  command  from  me,  and 
that  general  Cass,  in  his  letter  to  the  government,  has 
stated,  that  the  execution  of  it  was  only  prevented  by 
Ms  and  general  Mac  Arthur's  having  been  sent  on 


GENERAL  HULL.  149 

this  detachment,  it  may  account  for  the  conduct  of 
these  officers.  The  delay  was  possibly  to  mature 
their  plot,  and  to  put  it  in  practice. 

If  general  Mac  Arthur  was  on  his  trial  for  miscon 
duct  in  relation  to  these  transactions,  I  am  persuaded 
that  his  testimony  ought  rather  to  convict  him  than 
me. 


But  I  did  take  measures  for  supplying  the  detach 
ment  with  the  necessary  provisions.  My  information 
from  captain  Brush  was,  that  he  would  be  on  his 
march  with  the  provisions  under  his  escort,  with  the 
expectation  of  meeting  a  detachment  from  Detroit 
for  his  support. 

It  appeared  to  me,  that  not  a  moment  ought  to  be 
lost,  in  sending  a  force  to  meet  him ;  and  when  I 
found  that  general  Mac  Arthur  had  delayed  to  exe 
cute  my  orders  for  so  many  hours,  I  determined  that 
the  departure  of  the  detachment  should  not  be  longer 
postponed.  I  therefore  ordered  it  to  march,  and  de 
termined  to  send  provisions  after  it  on  pack  horses, 
I  immediately  gave  the  necessary  orders  to  the  acting 
Commissary  General,  for  that  purpose.  This  is 
proved  by  the  testimony  of  general  Taylor.  He  says 
that  on  the  fourteenth  of  August,  I  did  give  him  an 
order  to  furnish  pack  horses  to  carry  provisions  for 
the  detachment  going  to  the  river  Raisin,  under 
colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass.  That  he  did  not 
know  whether  the  provisions  were  sent,  but  that  pack 
14* 


150  DEFENCE  OF 

horses  were  furnished  for  the  purpose,  and  he 
sumes  the  provisions  were  sent.  That  I  gave  aH 
the  necessary  orders  for  sending  them  is  certain,  and 
if  my  orders  were  not  complied  with,  I  do  not  think 
I  am  the  person,  that  ought  to  be  called  to  an 
swer  for  it.  It  never  can  be  expected,  that  a  com 
manding  officer  should  not  only  give  orders,  but 
should  attend  to  the  execution  of  the  details. 
There  ^as,  as  Mr.  Watson  has  testified,  a  want  of 
system  In  every  department  of  the  army,  \vhich  it 
was  impossible  for  me  to  remedy,  because  the  heads 
of  them  were  totally  inexperienced.  However,  the 
fact  is,  that  the  provisions  in  this  case  were  sent. 
But  as  the  detachment,  pursuant  to  my  orders,  took 
an  unusual  and  obscure  road,  the  guides,  as  I  have 
heard,  misled  the  provisions,  and  they  were  not  heard 
of  before  the  surrender. 

In  the  seventh  specification,  under  the  charge  of 
unofficer-like  conduct,  is  assembled  a  variety  of  accu 
sations.  The  first  is  a  little  incongruous  in  its  lan 
guage.  It  is  stated,  that  the  enemy  having  erected 
batteries  opposite  to  Detroit,  I  was,  from  the  eleventh 
day  of  August*  to  and  including  the  sixteenth  day  of 
the  same  month,  guilty  of  a  neglect  of  duty,  in  not 
preventing  the  enemy  from  erecting  the  said  batteries. 

It  would  be  an  answer  to  this  charge  to  say,  that  I 
could  not  have  prevented  the  erection  of  batteries, 
which  it  is  stated  were  already  in  existence.  But 
though  I  ,think  there  are  many  incongruities  of  the 


GENERAL  HULL.  151 

s>ame  nature  in  the  specifications,  I  have  not  attempted 
to  avail  myself  of  them,  and  shall  no  further  notice 
this. 


The  Court  will  observe,  that  this  accusation  is 
connected  with,  and  indeed  entirely  rests  upon  a  pre 
vious  allegation,  that  I  well  knew  these  batteries 
were  erected  by  the  enemy  with  an  intention  to  an 
noy  Detroit,  and  with  a  design  to  facilitate  the  in 
vasion  of  the  Michigan  territory.  The  fact  is,  I 
had  no  such  knowledge.  I  had  a  firm  persuasion 
that  the  enemy  would  not  invade  our  territory.  I 
did  believe  that  the  war  on  their  part  would  be  en 
tirely  a  defensive  war,  and  that  these  batteries  were 
only  intended  for  the  defence  of  their  own  shores.  I 
admit,  Sir,  that  my  opinions  in  this  respect,  subsequent 
events  have  proved  were  entirely  ^rroneous.  But  I 
cannot  believe  that  a  mistake  in  opinion  or  judgment 
is  to  be  punished  as  a  crime.  This  would*  be  less  a 
defence  to  an  accusation  of  this  nature,  wasmot  the 
charge  so  connected,  as  I  have  mentioned,  with  the 
allegation,  that  I  knew  how  the  enemy  intended  to 
employ  their  batteries.  The  question  must  be^  first 
asked,  had  I  this  knowledge  ?  There  is  not  a  particle 
of  evidence  that  I  had ;  and  if  this  question  must  be 
answered  in  the  negative,  the  accusation  is  not  sup 
ported.  But  I  do  not  rest  this  part  of  my  defence  on 
this  ground. 

That  the  enemy  did  erect  batteries  opposite  to 
Detroit,  and  that  I  did  not  attempt  to  annoy  them, 


152  DEFENCE  OF 

till  they  commenced  their  fire  on  the  fifteenth,  are 
facts  not  to  be  disputed.  I  did  not  annoy  them  for 
the  reason  I  have  above  mentioned,  that  I  considered 
them  as  mere  defensive  works.  But  a  desire  to  pre 
serve  my  own  ammunition  was  the  principal  reason 
for  this  conduct.  I  might  have  hindered  the  enemy 
from  progressing  in  the  day  time,  but  in  the  night, 
any  annoyance  I  could  have  given  them  would  have 
been  ineffectual.  Captain  Dallaba  has  given  a  state 
ment  of  the  ammunition.  Captain  Dyson  of  the 
artillery  supposes  it  would  not  have  lasted  more 
than  three  or  four  days,  if  we  had  commenced  and 
continued  firing.  The  fixed  ammunition,  he  saTT~, 
could  not  have  lasted  more  than  two  days.  Captain 
Bacon  testifies,  that  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth, 
he  examined  by  my  orders  the  magazine,  and  could 
find  but  one  box  of  twenty-four  pound  cartridges, 
and  that  he  reported  to  me  they  were  nearly  ex 
pended.  The  testimony  of  all  the  witnesses  who 
have  spoken  shews,  that  my  mind  was  impressed  with 
the  necessity  of  sparing  the  ammunition,  and  that  this, 
as  well  as  the  expectation  that  the  enemy  did  not 
intend,  as  long  as  I  did  not  provoke,  offensive  opera 
tions,  were  the  reasons  why  I  did  not  cannonade  the 
enemy  while  they  were  fortifying  on  the  opposite 
shore.  Major  Trimble  testifies,  that  when  he  pro 
posed  to  me  to  fire  on  a  party  of  the  enemy,  which 
made  its  appearance  on  the  fourteenth  of  August  at 
Sandwich,  I  answered  that  it  would  not  do  to  expend 
the  ammunition  uselessly.  Captain  Bacon  says,  that 
on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth,  he  was  directed  by 


GENERAL  HULL.  153 

me  to  go  to  captain  Dyson,  at  the  battery  where  he 
commanded,  and  inform  him  that  the  twenty-four 
pound  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted,  and  that  he 
must  not  fire  but  when  there  was  a  prospect  of  his 
doing  execution. 

Another  of  the  accusatiorls  which  are  assembled  in 
this  specification  is,  that  I  omitted  to  fortify  Spring 
Wells.  I  do  not  know  why  it  might  not  as  well  have 
alleged  that  I  omitted  to  fortify  any  other  position  in 
the  river  Detroit. 

It  is  not  in  proof  that  that  spot  was  particularly 
adapted  to  a  fortification.  If  it  had  been  fortified,  the 
enemy  would  not  probably  have  selected  it  as  their 
place  of  debarkation ;  almost  any  other  spot  within 
the  same  distance,  above  or  below  the  fort,  was  as 
well  calculated  to  afford  them  a  landing.  This  spe 
cification  also  accuses  me  of  having  neglected  to  an 
noy  the  enemy  after  he  had  landed  at  Spring  Wells. 
Gentlemen,  the  answrer  to  this  specification  is  em 
braced  in  the  defence  I  have  made  as  to  the  final 
surrender. 

I  had  made  preparations  for  attacking ;  the  troops 
were  drawn  out,  and  formed  in  line  of  battle ;  but 
before  the  enemy  came  up,  I  determined  to  surrender. 
My  reasons  for  this  measure,  I  have  already  explain 
ed.  I  shall  not  repeat  them.  I  will  only  beg  you  to 
observe,  that  the  reasons  I  have  offered  have  not 
been  suggested  merely  for  the  present  occasion.  Ma- 


154  DEFENCE  OF 

jor  Munson  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  the  day  after  the 
surrender;  that  I  told  him  I  expected  to  be  censured 
for  what  I  had  done,  but  said,  "  I  have  done,  what 
"  under  all  circumstances  was  most  proper,  and  I 
"  have  saved  Detroit  and  the  territory  from  the  hor- 
"  rours  of  an  Indian  massacre." 

•   ~ 

But  I  am  accused  of  having  made  the  surrender  in 
an  unofficer-like  manner ;  in  having  made  it  before 
the  articles  of  capitulation  were  signed ;  in  not  stipu 
lating  for  the  honours  of  war,  or  for  the  security  of 
the  friendly  inhabitants  of  Canada,  who  had  taken 
protection  from  us.  Before  I  make  observations  on 
this  subject,  I  beg  leave  to  present  to  the  Court  col 
lectedly,  the  testimony  which  relates  to  it. 

Major  Snelling  testifies  in  substance,  that  immedi 
ately  after  the  second  shot  which  did  execution  in 
the  fort  was  fired,  captain  Hull  was  sent  across  the 
river  with  a  flag,  and  that  he  (major  Snellmg)  was 
sent  to  order  colonel  Findlay  into  the  fort.  The 
witness  having  performed  this  duty,  went  to  one  of 
the  batteries ;  while  there,  a  British  officer  with  a 
flag,  came  to  inquire  what  was  the  meaning  of  send 
ing  the  flag  across  the  river,  when  general  Brock  was 
on  the  American  side  ?  Lieutenant  Hunt  then  went 
with  the  information  to  me,  and  returned  with  a  sealed 
letter,  and  orders  that  he  (the  witness)  should  carry 
it  to  general  Brock.  That  the  witness  met  general 
Brock  at  the  head  of  his  troops,  about  three  quarters 
of  a  mile  from  the  fort,  where  they  were  not  in  sight 
from  the  fort. 


GENERAL  HULL.  155 

The  -witness  having  delivered  the  letter,  of  which 
lie  was  the  hearer,  general  Brock  asked  the  witness 
"if  he  rvas  authorized  to  agree  on  terms?"  The  witness 
said  not.  General  Brock  then  asked  two  of  his  offi 
cers  to  go  with  the  witness  to  the  fort. 

As  they  approached  the  fort,  they  were  met  by 
some  persons  who  conducted  them  to  a  tent,  which 
had  been  erected  by  my  orders,  where  they  were  met 
by  colonels  Miller  and  Brush,  commissioners  ap 
pointed  by  me,  and  the  capitulation  was  there  signed 
by  the  commissioners. 

The  contents  of  the  note,  the  witness  says,  were  no 
more  than  these  words :  "  Sir,  I  agree  to  surrender 
"  the  town  and  fort  of  Detroit."  He  would  not  un 
dertake  to  say,  that  the  words  he  gave  were  the  whole 
substance  of  the  note,  but  he  believed  they  were. 

Major  Snelling  further  testifies,  that  before  the  ca 
pitulation  was  signed,  he  saw  me  near  the  marquee 
in  conversation  with  colonel  Findlay,  and  with  the 
British  officers,  colonel  Mac  Donald  and  captain 
Clegg,  who  were  within  the  marquee.  The  witness 
said,  he  did  not  recollect  that  I  took  any  part  in 
drawing  up  the  capitulation.  That  I  ordered  off  a 
number  of  our  officers,  who  were  collected  about  the 
marquee,  and  among  the  rest  the  witness. 

In  a  subsequent  part  of  his  examination  he  says, 
that  before  the  capitulation  was  signed,  colonel  Find- 


156  DEFENCE  OF 

lay's  regiment  was  marched  into  the  fort,  which  was 
very  much  crowded. 

Captain  Mac  Commick  testifies,  that  after  colonel 
Findlay's  regiment  had  been  ordered  into  the  fort,  he 
met  colonel  Findlay  as  he  was  going  into  the  fort ; 
that  they  there  saw  me;  that  I  requested  colonel 
Findlay  to  join  colonel  Miller,  to  treat  with  the  ene 
my,  and  said  that  we  could  then  get  better  terms 
than  we  should,  if  we  waited  till  they  attempted  to 
storm  the  fort.  Captain  Mac  Commick  further  testi 
fies,  that  as  he  went  out  of  the  fort,  he  saw  the  British 
officers,  colonel  Mac  Donald  and  captain  Clegg, 
coming  towards  the  fort.  Some  one  said,  it  was  im- 
proper  they  should  be  permitted  to  come  in,  and  they 
went  to  the  tent.  Shortly  after  the  British  officers, 
with  colonel  Miller  and  colonel  Brush,  came  into  the 
fort,  and  were  there  together  in  Dyson's  quarters, 
where,  as  he  supposes,  the  capitulation  was  signed. 
The  witness  further  testifies,  that  before  this,  and  at 
about  the  time  the  British  officers  and  colonels  Miller 
and  Brush  went  into  Dyson's  quarters,  nearly  all  the 
troops  were  marched  iijto  the  fort. 

In  his  cross-examination,  captain  Mac  Commick 
says,  it  might  have  been  ten  minutes,  half  an  hour,  or 
more,  after  the  firing  ceased,  before  the  troops  were 
ordered  to  march  into  the  fort.  That  he  himself  did 
not  come  into  the  fort,  till  half  an  hour  after  the  firing 
had  ceased. 


GENERAL  HULL.  157 

Major  Van  Horn  testifies,  that  on  the  morning  of 
the  sixteenth,  captain  Hull  came  to  the  tent  of  colo 
nel  Findlay,  in  which  the  witness  also  quartered,  and 
informed  colonel  Findlay,  that  it  was  my  orders  that 
his  regiment  should  move  to  and  form  on  the  south 
west  of  the  fort. 

The  witness  then  describes  the  position  of  colonel 
Findlay 's  regiment  in  the  line,  and  the  manner  in 
which  the  whole  line  was  formed.  He  then  further 
testifies,  that  after  the  line  was  formed,  and  about  an 
hour,  or  half  an  hour  before  the  flag  was  hoisted,  I 
came  to  the  line.  That  this  was  during  the  can 
nonade. 

British  officers  were  then  seen  passing  to  and  from 
the  Indians.  That  I  appeared  satisfied  with  the  po 
sitions  of  the  troops.  That  the  witness  said  to  me, 
we  shall  be  able  to  give  a  good  account  of  them. 
About  the  time  the  firing  ceased,  witness  turned 
round  and  saw  a  flag  hoisted  in  the  fort,  and  at  about 
the  same  time,  captain  Snelling  came  with  orders 
from  me  to  colonel  Findlay  to  march  his  regiment 
into  the  fort,  and  said,  that  it  was  my  directions  that 
as  the  flag  was  out  it  should  not  be  violated. 

The  witness  further  testifies,  that  I  remained  at 
the  line   formed    by  the   troops    about  three,  or   it 
might  have  been,  five  minutes ; — that  colonel  Find- 
lay  expressed  dissatisfaction  with  the  order,  but  said, 
15 


I5B  DEFENCE  OF 

it  must  be  obeyed,  and  directed  the  witness  to  march 
liis  battalion  towards  the  fort,  which  he  did,  but  halt 
ed  near  the  fort  some  minutes  ; — that  finally  he 
marched  his  men  into  the  fort,  and  they  there  stacked 
their  arms ; — that  colonel  Findlay  did  not  come  in 
till  some  time  afterwards.  The  witness  further  testi 
fies,  that  when  he  got  into  the  fort  he  saw  me,  but 
was  not  certain  that  I  was  there  when  he  entered ; — 
that  some  time  after  the  witness  had  been  in  the 
tort,  I  addressed  him,  and  several  other  officers  at  the 
same  time,  and  invited  them  into  the  room  of  one  of 
the  officers ;  that  I  told  them  I  had  surrendered  the 
fort,  and  was  about  to  make  the  terms  ;— that  I  asked, 
if  they  thought  of  any  thing  as  a  condition,  I  should 
be  glad  to  know  what  it  was ; — that  the  witness  did 
not  go  into  the  room  ; — that  when  he  first  saw  me  I 
was  on  the  steps,  going  into  one  of  the  rooms ; — that 
jsome  time  after  this,  colonel  Mac  Donald  and  captain 
Clegg  rode  up,  came  into  the  fort,  and  went  into  the 
room  where  I  was ; — that  the  witness  does  not  know 
whether  I  did  or  did  not  go  into  the  marquee  before 
the  British  officers  came  in ;  that  our  whole  line,  as 
he  believes,  had  marched  into  the  fort  and  stacked 
their  arms  ; — that  this  had  taken  place  before  the  Bri 
tish  officers  came  in. 

Major  Jessup  testifies,  that  he  had  observed  our 
troops  retreating,  and  saw  the  flag  flying.  He  met 
colonel  Findlay,  who  requested  him  to  ride  towards 
the  fort,  and  learn  the  reason  of  the  retreat; — that 


GENERAL  HULL.  150 

he  found  me  in  the  fort,  and  thought  me  very  much 
frightened ; — that  after  a  conversation  with  me,  of 
which  he  has  repeated  his  own  gallant  expressions,  but. 
unfortunately  cannot  recollect  what  I  said,  he  went 
out  and  met  colonel  Findlay,  and  said  to  him  all  was 
lost; — that  when  he  saw  me  at  the  time,  the  terms  of 
capitulation  had  been  agreed  upon,  that  he  met  me  in 
a  piazza,  before  captain  Dyson's  quarters; — that  I  was 
then  perfectly  composed. 

He  then  relates  a  conversation  with  me,  which 
concluded  with  a  request  that  he  would  continue  to 
act  in  his  station,  till  the  troops  were  marched  out  of 
the  fort; — that  he  consented  to  this,  and  received 
from  me,  or  one  of  my  aids,  a  copy  of  the  capitulation, 
which  I  directed  him  to  read  to  the  troops ;  and  that 
he  did  this  when  the  troops  were  marched  out  at 
about  twelve  o'clock. 

The  witness  further  states,  that  he  thinks  a  detach 
ment  of  the  enemy  came  into  the  fort  before  the  ar 
ticles  of  capitulation  were  signed ;  but  that  he  is  not. 
certain  whether  the  enemy's  troops  marc  lied  in  before 
the  American  troops  marched  out,  but  knows  that 
the  American  troops  did  not  march  out  till  after  the 
capitulation  was  signed. 

Captain  Burton  testifies,  that  he  knew  when  the 
capitulation  was  agreed  upon ; — that  it  was  done  in 
captain  Dyson's  quarters,  where  he  saw  me,  general 


160  DEFENCE  OF 

Brock,  and  two  or  three  British  officers ; — that  thej 
were  writing  and  preparing  the  articles  of  capi 
tulation; — that  he  heard  remarks  which  induced 
him  to  believe,  that  the  articles  of  capitulation 
were  not  agreed  upon; — that  he  could  not  say, 
whether  the  American  troops  were  then  in  the  fort, 
but  there  were,  at  that  time,  one  hundred  and  fifty 
British  troops  standing  with  advanced  arms  in  the 
fort ; — the  enemy  were  at  or  about  this  time  placing 
guards  in  and  about  the  fort ; — that  the  reason  why 
he  supposes  that  the  articles  were  not  at  this  time 
finally  agreed  upon,  was,  that  he  saw  general  Brock, 
with  a  paper  from  which  he  struck  out  two  or  three 
lines,  which  as  he  understood  related  to  the  regular 
troops  returning  home,  which  general  Brock  said  he 
would  not  agree  to ; — that  at  about  this  time,  he  saw 
one  of  the  British  officers  writing.  Before  this  he 
had  seen  the  British  officers  and  American  officers  at 
the  marquee,  and  that  I  also  had  been  there ; — that 
it  was  about  three  quarters  of  an  hour  after  he  saw 
the  British  officers  going  with  me  to  the  marquee, 
before  he  saw  the  British  officers  in  Dyson's  quar 
ter  s. 

On  his  cross-examination  by  the  Court,  major  Jes- 
sup  says,  when  the  terms  of  the  capitulation  were 
discussing,  the  American  troops  were  crowded  in  the 
fort,  in  the  utmost  disorder,  and  the  enemy  were  per 
mitted  to  approach  so  near  the  fort  as  to  be  able  to 
take  possession  of  the  batteries. 


GENERAL  HULL.  161 

Captain  Fuller  testifies,  that  soon  after  the  white 
flag  was  hoisted,  he  went  to  the  fort,  and  there  met 
colonel  Mac  Donald  and  major  Clegg;-— that  I  was 
standing  near  the  gate,  one  of  the  British  officers  said 
to  me,  that  they  were  sent  by  general  Brock  in  con 
sequence  of  seeing  a  flag  hoisted,  to  receive  any  com 
munications; — that  I  replied,  that  I  should  surrender, 
and  desired  them  to  go  to  the  marquee,  where  I  would 
go  or  send  to  them ;— -that  major  Clegg  requested  the 
witness  to  go  with  him  to  the  marquee  for  fear  our 
militia  might  fire  on  him  ; — that  he  wenj;  with  him 
to  the  marquee  ; — they  were  furnished  with  pen,  ink, 
and  paper  by  major  Snelling ; — that  soon  after  they 
got  to  the  marquee,  I,  colonels  Miller  and  Brush 
came ; — that  he  staid  near  the  marquee  about  ten 
minutes,  and  then  went  to  the  fort,  leaving  me  at  the 
marquee ; — that  when  he  returned  to  the  fort,  he 
found  our  troops  were  in  and  had  stacked  their  arms ; — 
that  some  time  after  he  saw  the  British  officers, 
Mac  Donald  and  Clegg,  come  out  of  Dyson's  quar 
ters,  one  of  them  having  a  paper,  which  he  said  had 
been  signed  by  me,  and  that  he  was  going  to  take  it 
to  general  Brock  for  his  approbation,  and  wished  the 
w  itness  to  go  with  him  for  the  same  purpose ; — that 
he  accompanied  him  to  the  marquee  ;= — that  the  wit 
ness  went  and  found  the  Britfsh  column  led  by  colo 
nel  Proctor  about  half  a  mile  below  the  fort ; — that 
he  left  colonel  Mac  Donald  and  returned  to  the  fort 

Colonel  Miller  testifies,  that  on  the  morning  of  the 
sixteenth  I  was  in  the  fort  ,*— that  it  was  reported  to 
15* 


162  DEFENCE  OF 

me  that  the  enemy  were  advancing,  and  that  part  of 
the  Michigan  militia  had  joined  the  enemy ; — that 
upon  this  I  asked  him  if  I  had  not  better  send  out  a 
flag.  He  told  me  he  did  not  know.  I  had  better  con 
sult  the  officers  who  were  without  the  fort,  that  they 
had  the  best  opportunity  of  judging ;-— that  I  said 
there  was  no  time  for  consultation,  that  I  would  send 
a  flag,  and  that  I  did  so ; — that  some  time  after  this, 
colonel  Findlay's  regiment  marched  into  the  gar 
rison; — that  I  went  to  a  tent  ami  sent  for  him ; — that 
when  he  approached  the  tent,  I  was  standing  in  the 
tent  with  my  back  towards  him ; — that  he  heard  me 
say  to  the  British  officers  in  the  tent,  "  I  will  surren 
der;" — that  I  then  requested  him,  with  colonel  Brush, 
to  a&sist  in  drawing  up  some  articles  of  capitulation ;. — « 
(hat  he  remained  at  the  tent,  lying  on  the  ground, 
in  a  violent  fit  of  the  fever  and  ague,  while  colonels 
Brush  and  Mac  Donald  were  penning  the  articles. 

The  original  articles  of  capitulation  were  then 
shewn  to  the  witness,  and  he  said  he  believed  them 
to  bo  those  which  he  had  signed,  but  said  he  was 
strongly  impressed  with  a  belief  that  when  they  were 
read  to  him,  and  he  signed  them,  they  contained  a 
provision  that  the  garrison  should  march  out  with  the 
honours  of  war. 

In  his  cross-examination  by  the  Court,  colonel 
Miller  states,  that  according  to  his  best  recollection., 
he  went  to  the  tent  between  ten  and  eleven  o'clock. 


GENERAL  HULL,  163 

on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth ; — that  he  remained 
about  three  quarters  of  an  hour ; — that  after  he  had 
signed  the  capitulation,  he  went  to  the  fort  and  went 
to  bed.  There  were  then  no  British  troops  in  the 
fort,  but  he  saw  as  he  went  in,  a  company  of  about  one 
hundred  British  soldiers,  standing  near  the  gate  of  the 
fort.  In  a  subsequent  part  of  his  cross-examination, 
he  states,  that  I  told  him  I  was  willing  that  he  should 
make  a  surrender  the  basis  of  a  treaty,  and  that  he 
must  get  the  best  terms  he  could.  He  further  says, 
that  when  I  sent  out  the  flag,  I  mentioned  to  him  that 
I  did  it  to  gain  time ;  that  I  expected  to  procure  a 
cessation  of  hostilities,  and  that  I  might  in  the  mean 
time  hear  from  colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass.  Colo 
nel  Miller  was  called  again  a  few  days  after  his  first 
examination,  and  he  then  stated,  that  after  the  first 
flag  was  sent  out,  and  before  an  answer  was  returned, 
colonel  Brush  came  to  me,  and  having  been  inform 
ed,  that  Knagg's  men,  who  had  the  advanced  post  be 
low  the  fort,  had  deserted  to  the  enemy,  colonel 
Brush  exclaimed,  that  "  By  God,  or  that,  he  believed 
"  by  God,  his  men  would  desert  to  a  man." 

I  believe,  may  it  please  the  Court,  I  have  here  col 
lected  all  the  testimony  that  is  material,  whether  it 
be  for  or  against  me,  which  in  any  wise  relates  to  the 
matter  now  under  consideration.  I  do  not  pretend 
that  I  have  given  the  very  words  of  the  witnesses  in 
all  instances ;  but  I  have  done  so,  as  nearly  as  my 
own  recollection,  and  the  notes  of  my  counsel,  would 


164  DEFENCE  OF 

permit.  If  there  be  any  errours,  or  omissions,  they 
certainly  cannot  be  intentional ;  because  I  know  that 
the  members  of  the  Court  will  have  recourse  to  their 
own  minutes,  and  to  the  record  of  the  Judge  Advo 
cate  ;  and  if  it  should  appear  that  I  have,  in  any  re 
spect,  wilfully  perverted  the  testimony,  it  would  be  an 
artifice  from  which  I  would  derive  no  benefit. 

In  reviewing  the  testimony,  the  Court,  I  think,  must 
at  once  perceive  a  strange  variety  in  the  statements 
of  the  different  witnesses.  Though  the  times  at  which 
the  different  transactions  took  place  are  all  impor 
tant,  hardly  any  two  of  the  witnesses  agree  in  this 
respect. 

The  Court  will  recollect,  that  there  are  three  docu 
ments  in  evidence,  which  appear  to  form  the  articles 
of  capitulation.  These  are  all  dated  on  the  sixteenth 
of  August.  One,  purporting  to  be  the  articles  of  capitu 
lation;  the  other  purporting  to  be  a  supplement  to  the 
articles;  and  the  third  purporting  to  be  an  addition 
to  the  supplemental  articles.  There  is  also  a  fourth 
document,  being  a  letter  directed  to  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  Rapids,  which  purports  to  be  an  expla 
nation  of  the  articles  of  capitulation.  Before  I  make 
any  observations  on  this  testimony,  I  will  give  the 
Court  a  relation  of  my  conduct  in  respect  to  the  sur 
render,  and  state  the  motives,  which  influenced  me. 
If  a  departure  from  the  forms,  ceremonies,  and  eti 
quette  of  modem  warfare,  where  civilized  men  are  the 


GENERAL  HULL.  165 

belligerents,  will  condemn  me,  I  must  submit.  But  I 
do  persuade  myself,  that  this  Court  will  consider  my 
peculiar  situation,  and  the  character  of  the  enemy 
which  was  opposed  to  me ;  and  that  I  will  be  thought 
excusable,  if  I  permitted  a  precipitation  to  which 
some  forms  and  pageantry  were  sacrificed,  with  a 
view  to  save  from  the  cruelty  of  the  savages,  many 
brave  men,  and  many  families  of  parents  and  chil 
dren. 

As  soon  as  I  found  that  the  enemy  intended  a  se 
rious  attack  upon  Detroit,  I  knew  that  sooner  or  later 
my  army  must  fall.  I  knew,  that  even  victory  would 
not  save  me,  and  could  be  but  a  temporary  advantage* 
The  certain  consequences  of  defeat  I  could  not  con 
template  without  horrour.  It  presented  a  scene,  which 
I  need  not  attempt  to  describe.  It  is  obvious,  that 
it  would  have  left  our  savage  enemies  to  indulge,  with 
out  restraint,  their  passion  for  rapine  and  cruelty. 
The  small  body  of  regulars  which  I  had  with  me,  I 
was  obliged  to  keep  in  the  fort,  for  its  protection.  I 
had  no  other  troops  that  understood  the  management 
of  cannon.  With  one  third  of  the  residue  of  my  force 
absent,  and  with  nothing  to  rely  upon  out  of  the  fort, 
but  untried  and  undisciplined  militia,  officered  by 
men,  most  of  whom  were  in  hostility  to  me,  and  had 
even  conspired  against  me,  wrhat  wras  I  to  expect  from 
a  contest  ? 

I  determined  at  any  rate,  that  I  ought,  if  it  were 
possible,  to  ward  off  the  attack,  and  gain  time,  till  the 


166  DEFENCE  OF 

detachment   under  colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass,, 
who  were  my  two  senior  officers,  might  return. 

The  Court  will  recollect,  that  I  had  sent  an  ex 
press  for  them,  as  soon  as  I  received  general  Brock's 
summons  on  the  fifteenth.  After  the  line  was  formed 
on  the  sixteenth,  as  appears  by  the  testimony  of  cap 
tain  Mac  Commick,  colonel  Van  Horn,  and  major 
Snelling,  I  visited  the  troops  where  they  were  drawn 
up.  I  (hen  went  to  the  fort,  in  expectation  of  hear 
ing  of  the  absent  detachment ;  but  receiving  no  intel 
ligence  from  them,  I  determined  to  propose  a  cessa 
tion  of  hostilities  to  treat  of  a  surrender.  I  accord 
ingly  sent  a  flag  over  the  river,  and  when  the  British 
officer  came  to  inquire  the  meaning  of  that  flag,  I 
sent  the  note  to  general  Brock,  of  which  major  Snel 
ling  speaks.  That  these  were  my  views  when  I  sent 
this  flag,  appears  by  the  testimony  of  colonel  Miller, 
to  whom  I  explained  myself  on  the  subject.  I  do  not 
recollect  what  were  the  precise  words  of  this  note., 
but  I  think  it  will  appear  very  evident  to  the  Court, 
that  the  contents  of  it  could  not  have  been,  as  major 
Snelling  has  stated,  neither  more  nor  less  than  an 
offer  of  unconditional  surrender.  For,  according 
to  major  Snelling,  the  first  question  general  Brock 
put  to  him,  after  he  had  read  the  note,  was  to  ask 
major  Snelling  if  he  "  was  authorized  to  agree  on 
terms."  No  such  question  would  have  been  asked  if 
I  had  offered  to  surrender  without  terms. 

As  soon  as  I  had  determined  to  negotiate,  I  also  de- 
termjned  to  change  my  positions  for  defence.  I  thought 


GENERAL  HULL.  167 

it  better  to  draw  the  troops  to  the  fort,  and  if  I  made 
a  resistance,  it  was  my  opinion  that  I  could  do  it  to 
most  advantage,  by  manning  the  fort  with  a  full  com 
plement,  and  forming  a  line,  supported  on  the  right 
by  the  fort,  and  on  the  left  by  the  citadel  and  the 
batteries  on  the  bank  of  the  river ;  having  in  front  a 
line  of  pickets  which  extended  from  the  fort  to  the 
citadel,  and  which  was  intended  to  cover  the  commu 
nication  between  one  and  the  other.      With  these 
views  and  intentions,  I  ordered  the  troops  to  the  fort, 
intending  to  post  them  from  thence  before  the  negoti 
ation  should  break  off,  if  there  should  be  no  terms 
agreed  upon.     When  these  orders  were  given,  I  had 
appointed  colonels  Brush  and  Miller  to  repair  to  a 
tent  without  the  fort,  and  treat  with  the  enemy.     At 
this  moment  I  received  the  intelligence,  that  the  two 
companies  mentioned  by  major  Anderson,  Knagg's 
and  Shover's,  had  gone  over  to  the  enemy  ;  and  heard 
from  colonel  Brush,  the  declaration,  that  "  by  God* 
every  man  of  his  regiment  had  or  would  desert.     The 
consequences  of  such  a  defection  immediately  occur 
red  to  me.     Colonel  Brush's  troops  had  been  posted 
to  guard  the  upper  part  of  the  settlement.     If  they 
made  no  resistance,  there  was  nothing  to  hinder  the 
British  and  their  savages  from   landing  above  the 
town ;  and,  while  we  should  be  engaged  with  the  in 
vaders  from  the  south,  the  savages  would  be  making 
indiscriminate  slaughter  of  the  inhabitants,  through 
the  whole  extent  of  the  northern  part  of  the  settle 
ment. 


168  DEFENCE  OF 

From  this  moment  I  determined  to  surrender  on  the 
best  terms  I  could  obtain.  I  told  colonel  Miller,  that 
this  was  my  determination.  I  went  to  the  tent.  Colo 
nel  Miller  had  not  arrived  there.  I  had  mentioned  to 
colonel  Brush  and  the  British  officers,  the  terms  I 
should  insist  upon,  and  concluded  by  saying,  "  1  shall 
surrender ;'»  meaning,  on  the  terms  I  had  previously 
mentioned.  This  was  the  declaration  colonel  Miller 
heard.  After  I  had  explained  the  terms  I  had  ex 
pected,  I  left  the  tent  and  returned  to  the  fort.  On  my 
arrival  there,  I  found  to  my  surprise  that  all  the  troops 
had  crowded  into  the  fort,  had  stacked  their  arms,  and 
were  in  a  state  of  entire  insubordination.  Let  it  be 
remembered,  that  neither  of  these  steps  had  been 
taken  by  my  orders.  I  had  ordered  colonel  Findlay's 
regiment  only  into  the  fort ;  and  it  is  not  proved,  or 
pretended,  that  I  gave  any  orders  for  stacking  the 
arms.  I  now  became  impatient  to  put  the  place  un 
der  the  protection  of  the  British.  I  knew  that  there 
were  thousands  of  the  savages  around  us.  Every  mo 
ment  reports  were  brought  to  me  of  their  depredations, 
and  in  the  situation  in  which  my  troops  then  were,  I 
could  afford  no  protection  to  the  inhabitants.  I  wras 
anxious,  that  our  enemies  should  have  the  command 
and  government,  that  they  might  be  able  to  put  a  re 
straint  on  their  savage  allies,  which  I  had  no  power  to 
do.  An  additional  weight  on  my  mind,  that  had 
great  influence  on  my  conduct,  was  what  1  considered 
might  be  the  dangerous  situation  of  the  detachment 
under  colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass.  I  thought  it 
possible  it  might  be  at  a  distance,  ami  might  be 


GENERAL  HULL.  169 

cut  off.  If  we  should  unsuccessfully  resist,  I  was  sure 
it  would.  In  this  state  of  things,  the  articles  of 
capitulation  were  brought  to  me  from  the  tent,  signed 
and  executed.  I  accepted  them.  I  gave  a  copy  of 
them  to  major  Jessup,  as  he  has  testified,  and  he  after 
wards  read  them  to  the  troops,  when  they  marched 
out  at  twelve  o'clock.  These  must  be  considered 
as  the  articles  of  capitulation,  and  by  these  my  con 
duct  must  be  tested.  For  the  two  other  documents, 
the  one  styled  supplemental  articles,  and  the  other  an 
addition  to  the  supplemental  articles,  are  rather  to  be 
considered  as  an  agreement  between  myself  and  the 
enemy's  general  than  as  parts  of  the  capitulation.  I 
admit,  that  when  these  were  signed  1  had  no  power 
to  resist  if  he  had  not  chosen  to  agree  to  them,  and 
therefore  they  are  no  more  to  be  considered  as  a  part 
of  the  capitulation,  than  the  letter  which  bears  date 
the  next  day.  It  was  these  supplemental  articles, 
which  were  signed  in  captain  Dyson's  quarters,  and 
most  of  the  witnesses,  who  speak  of  what  was  done 
before  or  after  the  capitulation  was  signed,  obviously 
speak  with  reference  to  the  execution  of  these  instru 
ments. 

God  knows  the  articles  are  not  what  I  would  have 
wished  to  have  had  them.  If  I  had  been  warring 
with  civilized  man,  where  the  blood  of  combatants 
only  could  be  shed,  I  ought  not,  I  woukl  not  have 
accepted  them.  But  when  upon  the  consequences  of 
refusing  them,  depended  the  lives  of  so  many  innocent 
people,  I  did  not  feel  myself  authorized  to  reject 
them. 

16 


170  DEFENCE  OF 

Having  put  before  the  Court  the  testimony  which 
relates  to  this  specification,  and  given  my  own  ac 
count  of  the  transactions  to  which  it  relates,  I  will 
again  notice  the  accusations,  and  make  some  few  ob 
servations  upon  them. 

The  first  accusation  is,  that  I  surrendered  before 
the  capitulation  was  signed.  This  is  certainly  dis 
proved.  There  was  not  an  enemy  in  the  fort  before 
the  capitulation  was  brought  to  me  from  the  tent,  nor 
before  I  delivered  a  copy  of  it  to  major  Jessup.  The 
testimony  of  colonel  Miller  is  conclusive  upon  this 
point.  He  says,  there  wrere  no  British  troops  in  the 
fort  when  he  brought  me  the  capitulation  from  the 
tent. 

A  second  accusation  is,  that  I  did  not  stipulate  for  the 
honours  of  war.  Among  the  variety  of  circumstances, 
in  my  situation,  which  I  had  to  deplore,  and  which 
agitated  my  mind  to  a  great  degree,  there  was  none 
that  excited  my  own  feelings  more,  than  to  find,  that 
though  this  provision  had  been  inserted  in  the  articles, 
as  originally  drawn  by  the  commissioners,  it  had  been 
stricken  out.  I  thought  of  rejecting  the  articles  on 
this  account.  I  must  have  then  opened  a  new  nego- 
ciation.  I  have  already  stated  what  appeared  to  me  as 
the  consequences  of  further  delay.  The  savages  were 
unrestrained.  I  determined  not  to  expose  the  lives 
of  the  inhabitants  to  their  fury  for  the  sake  of  obtain 
ing  so  useless  a  pageantry. 


GENERAL  HULL.  171 

The  articles  are  also  condemned,  because  they  con 
tained  no  stipulation  for  the  security  of  the  friendly 
inhabitants  of  Canada.  With  respect  to  the  people 
of  Canada  \vho  had  been  friendly  to  us,  and  who  had 
remained  in  their  own  country  when  we  retreated,  no 
stipulation  in  their  favour  was  necessary.  The  Bri 
tish  had  offered  full  pardon  to  all  their  subjects  who 
had  shewn  any  disaffection;  and  when  the  capitula 
tion  was  signed,  there  were  none  in  Canada  who  had 
not  availed  themselves  of  this  offer.  With  respect  to 
those  who  were  with  us,  the  capitulation  does  contain 
an  article  in  their  favour.  They  are  unquestionably 
included  in  the  third  article,  which  provides  that 
"private  persons,  and  property  of  every  description, 
"  shall  be  respected." 

But,  Sir,  a  stipulation  in  favour  of  Canadians,  who 
were  with  us  at  the  time  of  the  surrender,  was,  in  fact, 
entirely  a  matter  of  supererogation ;  because,  accord 
ing  t@  the  best  of  my  recollection,  there  was  but  one 
person  of  that  description  with  us,  at  the  time  of  the 
capitulation,  and  he  is  now  an  officer  of  rank  in  our 
army. 

The  evidence,  that  any  stipulation  for  the  security 
of  the  Canadians,  other  than  what  the  articles  con 
tained,  was  unnecessary,  is,  that  it  is  the  undoubted 
fact,  that  from  the  time  we  retreated  from  Canada, 
no  individual  has  suffered,  either  in  his  person  or  pro 
perty,  on  account  of  any  part  he  may  have  taken 
against  his  own  government,  or  on  account  of  any 
connection  which  he  may  have  had  with  our  army. 


172  DEFENCE  OF 

The  specification  states  other  objections  to  the 
capitulation,  but  as  they  are  of  an  inferiour  nature,  and 
must  be  excusable  if  those  I  have  noted  are  so,  I 
shall  not  trouble  the  Court  with  any  remarks  upon 
them. 

Something  has  been  said  in  the  course  of  the  trial, 
as  to  my  having  after  the  capitulation  consented  to 
the  surrender  of  some  distant  posts.  It  might  be 
enough  to  say,  that  there  is  no  specification  on  this 
subject ;  but  I  will  only  observe,  that  so  far  from  this 
being  a  concession  to  the  enemy,  it  originated  in  my 
suggestion.  I  reflected,  that  if  they  should  hear  of 
the  capitulation,  before  they  were  informed  that  they 
were  included  in  the  surrender,  they  might  retreat,  if 
they  should  judge  it  in  their  power  to  do  so — but  if 
early  intelligence  of  the  surrender  should  not  reach 
them,  they  would  be  exposed  to  the  whole  savage 
force  of  the  enemy,  and  might  be  sacrificed,  unless 
they  were  protected  by  the  capitulation.  Much  tes 
timony  has  also  been  given  in  relation  to  the  situation 
of  the  British  troops  before  the  surrender,  and  to  shew 
that  they  were  suffered  to  approach  too  near  our  works 
before  the  capitulation  was  signed.  It  would  be  easy 
to  shew  the  strange  contradiction  of  testimony  on 
this  point,  and  to  prove  that  such  an  accusation  would 
be  without  foundation.  But  certainly  the  accusations 
against  me,  and  which  I  am  obliged  to  answer,  are 
sufficiently  numerous.  The  Court  would  hardly  think 
me  excusable  in  trespassing  on  their  patience,  to 
make  a  defence  against  accusations  not  preferred— 


GENERAL  HULL.  173 

I  shall  therefore  say  nothing  further  as  to  this  sug 
gestion,  than  that  a  specification  founded  upon  it  is 
not  to  be  found  under  any  of  the  charges. 

There  is,  Gentlemen,  one  other  charge  which  I 
have  to  answer.  It  is  an  accusation  which  has  been 
the  most  wounding  to  my  feelings,  and  the  discussion 
of  which  is  the  most  painful  task  I  have  yet  had  to 
perform.  Not*  because  I  have  any  doubt  but  that  I 
shall  convince  you  it  is  as  much  without  foundation 
as  any  other,  but  because  it  imposes  upon  me  the  ne 
cessity  of  examining  testimony,  which  no  man,  how 
ever  innocent  he  may  be,  can  repeat  without  disgust. 

If  in  the  embarrassing  and  difficult  situations  in 
which  I  was  placed  during  my  late  command,  I  have 
committed  some  errours,  surely  what  I  have  suffered 
by  this  prosecution,  and  what  I  must  now  suffer  in 
making  this  part  of  my  defence,  will  be  some  atone 
ment. 

For  more  than  half  a  century  I  supported  a  charac 
ter  without  reproach.  My  youth  was  devoted  to  the 
service  of  my  country.  I  fought  her  battles  in  that 
war  which  achieved  her  liberty  and  independence, 
and  which  wras  ended  before  many  of  you,  Gentlemen, 
who  are  my  judges,  wTere  born. 

If,  upon  any  occasion,  a  man  may  speak  of  his  own 
merits,  it  is  at  such  a  time  as  this,  and  I  hope  I  may 
be  permitted  to  present  to  you,  in  very  few  words,  a 


174  DEFENCE  OF 

narrative  of  my  life,  while  I  was  engaged  in  scenes 
which  were  calculated  to  prove  a  man's  firmness  and 
courage.  I  shall  do  it  with  the  less  reluctance,  because 
the  testimony  I  have  offered  of  the  venerable  men 
who  served  with  me  in  the  revolutionary  war  will 
vouch  for  all  I  have  to  say. 

In  the  year  seventeen  hundred  and  seventy-five,  at 
the  age  of  about  twenty-one  years,  I  WAS  appointed  a 
captain  in  one  of  the  Connecticut  regiments.  During 
that  campaign,  and  until  March,  seventeen  hundred 
and  seventy -six,  when  the  enemy  evacuated  Boston, 
I  served  with  the  army  at  Cambridge  and  Roxbury, 
under  the  immediate  command  of  general  Washington. 
I  was  with  that  part  of  the  army  in  March,  seventeen 
hundred  and  seventy-six,  which  took  possession  of 
Dorchester  Heights,  the  movement  which  compelled 
the  enemy  to  evacuate  Boston.  The  next  day,  the 
regiment  to  which  I  belonged  marched  for  New- York. 
I  was  on  Long  Island  when  the  enemy  landed,  and 
remained  until  the  night  the  whole  army  retreated. 
I  was  in  several  small  skirmishes,  both  on  Long 
Island  and  York  Island,  before  the  army  retired  to 
the  White  Plains.  I  then  belonged  to  colonel  Charles 
Webb's  regiment,  of  Connecticut. 

This  regiment  was  in  the  severest  part  of  the  ac 
tion  on  Chatterdon's  Hill,  a  little  advanced  of  the 
White  Plains,  a  few  days  after  the  main  body  of  the 
army  .'Abandoned  New-York.  This  battle  is  memora 
ble  in  the  history  of  our  country,  and  the  regiment  to 


GENERAL  HULL.  175 

T*!iicli  I  belonged  received  the  particular  thanks  of 
general  Washington,  in  his  public  orders,  for  its  bra 
very  and  good  conduct  on  the  occasion.  It  was  par 
ticularly  distinguished  from  all  the  other  troops  en 
gaged  in  the  action.  I  received  a  slight  wound  by  a 
musket  ball  in  my  side,  but  it  did  not  prevent  me 
from  remaining  at  the  head  of  my  company.  I  was 
in  the  battle  at  Trenton,  when  the  Hessians  were 
taken,  in  December,  seventeen  hundred  and  seventy- 
six,  and  being  one  of  the  3^oungest  captains  in  the 
army,  was  promoted  by  general  Washington,  the  day 
after  the  battle,  to  a  majority,  for  my  conduct  on  that 
occasion. 

The  first  of  January,  seventeen  hundred  and  seven 
ty-seven,  I  was  in  the  battle  of  Princeton.  In  the 
campaign  of  the  same  year,  the  regiment  to  which  I 
belonged  served  in  the  northern  army.  I  was  early 
hi  the  spring  ordered  to  Ticonderoga,  and  commanded 
the  regiment  (being  the  senior  officer  present)  under 
general  Saint  Clair,  and  I  was  with  that  officer  in  his 
retreat  from  that  post.  After  general  Saint  Glair's 
army  formed  a  junction  with  general  Schuyler's  army, 
on  the  North  river,  at  Fort  Edward,  the  regiment  to 
which  I  belonged  was  detached  and  marched  to  Fort 
Schuyler,  and  relieved  that  post  which  was  besieged 
by  general  Saint  Ledger.  On  the  retreat  of  general 
Schuyler's  army  from  Fort  Edward,  I  commanded  the 
rear  guard  of  the  army,  and  being  two  miles  in  the 
rear,  was  attacked  by  a  large  body  of  British  troops 
and  Indians  at  day  light  in  the  morning,  in  which 


176  DEFENCE  OF 

action  were  killed  and  wounded  between  thirty  and 
forty  of  my  guard,  and  I  received  the  particular  thanks 
of  general  Schuyler  for  my  conduct  on  the  occasion. 

I  was  in  the  two  memorable  battles  on  the  nine 
teenth  of  September,  and  the  seventh  of  October,  on 
Bhemus's  Heights,  against  general  Burgoyne's  army, 
previous  to  its  surrender.  In  the  action  of  the  nine 
teenth  September,  I  commanded  a  detachment  of 
three  hundred  men,  who  fought  the  principal  part  of 
the  afternoon,  and  more  than  one  half  of  them  were 
killed  and  wounded. 

On  the  seventh  of  October  I  likewise  commanded 
a  detachment  from  the  brigade,  which  assisted  in  at 
tacking  the  enemy  on  the  left  of  our  position,  defeated 
him,  followed  him  to  the  right  of  his  lines,  stormed 
his  entrenchments,  and  took  and  held  possession  of 
the  right  of  his  position,  which  compelled  him  to  re 
treat  to  Saratoga,  and  there  capitulate. 

After  the  memorable  event  of  the  capitulation  of 
general  Burgoyne's  army,  the  regiment  to  which  I 
belonged  was  ordered  to  Pennsylvania,  to  join  the 
army  under  the  command  of  general  Washington. 

I  remained  with  the  army  the  winter  of  seventeen 
hundred  and  seventy-seven,  at  Valley  Forge,  and  in 
the  spring  of  seventeen  hundred  and  seventy-eight, 
when  the  British  army  evacuated  Philadelphia,  I  was 
in  the  battle  of  Monmouth.  From  December,  seven- 


GENERAL  HULL.  177 

teen  hundred  and  seventy-eight  to  May  seventeen 
hundred  and  seventy-nine,  I  commanded  the  Ameri 
can  posts  in  advance  of  the  White  Plains,  near 
Kingsbridge,  during  which  time  I  had  various  skir 
mishes  with  the  enemy.  In  May,  seventeen  hundred 
and  seventy-nine,  the  principal  part  of  the  British 
army  advanced  up  the  North  river  to  Verplancks 
and  Stony  Point,  and  I  was  ordered  to  retreat  before 
them  to  West  Point. 

I  then  joined  the  light  infantry  under  (he  command 
of  general  Wayne,  anc\ ,was  in  the  memorable  attack 
on  Stony  Point,  with  a  separate  command  of  four 
hundred  light  infantry. 

For  my  conduct  on  this  occasion,  I  received  the 
particular  thanks  of  general  Wayne,  general  Wash 
ington,  and  Congress. 

"v  '^  ] 

In  the  summer  and  autumn  of  seventeen  hundred 
and  eighty,  I  commanded  the  advanced  posts  of  the 
army,  and  in  December  of  that  year  I  commanded 
an  expedition  against  the  enemy  stationed  at  Morri- 
siana,  which  was  successful,  and  for  which  I  re 
ceived  the  thanks  of  general  Washington  in  his 
general  orders  to  the  army,  and  likewise  the  thanks 
of  Congress. 

General  Washington  in  his  orders,  I  well  remember, 
made  use  of  these  word?,  "  he  thanked  me  for  my  ju- 


178  DEFENCE  OF 

"  dicious  arrangements  in  the  plan  of  operation,  and 
"  for  my  intrepidity  and  valour  in  the  execution." 

From  the  conclusion  of  the  revolutionary  war  I 
have  lived  with  the  respect  of  my  countrymen,  and 
have  enjoyed  repeated  marks  of  their  confidence  in 
the  offices  which  have  been  bestowed  upon  me. 
When  I  found  that  the  independence  for  which  I  had 
so  often  fought  was  assailed  ;  that  again  my  country 
must  appeal  to  arms  to  avenge  her  wrongs,  and  to 
protect  her  rights,  I  felt  that  I  might  yet  do  her  some 
service.  For  though  many  years  had  passed  since  I 
had  fought  under  her  standard,  and  though  my  arm 
might  not,  have  its  wonted-  strength,  yet  my  spi 
rit  was  unbroken,  and  my  devotion  to  her  unimpaired. 
I  thought,  in  the  field,  where  there  could  be  but  few 
who  had  any  military  experience,  what  I  had  learned 
in  the  most  active  scenes  of  a  seven  years  war,  might 
be  useful.  I  fondly  hoped  that  in  my  age,  as  well  as 
in  my  youth,  I  might  render  services  that  should  de 
serve  the  gratitude  of  my  country.  That  if  I  fell  by 
the  sword  of  her  enemies,  my  grave  would  be  moist 
ened  with  the  tears  of  my  countrymen,  that  my  de 
scendants  would  be  proud  of  my  name  and  fame :  but 
how  vain  is  anticipation !  I  am  now  accused  of 
crimes  which  would  blast  my  former  honours,  and 
transmit  my  memory  with  infamy  to  posterity.  And 
in  that  hideous  catalogue,  there  is  none  from  the  im 
putation  of  which  my  nature  and  my  feelings  have 
more  recoiled  than  from  that  of  cowardice,  to  which 
I  am  now  to  answer.  I  shall  confine  myself  under 


GENERAL  HULL.  179 

this  charge  to  the  specifications,  or  to  such  part  of 
the  specifications,  as  relate  to  my  personal  deport 
ment. 


Almost  every  omission  or  commission  during  the 
campaign,  which  it  has  been  thought  proper  to  cen 
sure,  has  been  assembled  under  this  charge,  and 
they  have  all  been  imputed  to  cowardice.  But  as 
most  of  the  acts  have  been  specified  in  support  of 
other  charges,  I  shall  not  again  notice  them,  but  con 
fine  myself  to  the  allegation  that  I  shewed  personal 
fear  and  a  want  of  courage. 

However  painful  the  recapitulation  of  the  testimony 
on  this  point  must  be  to  me,  it  is  so  necessary  that  it 
should  be  brought  together,  to  the  end  you  may  have 
it  before  you  in  one  view,  that  I  shall  go  through  the 
disagreeable  task  of  repeating  it. 

The  first  witness  in  point  of  fact,  as  well  as  of  im 
portance,  is  major  Snelling.  He  was  a  captain  when 
he  joined  the  army  at  Urbana ;  but  is  now  a  colonel. 

He  testifies  as  follows.  "  During  the  cannonade  I 
"  frequently  saw  the  General.  I  once  saw  him  stand- 
"  ing ;  he  might  have  risen  twice ;  most  of  the  time  he 
"  was  sitting  on  an  old  tent,  under  the  curtain  of  the 
"  fort  opposite  the  enemy's  batteries. 

"  I  have  been  taught  to  believe,  that  there  are  cer- 
;c  tain  human  passions  which  are  indicated  by  appear- 


ISO  DEFENCE  OP 

"  ances,  and  the  appearances  of  general  Hull  accord- 
"  ing  to  my  mind  indicated  fear. 

"  The  reasons  that  induced  me  to  draw  that  con- 
"  elusion  were,  that  the  General  selected  the  safest 
"  place  in  the  fort  for  his  seat ;  his  voice  trembled 
"  when  he  spoke  ;  he  apparently  unconsciously  filled 
~'  his  mouth  with  tobacco,  so  that  his  cheeks  were 
"extended  by  it;  the  saliva  ran  from  his  mouth  on 
"  his  neckcloth  and  cloaths ;  he  often  rubbed  his 
"  face  with  his  hands,  and  distributed  the  tobacco 
;;  juice  about  his  face." 

He  further  testified  in  his  cross-examination,  that 
when  he  returned  from  Spring  Wells,  at  the  dawn  of 
day  on  th$  morning  of  the  sixteenth,  he  went  into 
the  fort  to  make  his  report  to  general  Hull,  but  could 
not  find  him,  nor  find  any  one  who  knew  where  he 
was. 

He  said,  he  did  not  know  if  general  Hull  was  in 
the  fort  at  the  time  the  officers  were  killed.  He  saw 
him  immediately  afterwards.  After  the  men  were 
killed  it  might  have  been  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes 
before  he  saw  captain  Hull  with  the  white  flag.  It 
might  have  been  an  hour,  but  he  did  not  think  it  was. 

The  witness  could  not  say  that  he  saw  general 
Hull  in  the  situation  he  has  described  between  the 
time  the  men  were  killed  and  the  sending  the  flag  by 
captain  Hull.  He  recollects  that  at  the  time  captain 


GENERAL  HULL.  181 

Hull  was  fixing  the  flag,  general  Hull  was  standing, 
and  was  in  the  situation  he  has  described.  General 
Hull  was  out  of  the  fort  early  that  morning,  but  the 
witness  does  not  know  where  he  was.  At  the  time 
the  enemy  was  crossing,  the  General  was  standing  on 
the  parade. 

I  wish  the  Court  to  notice  the  great  attention, 
which  major  Snelling  paid,  to  be  particular  in  very 
minute  circumstances  in  giving  his  testimony ;  not 
only  as  to  the  positions  in  which  he  saw  me,  but  when 
his  examination  was  read  over  to  him,  and  he  found 
that,  as  it  stood,  it  represented  him  as  saying  that  I 
had  distributed  the  tobacco  over  my  face,  he  desired 
it  might  be  corrected,  so  as  to  state  that  what  he  had 
said,  was  confined  to  the  lower  part  of  my  face. 

Captain  Mac  Commick  testifies  as  follows,  "  I  was 
u  not  present  when  colonel  Vindlay  received  orders 
"  to  march  into  the  fort.  I  joined  him  as  he  was 
"  going  into  the  fort ;  he  told  me  of  the  order,  and  said 
"he  would  not  obey  it;  but  would  go  inio  the  fort 
"  himself,  and  directed  me  to  form  the  regiment. 
"  The  colonel  then  came  back  so  near  to  me,  as  to 
"  tell  me  to  let  the  companies  march  up,  and  I  did 
"  so."  The  witness  then  relates  what  passed  between 
colonel  Findlay  and  myself,  and  proceeds  as  follows. 
-*  The  General  appeared  very  much  agitated.  He 
';  appeared  to  be  under  as  much  alarm  as  I  ever  saw 
(:  a  person.  He  had  been  chewing  tobacco,  and  the 
17 


182  DEFENCE  OF 

"  lower  part  of  his  face  and  his  vest  were  covered 
"  with  it." 

On  his  cross  examination  he  testified,  that  it  might 
have  been  ten  minutes,  or  half  an  hour,  or  more,  after 
the  firing  ceased,  before  the  troops  were  ordered  to 
march  into  the  fort ; — that  it  was  at  least  half  an 
hour  after  the  firing  before  the  witness  went  into  the 
fort ; — that  he  saw  me  once  that  morning  out  of  the 
fort,  and  thinks  I  was  near  where  colonel  Findlay's 
regiment  was  forming  the  line  of  battle  behind  the 
picket  fence.  Colonel  Van  Horn,  who  was  a  major 
of  colonel  Findlay's  corps,  testifies,  that  after  colo 
nel  Findlay's  regiment  was  formed  on  the  morning  of 
the  sixteenth  of  August,  and  about  an  hour  or  half 
an  hour  before  the  flag  was  hoisted,  I  was  at  the 
line ; — that  this  was  during  the  cannonade ; — that  at 
about  the  time  the  firing  ceased,  captain  Snelling 
came,  with  orders  that  colonel  Findlay  should  return 
with  his  regiment  to  the  fort ; — the  cannonade  had 
then  ceased ; — the  witness  turned  round,  and  saw  the 
flag  hoisted  on  the  fort.  The  witness  further  stated, 
that  he  then  went  into  the  fort  with  his  battalion,  and 
after  he  got  in  he  saw  me,  but  is  not  certain  whether 
I  was  there  when  he  entered.  The  witness  then 
proceeded  as  follows,  "  when  I  first  saw  general  Hull 
"  he  was  on  the  steps  going  into  one  of  the  rooms. 
"  His  face  was  discoloured  with  tobacco  juice.  It  was 
"  over  the  lower  part  of  his  face,  and  a  spot  was  over 
"  his  eye.  I  thought  he  was  under  the  influence  of 
"  fear.  I  had  no  doubt  of  it/'  On  his  cross-exami- 


GENERAL  HULL.  183- 

nation  he  says,  that  he  saw  me  on  the  night  of  the 
fifteenth,  and  as  he  thinks,  about  midnight,  and  before 
the  cannonading  had  ceased,  at  the  place  where  colo 
nel  Findlay's  regiment  was  formed  that  night.  He 
saw  me  the  next  morning  out  of  the  fort  at  colonet 
Findlay's  quarters,  and  again  at  the  line  of  battle. 
When  the  witness  was  asked,  whether  care  and  anxiety 
might  not  have  produced  the  appearance  he  describ 
ed,  he  answered,  that  care  and  anxiety  might  have 
added  to  those  appearances,  but  upon  comparing  faces 
he  thought  mine  had  the  indication  of  fear. 

Captain  Baker  testifies  as  follows,  "  I  saw  general 
"  Hull  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth.  He  appeared 
"  to  be  embarrassed,  and  at  a  loss  how  to  act,  I  had 
"  but  one  opinion,  which  was  that  he  was  under  the 
"  influence  of  personal  fear.  I  could  not  account  for 
u  the  surrender  in  any  other  way."  On  his  cross-ex 
amination  he  said,  "  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth, 
';  during  the  cannonade,  I  saw  the  General  in  the 
ufort  sometimes  sitting,  sometimes  walking,  and 
"  sometimes  standing.'' 

Lieutenant  Stansbury  testifies,  that  on  the  night  of 
the  fifteenth  of  August,  he  found  me  at  about  eleven 
o'clock  at  night,  lying  on  the  piazza  of  the  barracks 
in  the  fort,  with  my  boots  and  cloaths  on ; — that  in 
the  morning  when  he  awoke  at  day  break  I  was  not 
there.  "  I  saw  the  General,"  says  he, "  on  a  tolerably 
"  safe  place ;  as  to  his  being  afraid,  I  cannot  say  whe- 
*'ther  Jbe  was  or  not."  "  J  saw  the  General  on  the 


184  DEFENCE  OP 

is  parade  ground.     I  did  not  see  any  necessity  for  his 
"exposing  himself  more  than  he  did." 

Major  Jessup  testifies,  that  on  the  fifteenth,  after 
the  cannonade  commenced,  he  in  company  with  Mr. 
Dugan  met  me  on  horseback  in  the  street  near  the 
second  battery.  He  saj^s,  "  the  General  appeared  to 
"be  agitated;  either  Mr.  Dugan  or  myself  observed, 
"  the  General  was  frightened;  one  of  us  said,  we 
cc  must  cheer  him  up.  We  approached  him,  spoke  to 
"  him,  he  appeared  pale  and  confused,  immediately 
a  dismounted  and  led  his  horse  towards  the  fort." 

"  I  did  not  see  general  Hull  till  about  break  of  day 
"  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth,  when  the  General 
"  came  to  my  tent,  and  directed  me  to  write  an  order 
"for  the  return  of  colonels  Cass  and  Mac  Arthur." 

The  witness  further  testifies,  that  shortly  after  the 
enemy  commenced  their  fire,  at  the  request  of 
colonel  Findlay,  he  went  to  me  to  have  an  explana 
tion  of  an  order  which  had  been  delivered  by  my 
aid-de-camp ; — that  he  found  me  and  received  direc 
tions  from  me,  for  forming  the  line  of  battle ; — that 
while  he  was  attempting  to  collect  some  dragoons,  of 
which  I  had  directed  him  to  take  the  command,  he 
saw  that  our  line  was  breaking  and  retreating  towards 
the  fort ; — he  then  looked  towards  the  fort,  and  saw 
the  white  flag  flying  from  it ; — that  at  the  request  of 
colonel  Findlay,  he  then  went  to  the  fort.  The  wit 
ness  then  proceeds  as  follows,  "I  found  the  General 


GENERAL  HULL.  185 

"  in  the  fort.  I  thought  him  very  much  frightened* 
"  When  I  met  him,  I  inquired  of  him,  if  it  were  pos- 
"  sible  we  were  about  to  surrender.  He  said  some- 
"  thing  about  terms,  and  something  about  the  enemy's 
"  force,  which  I  do  not  recollect.  His  voice  at  that 
"  time  was  tremulous.  I  observed,  we  could  at  least 
"  hold  out  till  joined  by  colonels  Cass  and  Mac  Ar- 
"  thur.  He  replied,  my  God,  what  shall  I  do  with 
"  these  women  and  children !"  The  witness  then 
states,  that  he  left  the  fort,  went  to  colonel  Findlay, 
and  did  not  see  me  till  terms  of  capitulation  had  been 
agreed  upon ; — that  then  I  was  perfectly  composed, 
The  witness  also  testifies  as  follows : — "  When  I  came 
._ "  to  report  to  the  General,  after  reconnoitring  the 
"  enemy,  I  found  him  on  the  side  of  the  fort  next  the 
"  enemy,  completely  sheltered,  sitting  on  a  tent  be- 
"  side  a  bed.  At  the  same  time  I  reported  that  our 
;*  guard,  the  most  advanced  towards  the  enemy,  had 
"  surrendered.  The  General  said  that  colonel  Brush 
ic  had  reported  to  him  that  his  men  were  leaving  him. 
"  After  this  when  I  met  the  General  in  the  fort,  and 
"  after  the  flag  was  hoisted,  he  exclaimed  that  four 
a  men  had  been  killed  by  one  shot ; — he  appeared  so 
M  alarmed  as  not  to  know  what  he  was  doing."  The 
witness  then  describes  my  appearance  at  that  time 
nearly  in  the  words  which  had  been  used  by  other 
witnesses. 

The  witness  on  a  subsequent  part  of  his  examina 
tion  stated,  that  at  the  moment  when  he  was  in  con 
versation  with  me  on  the  evening  of  the  fifteenth, 


186  DEFENCE  OF 

near  the  second  battery,  a  shot  struck  a  stone  house 
near  me ; — that  I  appeared  much  agitated,  dismounted 
my  horse,  and  walked  off  without  making  him  a  reply. 
"  Whenever  I  saw  the  General,"  says  the  witness. 
"  before  the  capitulation  was  signed,  he  appeared  agi- 
"  tated ;  afterward,  entirely  composed.  Whether  the 
"  agitation  proceeded  from  the  novelty  of  his  situa- 
"  tion  or  fear,  I  cannot  say,  but  I  believe  the  latter, 
"  if  not  both." 

Captain  Eustman  testifies  as  follows, "  on  the  even- 
"  ing  of  the  fifteenth,  a  shell  appeared  to  be  coming 
"  into  the  fort.  General  Hull  ran  towards  the  north- 
**  west  bastion,  apparently  to  avoid  it,  and  to  get  un- 
"  der  cover  of  the  platform.  The  General  appeared 
"  alarmed  and  frightened,  as  I  also  observed  to  my 
u  companions  at  the  time." 

Lieutenant  Philips  testifies  as  follows,  "  I  saw  ge- 
u  neral  Hull  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth.  Most 
4<  part  of  the  time  during  the  cannonade  he  was  sitting 
st  with  his  back  to  the  parapet  next  the  enemy.  He 
*'  was  silting  there  with  a  number  of  gentlemen.  I  re- 
'"'  collect  one  gentleman  and  one  lady  near  to  him.  He 
"  appeared  to  me  under  the  influence  of  fear.  He  ap- 
*•'  peared  very  much  agitated.  I  think  doctor  Cun- 
"ningham  was  the  gentleman  that  was  with  him. 
**  There  might  have  been  other  officers  with  him,  but 
"  I  do  not  recollect." 


GENERAL  HULL.  187 

Colonel  Miller  testifies  as  follows,  "  I  did  not  dis- 
e*  cover  any  agitation  in  the  General  on  the  fifteenth. 
"  On  the  sixteenth  he  did  appear  much  agitated.  He 
<f  was  on  the  fort.  He  was  sometimes  sitting,  some- 
"  times  standing,  and  sometimes  walking.  Whether 
"  his  agitation  proceeded  from  anxiety  on  account  of 
"  the  responsibility  he  was  taking,  or  from  personal 
"  alarm,  I  cannot  say.  After  the  surrender  he  told 
"  me  he  was  afraid,  if  he  had  fought  the  enemy,  (hey 
"  would  have  taken  advantage  of  tlrat  part  of  his  pro- 
"  clamation,  which  declared  that  no  white  man  taken 
c'  fighting  with  an  Indian  should  be  spared," 

On  his  cross-examination,  colonel  Miller  said,  "I. 
"  saw  no  act  of  the  General's  on  the  morning  of  the 
"  sixteenth  which  I  can  say  might  not  have  proceed- 
"  ed  from  the  fatigue  and  responsibility  he  was  under." 

I  put  to  colonel  Miller  the  following  question: — Can 
you  mention  any  act  of  mine  on  the  sixteenth,  which 
you  did  then  or  do  now  impute  to  personal  fear  ?— . 
To  this  the  witness  answered: — "Yes,  I  did  think 
"  such  an  immediate  surrender  must  have  proceeded 
";  from  your  fears." 

To  the  following  question : — Did  you  see  me,  while 
I  was  in  the  fort,  in  any  place  or  situation  unfit  for  a 
commanding  officer? — The  Colonel  answered: — "I 
"  can  describe  to  the  Court  where  the  General  wa.s3 
*'  and  the  Court  can  judge." 


J88  DEFENCE  OF 

"  He  was  generally  near  the  easterly  parapet  of  the 
"  fort.  I  was  there  part  of  the  time  myself.  The 
"  General  leaned  down.  The  whole  easterly  side  of 
"  the  fort  was  as  safe  as  the  spot  where  the  General 
"  was  for  the  most  part  of  the  time.  The  General's 
"  station  was  the  most  convenient  to  receive  commu- 
•*  nications  from  without  the  fort." 

Colonel  Miller,  upon  a  re-examination,  further  tes 
tifies,  that  he  had  frequently  observed  a  habit  which  1 
had  when  I  was  much  engaged,  of  chewing  tobacco  to 
excess,  and  taking  it  from  my  mouth  with  my  fingers, 
and  rolling  it  in  my  fingers,  and  putting  it  in  my  mouth 
again,  and  rolling  it  from  my  mouth  to  my  fingers 
alternately.  That  he  observed  more  of  this  habit  on- 
the  sixteenth  than  usual,  and  thought  the  addition 
might  be  owing  to  want  of  rest  from  fatigue. 

Major  Whistler  says,  my  appearance  induced  him 
to  think  I  was  under  the  influence  of  personal  fear. 

Lieutenant  Peckham  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  on 
the  sixteenth  of  August,  and  says,  "  I  had  no  doubt 
a  but  that  the  General  was  under  the  influence  of  per- 
"  sonal  fear,  from  his  embarrassment,  as  he  sat  still  and 
^  gave  no  orders." 

Major  Munson  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  on  the  fif 
teenth  of  August,  and  saw  me  again  on  the  sixteenth, 
after  the  capitulation  was  settled.  He  adds,  "  The 
4*  General's  situation  was  critical.  If  he  had  had  any 


GENERAL  HULL.  18X1 

"  feelings,  he  must  have  had  great  care  and  anxiety.  I 
"'  saw  nothing  which  might  not  have  been  accounted 
•'  for,  without  resorting  to  the  impression  of  personal 

»• 

"  fear."  On  his  cross-examination  by  the  Court,  this 
witness  says,  "It  was  ten  or  fifteen  minutes  after  the 
u  officers  were  killed,  that  he  saw  me  silting  in  one  of 
"  the  officers'  quarters;  but  does  not  recollect  that  it 
'*  was  during  the  cannonade,  either  on  the  fifteenth  or 
"  sixteenth,  that  he  saw  me," 

Captain  Maxwell  testifies,  that  he  served  in  the  re 
volutionary  war;  was  engaged  in  the  affair  at  Browns- 
town  under  colonel  Miller,  which  made  the  twenty- 
third  battle  in  which  he  had  fought; — that  after  the 
cannonading  commenced  on  the  fifteenth,  he  saw  me  on 
horseback  at  one  of  the  batteries  ; — that  I  had  a  con 
versation  with  the  officer  commanding  at  the  time  the 
balls  were  passing  and  repassing ; — that  he  took  notice 
of  my  countenance,  and  that  I  appeared  firm,  collect 
ed,  and  cool ; — that  I  sat  four  or  five  minutes  on  my 
horse,  and  rode  off  again ; — that  he  did  not  see  me  on 
the  sixteenth ; — -that  at  the  time  the  army  was  re 
treating  from  Sandwich,  there  was  a  clamour,  that  I 
was  intimidated,  and  that  was  the  reason  why,  on  the 
evening  of  the  sixteenth,  he  particularly  observed  my 
countenance. 

General  Taylor  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  several 
times  on  the  evening  of  the  fifteenth,  during  the  can 
nonade; — that  there  was  no  impression  made  on  his 
mind  of  my  being  under  personal  fear  on  that  day  or 


190  DEFENCE  OF 

evening ;— that  I  appeared  to  be  thoughtful  and  verjr 
low  spirited ; — that  he  heard  no  indication  of  inspirit 
ing  the  men ; — that  my  countenance  was  dull ; — that 
he  saw  me  near  the  gateway,  and  that  I  ordered  colo 
nel  Findlay  to  move  from  the  upper  to  the  lower  side 
of  the  fort,  without  any  specific  orders  how  to  form. 
Early  on  the  sixteenth,  information  came  that  the 
enemy  were  preparing  to  cross,  and  no  orders  were 
given  to  resist  them ; — that  my  appearance  displayed 
more  of  the  marks  of  tobacco  than  he  had  generally 
seen  in  a  neat  man ; — that  his  impression  was,  that  I 
was  under  the  influence  of  personal  fear ;— that  he  did 
not  see  me  again  till  the  flag  was  hoisted ; — that  when 
he  saw  me  near  the  gate  on  the  sixteenth,  he  saw 
many  officers  with  me,  and  among  the  rest  captain 
Snelling ; — that  he  did  not  consider  being  there  as 
shrinking  from  danger. 

Captain  Bacon  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  in  the  fort 
very  frequently  on  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth ; — that 
on  the  sixteenth  he  saw  me,  with  doctor  Cunningham 
and  his  wife,  sitting  on  some  planks ; — that  he  also  saw 
other  persons  there,  some  of  whom  he  thinks  were  offi 
cers  ; — that  during  the  cannonade  he  saw  me  on  the 
parapet  of  the  fort,  once  on  the  evening  of  the  fifteenth, 
and  once  on  the  sixteenth ; — that  he  saw  me  in  differ 
ent  places  about  the  garrison,  during  the  cannonade : 
— that  I  seemed  engaged  as  usual,  but  agitated  on  the 
morning  of  the  sixteenth  more  than  common ; — that  he 
did  not  know  the  cause; — that  he  had  no  suspicion 
that  it  was  personal  fear,  neither  did  he  hear  such  a 


GENERAL  HULL.  191 

suspicion  expressed  by  any  of  the  officers  ;• — that  after 
the  shot  came  in  which  did  execution,  the  officers 
and  men  very  generally  were  in  the  eastern  side  of 
the  fort,  under  the  protection  of  the  parapet  next  the 
enemy. 

Judge  Witherell  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  on  the 
fifteenth,  during  the  cannonade,  near  one  of  our  bat 
teries,  when,  from  all  he  saw,  I  was  cool  and  collected. 

I  believe,  Gentlemen,  I  have  now  collected  and 
presented  to  you  in  connection,  every  syllable  of  the 
testimony  which  has  been  offered  in  support  of  the 
specifications  under  this  charge  which  relate  to  my 
personal  appearance  and  deportment.  Such  parts  of 
the  testimony  as  have  the  most  bearing,  I  have  endea 
voured  to  repeat  in  the  witnesses'  own  words,  and 
have  done  it  with  as  much  accuracy  as  the  notes 
taken  by  my  counsel  would  permit. 

Before,  Gentlemen,  I  proceed  further  on  the  exami 
nation  of  this  testimony,  allow  me  to  lay  before  you  an 
extract  from  an  author  of  great  respectability,  contain 
ing  rules  not  inapplicable  to  the  present  occasion,  by 
which  the  credibility  of  a  witness  ought  to  be  tested. 

"  A  witness,"  says  Mr.  Tytler,  in  his  essay  on  Mi 
litary  Law,  "  who  amplifies  his  testimony,  unneces- 
w  sarily  enlarging  upon  circumstances  unfavourable  to 
<c  a  party ;  who  seems  to  be  gratified  by  the  opportu- 
'*  ftity  of  furnishing  condemnatory  evidence,  or  mani-. 


192  DEFENCE  OF 

"  festly  betrays  passion  or  prejudice  in  the  substance  of 
"  his  testimony,  or  in  the  manner  of  delivering  it,  is 
rt  to  be  listened  to  with  suspicion  of  his  veracity.  If 
u  a  witness,"  the  author  adds,  "  takes  upon  him  to  re- 
"•  member  with  the  greatest  minuteness  all  the  cir- 
*'  camstances  of  a  transaction  long  since  passed,  and 
"  which  are  of  a  frivolous  nature,  and  not  likely  to 
*'  dwell  on  the  memory,  his  testimony  is  thereby  ren- 
"'  dered  very  suspicious." 

I  ask  the  members  to  test  the  testimony  which  has 
been  given  against  me  by  these  rules.  Were  there 
not  many  of  the  witnesses  who  amplified  their  testi 
mony,  and  unnecessarily  enlarged  upon  circumstances 
unfavourable  to  me ;  who  seemed  to  be  gratified  by 
the  opportunity  of  furnishing  condemnatory  evidence? 
I  appeal  to  the  Court  to  judge  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  testimony  of  some  of  the  witnesses  was  delivered, 
and  whether  they  did  not  betray  a  Mrarmth,  that  could 
not  leave  them  free  from  a  suspicion  of  strong  preju 
dice  or  bias  ? 

Major  Sneiling  has  certainly  taken  upon  himself 
to  remember  with  the  greatest  minuteness  circum 
stances  of  a  frivolous  nature.  He  remembered  that 
my  cheeks  were  swelled  with  the  tobacco  I  put  in 
my  mouth.  He  remembered  that  my  neckcloth  and 
vest  were  soiled,  and  the  tobacco  was  distributed  about 
my  face.  And  when  his  examination  was  read  over 
to  him,  his  recollection  was  so  extremely  accurate 
as  to  the  most  minute  circumstance,  that  he  insisted 


GENERAL  HULL.  193 

that  what  had  been  written,  should  be  so  corrected, 
as  to  read  that  it  was  the  lower  part  of  my  face  which 
was  soiled.  Though,  on  this  particular,  he  is  contra 
dicted  by  colonel  Van  Horn,  who  it  appears  was  no 
less  observing  of  minute  circumstances,  and  whose 
memory  is  not  less  tenacious  of  them.  Colonel  Van 
Horn  recollects,  and  has  been  very  particular  in 
stating,  that  there  was  a  mark  made  by  the  tobacco 
over  one  of  my  eyes.  He  was  so  very  minute  as  to 
observe,  that  it  was  over  my  left  eye,  though  I  be 
lieve  it  is  not  so  recorded  in  his  testimony. 

Major  Snelling's  correction,  with  respect  to  the 
situation  of  the  tobacco  on  my  face,  will  not  appear 
in  the  record  of  his  testimony.  But  it  will  be  brought 
to  the  remembrance  of  the  Court,  by  my  reminding 
them,  that  when  major  Snelling  proposed  the  altera 
tion  in  the  record,  so  as  to  state  that  he  meant  to  have 
spoken  only  of  the  lower  part  of  my  face,  I  objected 
to  its  being  altered  in  the  minutes,  and  wished  that  it 
might  appear  from  the  record  of  the  evidence,  that 
this  was  a  correction  of  his.  , 

But,  Gentlemen,  the  opinion  of  major  Snelling  that 
I  was  under  the  influence  of  personal  fear,  as  well  as 
the  same  opinion  of  other  witnesses,  who  have  very 
nearly  followed  his  words  in  their  description,  is 
formed,  as  they  avow,  from  my  appearance,  and  from 
my  situation  and  conduct  in  the  fort. 
18 


194  DEFENCE  OF 

A  correct  and  certain  judgment  of  the  emotions  of 
the  mind  from  indications  of  the  countenance,  or  from 
mere  personal  appearances,  can  hardly  ever  be  formed. 
And  it  must  be  infinitely  difficult  to  do  so  when  fa 
tigue,  anxiety,  and  a  great  responsibility  may,  all  at 
the  same  time,  be  producing  their  effect.  . 

Major  Snelling,  though  a  very  young  gentleman,  it 
is  to  be  presumed  has  great  acquirements,  and  it 
would  seem  from  his  testimony,  that  the  human  pas 
sions  have  been  the  objects  of  his  study.  He  intro 
duces  his  testimony  on  this  point,  with  these  words : 
"  I  have  been  taught  to  believe  that  there  are  certain 
"  human  passions  which  are  indicated  by  appearanc.es, 
"  and  the  appearance  of  general  Hull,  in  my  mind, 
"  indicated  fear.'' 

I  hope  that  these  professions  of  major  Snelling  will 
not  give  his  opinion  an  undue  weight,  because  he  has 
not  told  us  in  what  school  he  acquired  his  science  in 
physiognomy.  Nor  has  he  given  us  the  rules  by 
which,  when  the. mind  may  be  under  various  excite 
ments,  he  can  distinguish  the  appearances  which  will 
indicate  the  prevalence  of  one  over  the  other. 

Major  Snelling,  I  have  no  doubt,  when  he  gains 
more  age  and  experience,  will  find  that  the  indica 
tions  of  appearances  in  respect  to  the  human  mind 
are  fallacious.  His  own  case  may  afford  an  evidence 
of  it. 


GENERAL  HULL.  195 

I  myself,  and  many  who  heard  his  testimony,  and 
i  hat  of  many  other  of  the  witnesses,  and  marked  the 
manner  of  it,  thought  that  they  manifested  great  pas 
sion  and  prejudice  against  me ;  that  they  seemed  gra 
tified  with  the  opportunity  of  furnishing  condemnato 
ry  evidence.  These  appearances  may  have  been  fal 
lacious,  but  if  they  were  so,  it  is  strong  evidence  that 
the  most  erroneous  conclusions  may  be  drawn  from 
expressions  of  countenance,  tone  of  voice,  and  eager 
ness  of  manner. 

I  beg  it  may  be  observed,  that  most  of  the  witnes 
ses,  except  major  Snelling,  who  have  given  their  tes 
timony  on  this  point,  did  not  see  me  in  the  fort,  till 
after  the  flag  was  hoisted,  when  there  was  of  course  a 
cessation  of  hostilities,  nor  till  after  I  returned  from  the 
tent.  The  witnesses  have  all  endeavoured  to  impress 
on  the  minds  of  the  Court,  that  I  intended  in  all  events 
to  make  an  unconditional  surrender.  If  this  were  the 
case,  where  was  the  occasion  for  personal  fear,  after  I 
had  invited,  by  the  flag,  a  negotiation,  and  had  stop 
ped  the  enemy's  fire  ?  Major  Jessup  says,  that  when 
he  saw  me  before  the  capitulation  was  signed,  I  ap 
peared  greatly  agitated,  but  that  afterwards  I  was  en 
tirely  composed.  And  yet,  as  major  Jessup  did  not 
see  me  in  the  fort  on  the  sixteenth,  till  after  the  nego 
tiation  was  commenced,  there  was  no  more  ground  for 
agitation  from  personal  fear,  when  he  saw  me  on  that 
day  previously  to  the  capitulation,  than  there  was 
after  that  event. 


196  DEFENCE  OF 

There  is  a  part  of  major  Jessup's  testimony,  which 
is  certainly,  worthy  of  remark.  His  power  of  judging 
of  the  human  passions  from  appearances  is  even  supe- 
riour  to  major  Snelling's,  because,  from  his  testimony, 
it  seems  he  can  perceive  the  appearances,  when  the 
object  is  at  some  distance.  He  states,  that  when  he 
and  Mr.  Dugan  saw  me -on  horseback,  on  the  fifteenth, 
1  appeared  to  be  frightened,  one  of  them  said,  we  must 
cheer  him  up;  we  then  approached  him,  says  the  wit 
ness,  and  spoke  to  him ;  he  appeared  pale,  &c.  So 
that  they  had,  according  to  this  testimony,  perceived 
that  I  was  frightened,  while  I  was  on  horseback,  in 
the  face  of  the  enemy's  fire,  and  before  they  had  ap 
proached  me,  or  spoke  to  me. 

I  do  not  deny  that  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth 
I  was  greatly  agitated.  My  body  was  worn  with  fa 
tigue,  and  my  mind  was  filled  with  the  deepest  anxiety. 
On  the  one  hand,  I  well  knew  the  consequences  of  a 
surrender.  I  knew  how  unfortunate  it  was  for  my 
country,  that  I  should  be  obliged  to  yield.  I  saw  the 
consequences  to  myself,  I  knew  that  the  disappoint 
ment  of  the  high  expectations  which  had  been  raised, 
would  be  charged  to  me.  And  that  all  the  faults  of 
others,  to  which,  in  fact,  the  failure  of  the  expedition 
was  owing,  would  be  laid  at  my  door.  I  saw  too, 
what  was  intended  to  be  the  effect  of  the  opposition  of 
my  officers  to  a  measure,  they  knew  I  must,  or  would 
pursue.  In  proportion  as  they  found  me  decided  on 
this  final  step,  they  became  insolent  in  their  opposi 
tion,  and  were  most  so  when  it  was  ascertained,  that 


GENERAL  HULL.  197 

they  would  not  meet  the  enemy,  and  could  not  be 
punished  by  me.  They  foresaw,  that  great  reputation 
was  to  be  purchased  at  so  cheap  a  rate,  as  appearing 
highly  averse  to  the  surrender,  and  afterward  pub 
lishing  to  the  world  all  they  said  and  did,  as  evidence 
of  my  criminality  and  their  own  heroism. 

While  all  these  considerations  enlisted  every  pri 
vate  feeling  against  the  surrender;  my  mind  was  agi 
tated  by  the  opposite  demands  of  duty.  The  dread 
ful  consequence  of  unsuccessful  resistance,  or  indeed, 
of  any  thing  less  than  a  most  decisive  victory,  filled 
my  thoughts.  In  the  midst  of  a  people,  among  whom 
I  had  lived  so  long,  as  to  be  known  to  almost  every 
inhabitant,  all  of  whom  looked  to  me  for  protection, 
and  many  of  whom  had  sought  safety  in  the  fort;  I 
could  not  reflect  on  the  horrours  of  a  general  massacre, 
which  would  have  been  the  consequence  of  a  defeat, 
without  emotion.  He,  who  in  such  a  situation,  could 
have  been  perfectly  tranquil,  whose  appearances 
should  have  discovered  no  agitation,  must  have  been 
either  less,  or  more  than  man.  He  must  have  been 
denied  the  sensibilities  common  to  our  nature,  or 
been  endowed  with  faculties  more  than  human. 

When  the  Court  considers  my  situation,  how  many 
causes  there  were  to  excite  strong  emotion,  will  they 
believe  that  the  witnesses,  who  have  testified  on  thi^ 
point,  were  capable  of  such  discrimination,  as  would 
enable  them  to  ascertain,  that  the  appearances  which 
they  have  described,  proceeded  from  personal  fear  2 
18* 


198  DEFENCE  OF 

Major  Snelling  professed  to  have  been  instructed  in 
this  branch  of  science.  But  captain  Mac  Commick, 
•who  was  not  in  the  fort  till  after  Findlay's  regiment 
had  marched  in,  made  no  such  pretensions.  He  ap 
peared  to  found  his  judgment  on  his  natural  instinct,, 
and  indeed  he  did  right  not  to  make  a  claim,  which 
was  beyond  the  first  stage  of  civilization ;  to  which 
rank,  notwithstanding  his  tawdry  regimentals,  it  was 
evident  he  belonged. 

Several  of  the 'witnesses  have  given  their  opinion 
on  this  subject,  with  less  confidence,  and  some  quali 
fications.  Colonel  Van  Horn  has  admitted  that  care 
and  anxiety  might  have  added  to  the  appearances 
which  he  described.  His  belief,  however,  as  to  what 
related  to  personal  fear,  he  says,  he  formed  from  a 
comparison  of  faces,  by  which  he  judged,  that  mine 
indicated  fear. 

I  believe,  Sir,  that  in  the  comparison  of  counte 
nances,  when  I  was  surrounded  by  my  officers  at  the 
time  of  the  surrender,  a  vast  difference  might  have 
been  observed,  between  the  expression  of  fmany  of 
theirs  and  mine.  If  my  countenance  expressed  what 
I  felt,  it  must  have  shewn  traces  of  the  painful  anxiety 
by  which  I  4iad  been  oppressed,  and  marks  of  the 
deepest  regret  for  the  measures  I  had  been  obliged  to 
pursue;  while  other  faces  might  perhaps  have  beamed 
with  the  exultation,  which  the  minds  of  some  can  feel, 
when  they  look  upon  what  they  may  think  a  fallen 
man. 


GENERAL  HULL.  199 

Possibly,  there  may  have  been  around  me,  those 
who  felt,  and  whose  countenances  expressed  a  joy, 
that  by  the  capitulation,  they  had  purchased  personal 
security,  and  avoided  a  bloody  contest,  at  the  expense, 
as  they  supposed,  of  my  character  and  honour. 

General  Taylor  also  concluded  from  my  appear 
ance  that  I  was  under  the  influence  of  personal  fear. 
He  gives  you  the  grounds,  on  which  he  drew  his 
conclusion.  They  are,  that  I  appeared  thoughtful, 
and  very  low  spirited ; — that  my  countenance  was 
dull,  and  that  he  saw  about  me  more  of  the  marks  of 
tobacco,  than  was  consistent  with  neatness.  Are 
these  grounds  which  will  warrant  a  conclusion,  that 
is  to  affect  the  life  of  a  man  ?  As  to  what  has  been 
said  on  this  disgusting  subject  of  the  tobacco,  I  will 
dismiss  it  as  to  all  the  witnesses,  with  a  reference  to 
the  testimony  of  colonel  Miller,  who  proves,  that  I 
had  a  habit,  which  might  have  produced  all  the  ap 
pearances,  which  the  witnesses  say  my  chewing  had 
produced.  It  is  known,  that  where  there  is  a  habit 
of  using  tobacco,  it  is  commonly,  unconsciously,  taken 
to  excess,  whenever  the  mind  is  much  occupied. 
Even  the  excitement  that  some  of  the  witnesses,  who 
use  tobacco,  felt,  while  they  were  under  examination, 
deluged  this  floor  with  their  expectorations. 

Major  Munson  saw  me  in  the  fort,  fifteen  minutes 
after  the  officers  were  killed.  He  does  not  recollect, 
that  the  cannonade  then  continued ;  but  I  beg  the 
Court  to  remark,  that  he  speaks  of  a  time,  to  which 


200  BEFENCE  OF 

the  testimony  of  many  of  the  officers  who  have  spoken 
of  my  personal  appearance,  must  refer.  He  says,  he 
saw  nothing  which  might  not  have  been  accounted 
for,  without  resorting  to  the  supposition  of  personal 
fear. 

Captain  Maxwell  did  not  see  me  on  the  sixteenth, 
but  on  the  fifteenth  he  saw  me  in  a  situation,  where 
I  was  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  He  says  that 
I  was  collected  and  cool.  He  informs  you,  why  he 
was  induced  to  notice  my  appearance,  and  his  testi 
mony  is  of  some  importance,  because  it  shews,  that 
as  early  as  the  retreat  from  Canada,  my  officers  had 
begun  to  propagate  imputations  on  my  courage ;  and 
because  his  testimony  must  relate  to  the  same  time, 
when  major  Jessup  says,  he  saw  me  oil  horseback, 
and  observed  such  strong  indications  of  fear.  If,  Sir, 
the  opinions  of  these  two  witnesses  are  in  opposition, 
the  Court  must  determine,  whether  they  will  rely  on 
the  veteran,  who  has  been  twenty-three  times  engaged 
with  the  enemies  of  his  country,  or  the  young  gentle 
man  who,  at  the  time  he  speaks  of,  was  about  twenty- 
five  years  of  age,  and  who  knew  no  more  of  battles, 
than  what  he  had  heard  or  learned  from  books.  The 
testimony  of  judge  Witherell,  who  was  a  revolutionary 
officer,  who  also  saw  me  on  the  evening  of  the  fifteenth, 
is  likewise  in  opposition  to  the  testimony  of  major 
Jessup. 

Captain  Bacon  says,  I  was  much  agitated  on  the 
morning  of  the  sixteenth,  but  that  he  had  no  suspicion 


GENERAL  HULL.  201 

U  was  personal  fear;  neither  did  he  hear  such  a  suspi 
cion  expressed  by  any  of  the  officers. 

The  deposition  of  major  Anderson,  I  have  not  been 
able  to  procure  in  time,  to  submit  to  my  counsel,  pre 
viously  to  my  defence  being  closed.  It  is  very  im 
portant,  not  only  as  it  respects  the  point  now  under 
consideration,  but  the  Court  will  find,  that  there  is 
a  great  variation  between  his  testimony,  and  that  of 
general  Mac  Arthur,  in  relation  to  the  fortification  at 
Sandwich,  but  as  I  would  not  ask  another  postpone 
ment  of  the  Court,  for  the  sake  of  making  any  further 
observations  on  the  testimony  of  major  Anderson,  I 
must  rely  upon  the  Court  to  examine  his  deposition, 
and  to  give  his  testimony  its  due  weight. 

There  are  some  of  the  witnesses  who  have  given 
a  more  naked  opinion,  that  I  was  under  the  influence 
of  personal  fear,  without  assigning  any  reasons  for 
their  opinion,  whose  testimony  I  shall  not  notice.  It 
is  impossible  it  can  have  any  influence  in  the  minds 
of  the  Court. 

Major  Jessup  said,  that  whether  the  agitation  which 
he  described,  proceeded  from  the  novelty  of  my  situ 
ation,  or  fear,  he  could  not  say,  but  he  believed  the 
latter,  if  not  both.  Captain  Baker  said,  he  was  of 
opinion,  that  I  was  under  the  influence  of  fear,  as  he 
could  not  account  for  the  surrender  in  any  other  way. 
This  explanation  of  captain  Baker  may  afford  a  key 
to  much  of  the  testimony  on  this  point,  JHe,  like 


202  DEFENCE  OF 

many  other  of  the  officers,  thought  the  surrender  uir* 
necessary.  They  did  not  concern  themselves  with 
considerations  of  what  might  be  the  consequences  of 
resistance.  They  therefore  saw  no  other  motive  for 
the  step  I  had  taken,  than  my  own  fears.  They 
therefore,  when  questioned  on  this  point,  said,  they 
thought  I  was  under  the  influence  of  personal  fear, 
because  I  surrendered. 

I  beg  the  Court  to  note,  that  colonel  Miller's  an 
swer  to  the  interrogatory  put  to  him  on  this  subject, 
is  to  the  same  effect,  although  he  was  stationed  in  the 
fort,  and  I  had  been  in  his  sight  whenever  I  was  in 
the  fortress,  from  the  commencement  of  the  cannonade, 
till  the  surrender.  He  says,  he  saw  no  conduct  of 
mine,  which  might  not  have  proceeded  from  fatigue, 
and  the  responsibility  of  my  situation,  and  that  he 
could  mention  no  act  of  mine,  which  he  did  then,  or 
does  now,  impute  to  personal  fear,  but  the  surrender ; 
and  yet  colonel  Miller  had  better  opportunities  of  ob 
serving  me,  than  any  other  witness.  He  was  an  older, 
and  a  more  experienced  soldier,  than  any  who  have 
given  their  testimony ;  many  of  whom  heard  the  re 
port  of  an  enemy's  gun  for  the  first,  at  the  time  to 
which  their  testimony  relates. 

If,  Gentlemen,  your  decision  upon  this  point  could 
rest  upon  the  weight  of  the  opinions  given  by  the 
witnesses  called  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  the  prepon 
derance  would  be  in  my  favour.  The  opinions  of 
colonel  Miller,  he  having  been  placed  in  a  situation 


GENERAL  HULL.  203 

ivliich  gave  him  such  superiour  advantages  for  con 
tinual  deliberate  observation,  must  deserve  more  re 
spect,  than  the  testimony  of  all  the  inexperienced  and 
young  men,  who  only  saw  me  occasionally,  on  the 
morning  of  the  sixteenth,  and  who  have  attempted  to 
support  this  charge  by  their  opinions. 

So  far  as  any  of  the  witnesses  have  founded  their 
opinion,  that  I  was  under  the  influence  of  personal 
fear,  from  the  act  of  surrender,  as  is  the  case  with 
colonel  Miller,  and  captain  Baker,  and  others,  their 
testimony  can  have  no  weight.  The  Court  have  the 
same  opportunity  of  drawing  a  conclusion  from  that 
fact,  that  they  had.  I  have  endeavoured  to  satisfy 
the  Court,  that  that  act  was  justifiable,  or  at  least, 
that  I  had  strong  reasons  for  thinking  it  so,  and  if  this 
were  the  case,  it  cannot  be  made  the  ground  of  con 
demnation,  because  witnesses  may  have  made  it  the 
foundation  of  their  opinion  of  my  want  of  courage. 

But,  Gentlemen,  there  is  no  example  of  the  opinion 
of  witnesses  on  this  subject,  ever  having  been  re 
ceived  as  evidence  on  which  to  ground  a  conviction. 
^Expressions  of  the  human  countenance,  and  the  man 
ners  of  men,  are  but  fallible  indications  of  the  work 
ings  of  the  human  mind.  The  difference  in  appear 
ances,  produced  by  the  excitements  of  different  pas 
sions,  are  too  subtle,  to  admit  of  observations,  from 
which  any  certain  conclusions  may  be  drawn — much 
depends  upon  constitution,  and  often  much  upon  the 
temporary  physical  condition  of  the  body. 


204  DEFENCE  OF 

A  man,  worn  with  fatigue  of  body  or  mind,  and 
pressed  with  a  thousand  dreadful  anxieties,  may, 
though  on  the  point  of  inevitable  destruction,  forget 
his  own  fate,  and  be  moved  only  by  the  condition  of 
those  around  him,  while  the  superficial  observer 
would  impute  his  agitation  to  the  dread  cf  death.  The 
uneducated  spectator,  who  has  not  been  taught,  as 
major  Snelling  has  been,  the  indications  of  the  human 
passions,  would  most  probably  see,  in  the  countenance 
and  manner  of  the  Laocoon,  only  expressions  of  terror 
and  bodily  pain ;  and  would  not  understand,  that  the 
artist  has  expressed,  in  the  countenance  and  convul 
sive  agitation  of  a  dying  father,  agony  of  mind  ex 
cited  by  the  torture  of  his  expiring  children. 

There  never  has  been,  and  in  justice,  never  can 
be  a  conviction,  under  this  charge  of  cowardice,  but 
where  a  want  of  courage  is  indicated,  by  the  omission, 
or  commission  of  some  act  in  violation  of  the  duty  of 
the  person,  against  whom  the  charge  is  made. 

I  shall  conclude  my  observations  upon  that  part  of 
the  evidence,  which  relates  to  my  personal  appear 
ance,  with  some  extracts  from  an  English  historian, 
who  gives  an  account  of  the  trial  of  Lord  George 
Sackville,  who  was  tried  for  misconduct  at  the  battle 
of  Minden.  Dr.  Smollet  having  stated,  that  some 
testimony  was  given  to  prove,  that  when  certain  or- 
d,ers  were  delivered  to  Lord  George,  he  was  alarmed 
in  a  very  great  degree,  and  seemed  in  the  utmost 
confusion ;  subjoins  remarks,  from  which  the  follow- 


GENERAL  HULL.  205 

hig  are  extracts :  "  The  candid  reader  will  of  himself 
"  determine,  whether  a  man's  heart  is  to  be  judged 
"  by  any  change  of  his  complexion.  Granting  such  a 
"  change  to  have  happened,  whether  it  was  likely, 
"  that  an  officer,  who  had  been  more  than  once  in 
"  actual  service,  and  behaved  without  reproach,  so  as 
u  to  attain  an  eminent  rank  in  the  army,  should  ex- 
"  hibit  symptoms  of  fear  or  confusion,  when  in  reality 
-'there  was  no  appearance  of  danger. 

**  With  respect  to  the  imputation  of  cowardice  le- 
"'•  veiled  at  Lord  George,  by  the  unthinking  multitude, 
u  and  circulated  with  such  industry  and  clamour,  we 
"  ought  to  consider  it  as  a  mob  accusation,  which  the 
"  bravest  of  men,  even  the  great  Duke  of  Marlborough 
"  could  not  escape.  We  ought  to  view  it  as  a  dan- 
"  gerous  suspicion,  which  strikes  at  the  root  of  cha- 
•'racter,  and  may  blast  tbat  honour  in  a  moment, 
"  which  the  soldier  has  acquired,  in  a  long  course  of 
"  painful  services,  and  at  the  continual  hazard  of  his 
"  life.  We  ought  to  distrust  it  as  a  malignant  charge, 
"  altogether  inconsistent  with  the  former  conduct  of 
"  the  person  accused." 

The  testimony  of  some  of  the  witnesses  appears  to 
have  been  intended  to  prove,  that  I  manifested  a 
want  of  courage,  by  certain  acts  during  the  cannon 
ade,  as  well  on  the  fifteenth  as  on  the  sixteenth. 
These  are,  that  on  the  fifteenth,  I  dismounted  and 
went  towards  the  fort,  when  a  shot  struck  a  house 
19 


206  DEFENCE  OF 

near  me ;  that  I  avoided  a  shell  which  appeared  to 
be  coming  into  the  fort ;  and  that  I  remained  in  the 
fort  in  a  place  of  security,  during  the  cannonade. 

It  does  appear  to"  me,  Gentlemen,  that  if  all  these 
facts  were  exactly  as  the  witnesses  would  wish  them 
to  appear,  they  would  not  support  any  charge. 

If  I  found  myself  unnecessarily  exposed  to  the  shot 
of  the  enemy  by  being  on  horseback,  was  it  not  my 
duty  to  dismount  ?  Is  it  to  be  considered  a  dereliction 
of  duty  in  an  officer,  to  avoid  the  explosion  of  a  shell  ? 
Or  is  it  unjustifiable  in  a  commander,  when  in  a  for 
tress  that  is  bombarded,  to  put  himself  in  a  place  of 
security,  provided  he  be  in  such  situation,  as  that  he 
may  give  his  orders,  and  perform  the  necessary  duty 
of  his  station  ?  Judging  from  what  I  have  seen  of  ser 
vice,  with  the  bravest  men  our  country  ever  pro 
duced,  I  may  venture  to  say,  that  the  Court  would 
answer  these  questions  in  the  negative.  But  yet  I 
must  ask  the  patience  of  the  Court  while  I  give  the 
testimony  which  has  been  offered  on  one  of  these 
points,  (that  is  to  say,)  my  remaining  in  the  fort,  and 
my  situation  there,  a  slight  examination.  The  others 
I  do  not  think  worthy  my  attention. 

Major  Snelling  went  into  the  fort  when  he  returned 
on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth  from  Spring  Wells, 
He  was  roused  from  a  repose,  after  having  been  at  a 
post  all  night,  by  the  commencement  of  the  cannon 
ade.  He  remained  there  till  after  the  flag  went  out, 


GENERAL  HULL.  207 

when  he  was  sent  with  orders  to  colonel  Findlay's 
regiment.  He  appears  to  have  returned  to  the  fort 
again,  about  the  time  that  the  British  officers  went 
into  captain  Dyson's  quarters.  In  short,  major  Snell 
ing  was  in  the  fort,  according  to  his  account,  during 
the  whole  time  of  the  cannonade  on  the  sixteenth, 
and  until  the  British  troops  marched  in,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  a  very  short  interval  between  the  sending 
of  the  flag  and  the  final  surrender.  Now,  during  the 
time  of  the  cannonade,  major  Snelling  saw  me  stand 
ing  but  once.  His  memory  is  so  extremely  tenacious 
of  the  minutest  circumstances,  even  of  a  frivolous 
nature,  that  he  will  only  admit  as  a  possibility,  that  I 
may  have  risen  twice.  The  words  of  major  Snelling 
are, 

"  During  the  cannonade,  I  frequently  saw  the  Ge- 
"  neral.  I  once  saw  him  standing ;  he  might  have 
"  risen  twice ;  most  of  the  time  he  was  sitting  on  an 
"  old  tent,  under  the  curtain  of  the  fort,  opposite  the 
"  enemy's  batteries." 

Whether  I  was  sitting  or  standing  in  the  situation 
which  major  Snelling  describes,  is  immaterial.  I 
should  have  been  equally  safe  in  either  position.  It 
is,  therefore,  extraordinary  that  so  unimportant  a  cir 
cumstance  should  have  made  such  a  lasting  impres 
sion  on  his  mind. 

The  testimony,  however,  of  the  other  witnesses 
called  by  the  Judge  Advocate  does  not  appear  to  cor 
respond  with  the  recollection  of  major  Snelling. 


208  DEFENCE  OF 

General  Taylor's  testimony  is  certainly  worthy  ©f 
remark.  It  appears,  that  though  major  Snelling 
thought,  that  my  taking  a  position  under  cover  of  the 
parapet  of  the  fort  during  the  cannonade  was  evidence 
of  cowardice,  yet  major  Snelling  himself.,  it  seems, 
thought  he  was  at  liberty  to  avail  himself  of  the  very 
same  protection.  General  Taylor  says,  he  saw  ma 
jor  Snelling,  as  well  as  many  other  of  the  officers,  in 
the  same  situation  that  I  generally  occupied,  during 
the  firing,  when  I  was  in  the  fort. 

Captain  Baker  says,  "  on  the  morning  of  the  six- 
"  teenth,  during  the  cannonade,  I  saw  the  General  in 
"  the,  fort,  sometimes  sitting,  sometimes  walking,  and 
"  sometimes  standing."  Colonel  Miller  also  states, 
that  I  was  sometimes  sitting,  sometimes  standing,  and 
sometimes  walking. 

Indeed,  there  could  have  been  no  reason  for  my 
remaining  precisely  in  one  situation  during  the  can 
nonade,  if  I  had  been  actuated  by  an  undue  regard 
to  personal  safety.  For  it  appears,  that  the  whole 
eastern  side  of  the  fort  was  as  secure  in  one  part  as 
another.  If  there  were  any  reasons  for  giving  prefer 
ence  to  the  spot  where  the  witnesses  say  I  was  sit 
ting,  it  is,  that  it  was  near  the  gate,  a  situation  where 
I  could  easily  be  found,  and  where  it  was  most  con 
venient,  as  colonel  Miller  has  testified,  to  receive  re 
ports,  and  to  give  my  orders. 

From  this  post,  I  had  the  whole  interiour  of  the 
fort  under  my  view3  and  could  communicate  my  or- 


GENERAL  HULL.  209 

tiers  to  any  part.  Was  I  not  then  in  a  proper  situa 
tion  for  a  commander  ?  The  Court  will  recollect, 
that  colonel  Miller  states,  that  he  himself  was  some 
times  with  me,  while  I  was  in  the  place  the  witnesses 
have  described.  And  the  fact  is,  that  every  officer 
in  the  fort  placed  himself  under  the  protection  of  the 
eastern  parapet,  when  his  duty  did  not  require  that  he 
should  be  in  a  more  exposed  situation. 

But  it  has  been  attempted  to  prove,  that  I  remained 
in  the  fort,  and  took  no  measures,  and  issued  no  or 
ders  for  a  disposition  of  the  troops,  after  the  cannon 
ade  commenced. 

Major  Jessup  states,  that  shortly  after  the  answer 
had  been  returned  to  the  British  summons  on  the  fif 
teenth,  he  met  me  on  horseback,  and  that  I  then  gave 
him  directions  for  the  disposition  which  was  to  be 
made  of  the  troops,  for  the  defence  of  the  town.  It 
is  also  proved  by  the  testimony  of  major  Jessup,  that 
in  the  evening  of  the  fifteenth,  I  was  on  horseback, 
visiting  the  batteries  while  the  cannonade  continued. 

Major  Munson  met  me  on  the  same  evening  on 
horseback,  when  I  was  visiting  the  posts.  Major 
Jessup  said,  he  met  me  on  the  night  of  the  fifteenth, 
at  about  midnight,  at  the  position  which  colonel  Find- 
lay's  corps  had  taken  up  for  that  night.  I  was  also, 
as  he  testifies,  at  his  quarters  about  day  break  on  the 
morning  of  the  sixteenth,  while  he  was  writing  by 
candle  light,  and  gave  him  directions  to  despatch  an 


210  DEFENCE  OF 

order  for  colonels  Mac  Arthur  and  Cass.  And  cap 
tain  Mac  Commick  testifies,  that  he  saw  me  on  horse 
back  at  the  time  on  which  the  troops  were  formed,  a 
short  time  before  the  firing  ceased.  Several  other 
witnesses  prove,  that  they  saw  me  out  of  the  fort  at 
several  times,  as  well  on  the  fifteenth,  as  the  sixteenth. 
What  foundation  is  there,  therefore,  for  the  charge, 
that  during  the  whole  time  of  the  cannonade  I  took 
shelter  in  the  fort  ? 

Major  Snelling's  testimony  is  so  important,  as  to 
my  personal  appearance,  that  I  cannot  but  direct  the 
attention  of  the  Court  to  any  circumstance  in  his  tes 
timony  on  any  other  point,  which  I  think  may  de 
velop  the  spirit  or  disposition  with  which  he  has 
testified.  With  this  view,  I  beg  the  Court  to  notice, 
that  major  Snelling  has  testified,  that  when  he  re 
turned  from  the  Spring  Wells,  on  the  morning  of  the 
sixteenth,  at  dawn  of  day,  he  went  into  the  fort  to 
make  his  report  to  me.  "  But,"  says  the  major,  "  I 
a  could  not  find  the  General,  nor  find  any  one  who 
"  knew  where  he  was."  It  has  been  proved  by  other 
witnesses,  that  I  was  out  of  the  fort  at  that  time. 
Now,  when  major  Snelling  could  not  find  me  in  the 
fort,  nor  find  any  body  that  knew  I  was  there,  it 
seems  to  me,  he  might  have  ventured  to  say,  I  was 
not  in  the  fort  at  that  time.  I  do  think,  he  had  at 
least  as  good  grounds  to  draw  that  conclusion,  as  he 
had  to  infer,  that  I  wras  under  personal  fear,  from  the 
appearances  he  observed.  Major  Snelling  does,  in  a 
subsequent  part  of  his  examination,  say,  that  I  was 


GENERAL  HULL.  211 

out  of  the  fort  early  that  morning.  But  whether  this 
refers  to  the  time  when  he  made  his  report  or  not,  I 
do  not  know. 

•* 

I  have  now,  Gentlemen,  done  with  this  charge,  so 
far  as  it  respects  my  personal  appearance  and  deport 
ment.  You,  who  I  am  to  presume,  and  do  believe 
are  brave  and  honourable  men,  will  judge  of  what  I 
must  have  suffered,  to  have  sat  here  day  after  day, 
listening  to  imputations,  of  all  others  the  most  wound 
ing  to  the  feelings  of  a  soldier ;  to  have  these  impu 
tations  cast  upon  me,  by  representations  intended  to 
make  me  appear  abjectly  and  disgustingly  base;  to 
be  obliged  to  hear  my  name  and  fame  polluted  by  the 
testimony  which  has  been  given ;  to  be  obliged  to 
repeat  the  language  of  the  witnesses  in  my  defence, 
are  in  themselves  punishments  hardly  inferiour  to  that, 
which  would  be  the  consequence  of  your  pronounc 
ing  me  guilty.  But,  Gentlemen,  of  that,  upon  this 
charge  of  cowardice,  I  am  bold  to  say  I  have  no 
dread. 

I  h^ve  fought  more  battles,  than  many  of  the  young 
men  who  have  impeached  me  of  this  crime,  have 
numbered  years. 

I  appeal  to  the  history  that  bears  record  of  those 
who  were  engaged  in  the  bloody  contests  for  our 
liberties.  There  you  shall  often  find  my  name,  but 
not  as  a  coward  ! 


212  DEFENCE  OP 

I  have  brought  before  you  the  testimony  of  the  few 
who  remain  of  those,  who  were  my  companions  in 
arms,  in  times  that  tried  men's  souls.  Do  they  say 
I  am  a  coward  ? 

I  invoke  the  spirits  of  the  departed  heroes,  who 
have  died  at  my  side  by  the  sword  of  the  enemy,  to 
say  if  I  am  a  coward ! 

I  would  call  the  shades  of  Gates,  Wayne,  Schuyler, 
and  of  Washington,  to  tell  you  how  often  they  have 
led  me  to  battle,  and  to  say  if  they  found  me  a  coward. 

Will  you  believe,  that  the  spirit,  which  has  so 
often  prompted  me  to  risk  my  life  for  my  country, 
should  now  so  far  have  forsaken  me,  as  that  I  should 
have  become  a  traitor  and  a  coward  ? 

Will  you  believe,  that  the  years  in  which  I  have 
grown  gray  in  my  country's  service,  should  so  far 
have  changed  my  nature,  as  that  I  could  have  been 
the  base  and  abject  thing  my  enemies  have  repre 
sented  ? 

No,  Gentlemen,  that  blood  which  animated  my 
youth,  age  has  not  chilled.  I  at  this  moment  feel  its 
influence,  and  it  makes  me  dare  to  say,  that  no  man 
ever  did,  or  can  think  me  a  coward. 

Before  I  conclude,  permit  me  to  say  a  few  words. 
It  may  be  thought,  that  I  have  spoken  of  the  officers 


GENERAL  HULL.  213 

who  have  been  witnesses  against  me,  with  too  much 
asperity.  They  have,  in  my  opinion,  forfeited  all 
claims  to  my  respect ;  but  I  do  not  mean  to  charge 
any  of  them  with  wilful  perjury.  I  believe  they  have 
imbibed  a  prejudice  and  bias  against  me,  which  has 
influenced  the  perceptions  of  their  own  minds. 

My  object,  by  the  examination  I  have  given  their 
testimony,  has  been  to  make  that  bias  and  prejudice 
appear  to  you.  Many  of  them  are  young  men,  who 
give  their  country  great  promise.  Many  of  them,  I 
believe,  have  good  hearts;  and  such  I  know  will  one 
day  regret,  that  they  should  have  yielded  to  an  in 
fluence,  which  has  induced  them  to  represent  me  in 
colours  that  they  will  be  conscious  I  have  not  de 
served.  I  know  the  time  will  come,  when  they  will 
consider  how  they  courted  my  favour  when  I  was  in 
power,  and  how  they  treated  me  when  they  thought 
I  was  in  disgrace,  and  saw  me  in  adversity. 

When  that  time  comes,  as  come  I  am  sure  it  will, 
let  it  be  a  consolation  to  them  to  know,  that  what 
ever  may  be  my  fate,  I  pity  and  from  my  heart  for 
give  them. 

I  have  now,  Gentlemen,  concluded  my  defence. 
I  have  noticed  every  accusation  which  the  Judge 
Advocate,  in  the  opening  of  the  cause,  mentioned  as 
those  which  he  should  rely  upon,  and  which  he  ex 
pected  to  maintain. 


214  DEFENCE  OP 

I  have  not  left,  as  I  believe,  any  part  of  the  speci 
fications  to  which  any  testimony  whatever  was  offer 
ed,  unanswered. 

Allow  me,  Mr.  President,  and  Gentlemen  of  the 
Court,  with  the  most  heartfelt  sensibility  to  return 
you  my  sincere  thanks,  for  the  manner  in  which  this* 
trial  has  been  conducted.  For  though,  as  I  humbly 
conceive,  there  has  been  some  departure  from  accus 
tomed  forms,  in  respect  to  the  examination  of  wit 
nesses,  I  knowv  that  the  Court  has  been  governed  by 
nothing  but  its  own  sense  of  propriety. 

?••*  4 

The  conduct  of  the  members  of  this  Court,  and  of 
the  Judge  Advocates,  has  been  such  as  I  had  antici 
pated;  and  every  thing  that  I  could  expect  from 
honourable,  impartial,  and  humane  men. 

Whatever  may  be  the  sentence,  I  shall  always 
with  gratitude  acknowledge  that  I  have  had  a  fair, 
candid,  and  patient  hearing.  I  do  feel  myself  bound 
to  make  particular  acknowledgments  to  the  special 
Judge  Advocate,  for  the  delicacy  and  propriety  of 
his  deportment  towards  me,  and  though  I  may  feel 
the  force  of  the  talents  with  which  he  has  conducted 
this  prosecution,  it  shall  not  make  me  forget  what  I 
owe  to  his  humanity  and  liberality. 

Gentlemen,  my  life  is  in  your  hands.  But  you  are 
guardians  of  what  is  more  dear  to  me ;  you  are  the 
guardians  of  my  honour !  with  you  in  sacred  deposite 


GENERAL  HULL.  215 

is  that  sword,  which  has  been  my  companion  in  times 
that  might  have  appalled  the  weak  hearted.  It 
has  been  taken  from  me,  till  you  shall  pronounce 
that  I  am  not  unworthy  to  wear  it.  I  feel,  that  in 
justice,  I  may  demand  it  of  you.  And  when  I  shall 
receive  it  at  your  hands,  believe  me,  that  here  is  yet 
enough  of  heart  and  life,  and  in  this  arm  is  yet  nerve 
enough,  to  draw  it  in  vindication  of  my  country's 
rights.  If  I  should  receive  it,  untarnished  by  your 
judgment,  I  may  yet  live,  to  prove  by  my  future,  as 
well  as  by  my  past  conduct,  how  I  have  been  calum 
niated,  and  the  justice  of  your  sentence. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

RENEWALS  ONLY— TEL.  NO.  642-3405 
This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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